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VOL. III.

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OF

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I.

THE Viscount de Turenne was born at Sedan, in 1611. His father, the sovereign prince of Sedan, left him in infancy under the guardianship of his mother, sister to the Prince of Orange; the Duke of Bouillon, one of the principal leaders

of the *Fronde*, was his eldest brother. Turenne made his first campaign in the Dutch army, under the Prince of Orange, his uncle; he was a volunteer, and carried a musquet. In 1626 he was made a captain, and served in that rank in four campaigns against Spinola. He distinguished himself at the siege of Bois-le-Duc, in 1629.

In 1630, his mother sent him to Paris; he entered the French service in the capacity of a colonel of infantry, and signalized himself at the siege of Lamotte in Lorraine. Cardinal de Richelieu appointed him a *maréchal-de-camp*;* he was only twenty-three years of age. He served in this rank in the campaign of Germany, under Cardinal de la Valette, in 1636; and gave proofs of talent in the retreat of the Palatinate. The following year he besieged and took Saverne. In 1637 he served in Flanders, attacked and took the Castle of Solre-sur-Sambre, by which exploit he obtained the rank of lieutenant-general.

In this capacity he served at the siege of

---

* The person invested with this rank was a general officer, and ranked next to a lieutenant-general. It was his duty to see the army properly disposed of in camp or quarters; to be present at all the movements that were made; to be the first to mount his charger, and the last to quit him. He commanded the left in all attacks. The appointment, under this distinction, was first created by Henry IV. in 1598.—*Tr.*

Brisach, under the command of the Duke of Weimar; this siege lasted eight months, during which three battles and three minor engagements were fought with the Austrian army and that of the Duke of Lorraine: Turenne distinguished himself at this siege. In 1639, Cardinal Richelieu sent him into Piedmont, where he served under Count d'Harcourt; commanded at the action of the *Route-de-Quiers*, and was wounded at the siege of Turin in 1640. That siege afforded an extraordinary spectacle: the citadel occupied by the French was besieged by Prince Thomas of Savoy, who was master of the city, but was himself besieged by the French army, whilst the latter was besieged in its lines of countervallation by the Spanish army commanded by the Marquis de Leganes. On the 2d of July, Prince Thomas capitulated, and the French entered the town. In 1643, Turenne besieged and took Trino on the Po. The regent, Anne of Austria, sent him on this occasion the baton of a marshal of France. He was then thirty-two years of age, had been four years captain, four years colonel, three years *maréchal-de-camp*, and five years lieutenant-general. He had served under four generals: the Prince of Orange, his uncle, to whom he acknowledged himself indebted for *his precepts for the proper choice of a camp, and the best mode of attacking a fortress;*

the Duke of Weimar, of whom he said, *that he made every thing out of nothing;* the Cardinal de la Vallette, of whom he had learnt *to despise the artificial delicacies of courts and of gallantry, and to adopt in preference the manners of camps;* and lastly, the Duke of Harcourt, from whom he learned *that diligence and activity are the grand causes of success in military affairs.*

II.

Marshal Guébriant commanded the Weimar troops after the death of the Duke of Weimar. He besieged and took Rothwerl in Swabia, but was killed there. M. de Rantzau, who succeeded him in the command of that army, marched on Tuttlingen, and was defeated and taken prisoner there. All the German infantry in the French service dispersed themselves, and the cavalry retreated on the Rhine. Cardinal Mazarin confided the command on that frontier to Turenne, and charged him to re-organize the Army of Weimar. He reached Colmar in 1643. Alsace was devastated: he therefore fixed his cantonments in Lorraine behind the Vosges, taking possession of the small fortresses of Vesoul and Luxeuil, and succeeded in re-establishing the Army of Weimar in the course of the winter. In the spring of 1644, it consisted of 9000 men under arms, 5000 of whom were cavalry. He

then marched on the Rhine, and occupied Vieux Brisach and Freyburg, where he placed a garrison of 600 men. Being informed that Baron de Merci was, with 2000 men, at the source of the Danube, he passed the Black Mountains, and defeated him, taking 400 men. The Baron retired into the camp of his brother, Count Merci. After this exploit, Turenne returned to the left bank of the Rhine. Merci laid siege to Freyburg, at the head of 15,000 men. Turenne passed the Rhine at Vieux Brisach, with 10,000 men and twenty pieces of cannon, to succour this important place. Although Merci had invested it eight days before, he had not formed any lines. The Viscount ordered a brigade to march to occupy the summit of the Black Mountain; but a grand guard of twenty Bavarian grenadiers, having perceived this movement, climbed to the top, and overawed the French brigade, which abandoned the attack in disorder. This disgraceful occurrence, and the skilful dispositions made by Merci, prevented the succouring of the place. The town capitulated on the 18th of July, in the presence of the Marshal, who was encamped at the distance of a league and a half.

III.

The Court sent the Prince of Condé with a reinforcement of 10,000 men, called the Army of France, half of which number were cavalry. This army was commanded by the Marshal de Grammont. He passed the Rhine at Vieux Brisach, joined Turenne's camp, and took the command of the two armies, which amounted to 20,000 men. The Count de Merci occupied a strong intrenched position on the heights before Freyburg: Condé, whom nothing could stop, attacked him in front, on the 3d of August at five o'clock in the afternoon, with the Army of France; whilst Turenne, who had commenced his march through the valley at day-break, debouched by a ravine on the enemy's flank. The action was warmly maintained at every point; the enemy's positions were strong and well defended; the Prince of Condé dismounted, and was the first man that rushed into the intrenchments; at night he was master of the heights, where he fixed his bivouacs. Turenne kept up the action throughout the night; at day-break the two armies joined in the plain. Merci had effected his retreat, and taken up a new position; with his right, supported on Freyburg, composed of cavalry, (the ground being a plain,) and his left resting on the Black Mountain. On the 4th

the French troops rested; the Bavarian general employed this day in intrenching his position. On the 5th the two French generals reconnoitred the enemy's position. Espenau, who commanded Condé's infantry, began the action without orders; the result was unfortunate; the French army and that of Weimar were repulsed with loss. The Prince then changed the plan of attack, and went into the plain to attack the enemy's right. The Bavarian cavalry dismounted and fought like the most valiant infantry; they repulsed every attack made by the French, who lost 3000 men. The armies remained opposite each other until the 9th, when the Prince of Condé resolved to manœuvre. He advanced on Langendenzlingen and the Val de Closterthal, threatening to cut off the Val de Saint-Pierre. As soon as Merci perceived this, he raised his camp, and removed beyond the Black Mountains in the country of Wurtemberg. The losses of the two armies were equally considerable; the Bavarians lost 8000 men, and the Army of France and Weimar 9000, almost half their number.

The Bavarian army was disabled to attempt any new enterprise for the present; the Prince of Condé, without considering the bad condition of his army, proceeded to the Lower Rhine, neglecting Freyburg, invested Philipsburg, and had a besieging-train brought down from Brisach. The

city of Strasburg allowed him a passage. In four days he formed his lines of circumvallation round Philipsburg; he constructed a bridge, and, during this siege, got possession of Germersheim and Spire. The trenches were opened by two attacks, one commanded by Turenne, and the other by Marshal Grammont. Philipsburg capitulated on the 12th of September. The Prince of Condé, menaced by a fresh army, with which Count Merci was advancing, repassed the Rhine, retaining possession of Philipsburg by means of a good garrison. He had Landau, Worms, Mentz, and Oppenheim taken, and all the country between the Rhine and Moselle occupied by Turenne; after which he returned into France, with the Duke of Grammont's army, leaving Turenne on the Rhine, reinforced with a few regiments. On receiving information of these transactions, Merci marched on Manheim, and took that place, threatening to cross the Rhine. The Duke of Lorraine passed the Moselle and entered the Hundsdruck, making a show of joining the Bavarian army. Turenne manœuvred to oppose this junction, which he succeeded in preventing, and gained possession of Kreutzach. Both armies went into winter-quarters.

IV.

Observation I.—The Marshal should have encamped under Freyburg, which would have hindered Merci from besieging that place. With so considerable an army, although inferior to that of Merci, he might have done more than he did to defend Freyburg. He should at least have taken a position to intercept the enemy's convoys.

Observation II.—The Prince of Condé infringed one of the maxims of mountain warfare: *never to attack troops which occupy good positions in the mountains, but to dislodge them by occupying camps on their flanks or in their rear.* Had he taken up a position commanding the Val de Saint-Pierre, Merci would have been immediately compelled to take the offensive side, which he could not do with an inferior army; besides, that would have been returning to the principles of mountain warfare. He would, therefore, have been obliged to pass the Black Mountains to regain Wurtemburg, and to abandon the fortress of Freyburg, which would have been left to itself. The French army succeeded, on the first day, in forcing the first positions by unparalleled efforts of courage; but it failed on the next day but one, because, amongst mountains, when one position is lost, another of equal strength is im-

mediately found, to stop the enemy. As the Prince of Condé meant to attack, he should have attacked on the 4th, in the hope that Merci would not have had time enough to secure his new position.

Observation III.—Turenne's conduct, after the departure of the Prince of Condé, was skilful; he was, indeed, wonderfully seconded by local circumstances. The armies of Bavaria and Lorraine were separated by the Rhine and by mountains, and their junction was a difficult operation.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN OF 1645.

I. Turenne's operations in March, April, and May; Battle of Marienthal (Mergentheim), May 2.—II. Battle of Nordlingen (August 4.)—III. Marches after the battle of Nordlingen, during the Autumn.—IV. Observations.

I.

TURENNE wintered at Spire; in the spring his army amounted to 12,000 men, of whom 5000 were cavalry, with fifteen pieces of cannon. The Count de Merci's force was weakened by his having sent a detachment of 4000 men into Bavaria. Turenne profited by this circumstance to pass the Rhine; he entered Stuttgard, passed the Necker, advanced on the Tauber, seized on Rothemburg, and took up his quarters at Mergentheim, a little town situate on the left bank of that river. The Bavarian army made no stand against him; he was soon master of all Franconia. His light horse levied contributions under the walls of Wurtzburg and Nuremberg. Merci's army was two

marches off; Turenne thought proper to place his troops in quarters of refreshment, but, having conceived some apprehensions, he contracted his quarters to three leagues round Mergentheim. On the 2d of May, at day-break, he was informed that Merci was advancing upon him with all his forces. He immediately despatched the Swedish general Rosen from head-quarters to Erbsthausen, which place he had appointed as a rendezvous for the troops in quarters. This village is situate two leagues from Mergentheim on the Fruchtwang road, by which the enemy was advancing. He went in person to the place of assemblage, and there found 3000 of his infantry already in junction, and part of his cavalry. At the same instant he perceived the Bavarian army debouching upon him from a wood at the distance of a quarter of a league. He had only just time enough to draw up his little army in line of battle; he caused his infantry, which he placed in a single line, to occupy a wood on his right. He placed himself at the head of his left, formed of his cavalry, likewise on one line. Merci deployed his troops, placed his infantry in the centre, confided his left to John de Wert, commanded his right himself, formed of cavalry, like the left of the French, and covered the wood which the French infantry occupied and which prevented

the cavalry of the left from advancing. Merci placed himself at the head of the infantry of his centre, and attacked this wood. Turenne conceived all the importance of this movement; he advanced, charged the cavalry of the Bavarian right, broke them, took their cannon and twelve standards; but his infantry, alarmed at the great number of battalions which were marching against them gave way almost without resistance. John de Wert's cavalry then crossed the wood, and took the French cavalry in flank, which thereupon dispersed. It was with difficulty that Turenne himself escaped; but after having crossed a wood which was in the rear of his line of battle, he fortunately met with some of his squadrons which had just arrived. He rallied his little army on this reserve, and made a stand; he ordered his infantry to retreat on Philipsburg, and directed his own march on Hesse with all the cavalry he could muster. At this battle of Marienthal or Mergentheim, he lost 1500 cavalry, five-sixths of his infantry, and all his cannon.

On his arrival in Hesse, the Landgravine, to cover her own states, reinforced him with her army, which she placed under his command. A few days after, Count Konigsmark joined him with the Swedish army. Thus, eight days after

his defeat, Turenne found himself at the head of a new army of 15,000 men, and was in a condition to drive Merci into Franconia, when he received orders from the Court not to attempt any thing. The Prince of Condé was on his march with 8000 men to take the command of the army.

II.

The Prince arrived at Spire on the Rhine; Turenne repassed the Rhine, and joined him in that town on the 2d of July. On the other hand, Merci had been reinforced by an Austrian division commanded by General Glein. But the French army was still much the stronger of the two. The Prince of Condé passed the Necker, and took possession of Heilbron and Wimpfen. Merci retreated precipitately into Franconia. After the passage of the Necker, the Swedish general, conceiving himself aggrieved by the haughtiness of the Prince, left the army with his troops. This disappointment did not stop him; he passed the Tauber, and marched on Nordlingen. On the 2d of August, although the two armies marched side by side for several hours during the night within cannon-shot, they did not perceive each other; but at sunrise they discovered their vicinity, and cannonaded each other all day without coming to close quarters. In the

night of the 3d the Prince of Condé commenced his march for the purpose of advancing on Nordlingen, a fortified place guarded by the burghers. He found that Merci had anticipated him by a skilful march, and that he occupied a strong position in the rear of that town, protecting it and covering Donawerth. He perceived that the enemy's right, composed of Austrians, occupied the Weimberg, and rested on the Warnitz; that his centre, which was his main body, was a hundred toises behind Allerheim, which place he occupied, and the church-tower and cemetery of which he had fortified; that his left, commanded by John de Wert, occupied the hill and castle of Allerheim, and rested on the Eger, a rivulet inclosed between steep banks; and that Merci, although only just arrived, was beginning to intrench himself, according to custom. The Prince formed his army in line, with the left, formed by sixteen squadrons and six battalions of Hessians, commanded by Turenne; his centre facing Allerheim, under the Count de Marsin; and his right, composed of ten squadrons and four battalions, under Marshal Grammont, resting on the Eger, and having as a second line, a reserve of six squadrons and four battalions, under the command of the Chevalier de Chabot. His army consisted of 17,000 men; the Bavarian army of 14,000; the number of pieces of artillery was nearly equal

on both sides. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Condé, notwithstanding the goodness of the position occupied by the enemy, ordered Count Marsin, with the infantry, to proceed to the village of Allerheim. The Bavarian infantry there sustained a terrible conflict; the whole of the Prince of Condé's infantry was successively engaged. He did not succeed; in vain he rushed into the thickest of the conflict, his coat was riddled with bullets; the Count de Marsin was severely wounded; the whole of the French infantry was killed, wounded, or dispersed; but Merci was mortally wounded by a musquet shot. John de Wert, who commanded the left, found himself opposed to the Duke of Grammont: the French cavalry did not behave well; it was broken; the Marshal was taken prisoner. The Chevalier de Chabot's reserve was equally unable to make a stand; John de Wert overthrew it; several of his squadrons entered the encampment of the baggage, and spread confusion round them; the battle appeared irretrievably lost. The Prince, in despair, having now neither centre nor right, proceeded to his left, where was Turenne. They both marched on the right wing of the enemy, where the Austrian general Glein commanded, broke the line, took that general prisoner, and carried the battery of Weimburg, and the whole position.

Turenne, by a change of front, approached with his left before the battery of the centre, and his right then reached Allerheim, which was still occupied in force by the Bavarian infantry. John de Wert, being informed of what was passing, retrograded in order to stop Turenne, but he committed the error of retrograding by his former ground and taking up his first position again, then changed his front, the right to the rear, and marched against Turenne. Victory still inclined to the Bavarians; but at night, the infantry occupying the village of Allerheim, having learnt the death of their General-in-chief the Count de Merci, supposing themselves surrounded by Turenne, and being ignorant of the position which John de Wert had retaken, had the weakness to capitulate. This unexpected resolution gave the French the victory. The vanquished now found themselves conquerors. John de Wert, the only general the enemy's army now had, seeing that his left and centre had disappeared, effected his retreat on Donawerth, where he passed the Danube, abandoning all his artillery except four pieces of cannon. Turenne followed him as far as the river. A few days after, General Glein was exchanged for Marshal Grammont. The day after the battle Nordlingen capitulated. The army took eight days rest to repair its losses.

III.

The Prince having fallen ill, left the army and went to Philipsburg. Turenne and Grammont commanded, and led the forces into Swabia, to encamp at Halle. In the mean time the Archduke Leopold had marched from Hungary with 5000 horse, passed the Danube and joined John de Wert. The French army had received no reinforcement since the battle of Nordlingen, and had suffered much greater loss than the enemy. Turenne, being informed of the Archduke's junction, repassed the Necker by swimming, every cavalier having a foot soldier mounted behind him, and marched on Philipsburg, but he was closely pursued by the Archduke, and having no bridge to repass the Rhine by, he placed himself between that place and the river, and intrenched his position. When the bridge was constructed, the baggage of Marshal de Grammont's army crossed to the left bank. Turenne with the army of Weimar, remained in his camp. The Archduke retook Nordlingen, and afterwards all the places which the French had taken, successively; they had not an inch of ground left in Germany. A few months after, he entered Bohemia, whither he was called by the internal affairs of that kingdom. Turenne then repassed the Rhine without molesta-

tion, and although it was in November, made a march of forty leagues, took possession of Treves, and there re-installed the Elector, who had been driven from that city twelve years before. He constructed a redoubt on the bridge of Treves, left 500 men in it, and went into winter-quarters. He did not return to court until February.

IV.

Observation IV.—Turenne having contracted his cantonments to the space of three leagues round his head-quarters, his position was not dangerous; it is not, therefore, to his position that the loss of the battle of Marienthal is to be attributed. It was doubtless unnecessary to go into quarters of refreshment in so rich a country, where it was so easy to collect great magazines. But his real error was the rallying point he fixed for his army; he should not have selected Erbsthausen, because that village was situate at the advanced posts by which the enemy was approaching; but Margentheim, behind the Tauber, where the army would have been in junction four hours earlier, and where Merci would have found the French army covered by a river and in position. It is one of the most important rules, in war, and rarely violated with

impunity, to *collect one's cantonments on the point most distant and best sheltered from the enemy.*

Observation V.—1. The Prince of Condé was wrong at Nordlingen, in attacking Merci in his camp, with an army almost entirely composed of cavalry, and with so little artillery; the attack of the village of Allerheim was a grand affair. If Condé's army was superior in cavalry, both armies were equal in infantry, and Merci's wings were strongly supported. It is not extraordinary that Condé, without howitzers and with so little artillery, should have failed in all his attacks on Allerheim, when that place was supported, at the distance of 100 toises, by the line of battle; and all its houses, as well as the church and cemetery, embattled and defended by an infantry superior to the French, not only in number, but in quality. Had it not been for Merci's death, the Bavarians would have remained masters of the field of battle, and the retreat of the Prince of Condé across the Wurtemburg Alps, would have proved most fatal to his army.

2. Notwithstanding the death of Merci, the Bavarians would still have gained the victory, if John de Wert, on his return from pursuing the right wing of the French, had advanced against Turenne, not by first resuming his former position, and thus traversing two sides of the triangle, but by crossing the plain diagonally, leaving

Allerheim on his right, and falling on the rear of the cavalry at Weimar, which was then engaged with Glein's Austrian troops. By this plan he would have succeeded; but he was not daring enough. The angle he made retarded his movement only half an hour; but the fortune of battles frequently depends on the slightest accident.

3. Notwithstanding the death of the Count de Merci, and the circumspection of John de Wert, the Bavarians would still have conquered, if the infantry posted at the village of Allerheim had not, although victorious, capitulated. The capitulation accepted or proposed by these troops is a new proof that a body of troops in line ought never to capitulate during a battle. The loss of this battle was occasioned by the erroneous principle generally received amongst the German troops, that when once they are surrounded they may capitulate; thus assimilating themselves, by an unfortunate misapprehension, to the garrison of a fortress. If the military code of Bavaria had prohibited such a proceeding as dishonourable, it would not have taken place, and the Bavarians would have conquered. No sovereign, nation, or general, can have any guarantee, if the officers are allowed to capitulate on the field, and to lay down their arms according to the terms of a contract favourable to the in-

dividuals of the corps contracting it, but injurious to the army. Such conduct ought to be proscribed, declared infamous, and punished with death. Decimation should be inflicted; of the generals and officers, one in ten ought to suffer; of the sub-officers, one in fifty; and of the men, one in a thousand. He or they by whom the order to surrender arms to the enemy is given, and those who obey that order, are equally traitors, and deserving of capital punishment.

4. Condé merited victory by the obstinacy and extraordinary intrepidity which distinguished him: for if these qualities availed him nothing in the attack on Allerheim, they impelled him, after having lost his centre and his right, to renew the action with his left, the only force he had left; for it was he who directed all the movements of this wing, and who is entitled to all the glory of its success. Observers of ordinary minds will say, that he ought to have made use of the wing which remained untouched, for the purpose of securing his retreat, and not to have hazarded the remainder of his forces; but with such principles, a general is sure to miss every opportunity of success, and to be constantly beaten. It was thus that the Count de Clermont reasoned at Crevelt, Marshal Contades at Minden, and the Prince of Soubise at Wilhelmsthal. The glory and

honour of his country's arms is the first duty which a general who gives battle ought to attend to; the safety and preservation of his men is but the second; but their safety and preservation is, in fact, to be found in that daring obstinacy itself; for even had the Prince of Condé commenced a retreat with Turenne's corps, he would have lost nearly all his men before he could have reached the Rhine. It was thus that after Minden, Marshal Contades lost in his retreat, not only the honour of his country's arms, but more men than he would have lost in two battles. Condé's conduct is worthy of imitation. It is agreeable to the spirit, the rules, and the feelings of warriors: if he did wrong in giving battle to Merci in the position he occupied, he did right in never yielding to despair while he had brave men under his colours. By this conduct he gained the victory, and deserved to gain it.

Observation VI.—Turenne with his army was driven under the walls of Philipsburg by very numerous forces; he had no bridge over the Rhine, but he availed himself of the ground between the river and the fortress to establish his camp. This ought to be a lesson for engineers, not only with respect to the construction of fortified places, but also for that of *têtes-de-pont*; they should leave a space between the place and the river, so that an army might draw up and

rally between the place and the bridge, without entering the fortress, which would place it in jeopardy. This plan has been adopted at Wittemburg on the Elbe, but neglected by the engineers at Torgau. There is no such thing at Cassel, opposite Mentz: an army retiring on Mentz, is necessarily compromised if pursued, because several days are requisite for it to pass the bridge, and the extent of the walls of Cassel is too small to allow it to remain there without confusion. Two hundred toises should have been left between the place and the Rhine: this should be carefully attended to in the construction of every *téte-de-pont* before such considerable rivers. At Praga on the Vistula, in the war of 1806, this principle was disregarded: this was blameable, although there were strong redoubts established in advance, forming a great intrenched-camp. In the same campaign the *têtes-de-pont* which the engineers constructed before Marienwerder, were contiguous to the Vistula, and would have been of little protection to the army, if it had been compelled to repass this river in a retreat. *Têtes-de-pont*, like those which are recommended and taught in the schools, are only good before little rivers where the defile is not long.

CHAPTER III.

CAMPAIGN OF 1646.

I. Turenne's march from Mentz to Wesel and Giessen, to join the Swedish army; skilful manœuvre to dislodge the Archduke from his camp, near Memingen.—II. Observations.

I.

In the month of April, Turenne collected his army at Mentz, preparing to pass the Rhine in order to join the Swedish army in Hesse, commanded by General Wrangel; but Cardinal Mazarine sent him orders to remain on the left bank, because the Duke of Bavaria had promised that his army should not join that of the Emperor, if the French did not pass the Rhine. This prince did not keep his word; he made his army join the Imperialists, and they advanced, combined, against the Swedish army and that of Turenne, who could no longer join the Swedes by the direct road. Indignant at the perfidy of the Duke of Bavaria, he marched from Mentz, and down the Rhine as far as Wesel, where he passed that river; and on the 10th of

August, he joined Wrangel's army at Giessen on the Lahn. On his approach the enemy retired to the camp of Friedburg; but Turenne, without making any alteration in his plan, marched by Aschaffenburg with a force of 20,000 men, including 10,000 cavalry and 60 pieces of cannon, on Donawerth, where he passed the Danube, proceeded to the Lech, passed that river on the 22d of August, and surrounded Augsburg. The Swedes invested Rain. Being unwilling, however, to conduct two sieges at once, he added his efforts to those of General Wrangel to accelerate the taking of Rain, which place capitulated after fifteen days open trenches. He then returned to Augsburg, but in this interval 1500 Bavarians had thrown themselves into the place. The Archduke, who had quitted his camp at Friedburg, had advanced through Fulde, Schweinfurth, Bamberg, Nuremberg, and Straubing, on the Lech. Turenne renounced all hopes of taking that important city, and proceeded to Lauingen on the Danube. The Archduke encamped between Landsberg and Memingen. It was the beginning of November. Turenne resolved to attack him, but finding, on reconnoitring, that his camp was too strongly posted, he marched on Landsberg, boldly seized the bridge over the Lech, the depôt of the Archduke's stores, which compelled that prince to evacuate his excellent

position, to repass the Lech hastily, and to return to Austria to take up his winter quarters. The Bavarian Army wintered in Bavaria.

II.

Observation VII. — 1. Turenne's march of 80 leagues along the left bank of the Rhine, in order to return up the right bank, of his own accord, without orders from his court, was worthy of him.

2. His march on the Danube and Lech, to carry the war into Bavaria, profiting by the Archduke's false marches, was a bold judicious manœuvre.

3. He lost his time in besieging Rain, instead of instantly seizing on Augsburg, which, at that time, was not garrisoned. The burghers were prepared to deliver him the keys; there would afterwards have been time enough to take Rain, and he might even have dispensed with that place. He was wrong in yielding to the solicitation of General Wrangel, which enabled 1500 Bavarians to throw themselves into Augsburg, and the Archduke to reach that place with his army.

4. The manœuvres by which the Archduke was dislodged from his camp between Memingen and Landsberg display great boldness, sagacity, and genius; they are fertile in grand results, and ought to be studied by all military men.

CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN OF 1647.

I. Convention between France and Bavaria, Turenne's army repasses the Rhine.—Revolt of the troops of Weimar.—II. Observations.

I.

On the 14th of March 1647, the Regent and the Duke of Bavaria signed a convention, by which that prince engaged to remain neutral, to furnish no succours to the Emperor, to leave in the possession of the French the fortified places of Ulm, Lauingen, Gundelfingen, Hochstett, and Donawerth. These places of security seemed necessary to afford a guarantee against the changefulness of the views of the Court of Munich. The Imperial Army being thus abandoned by the Bavarians, consisted of only 11,000 men, of whom 6000 were cavalry. The Army of France, Weimar, and Sweden, consisted of 34,000 men, 20,000 of whom were cavalry. Turenne received

orders to proceed into Flanders with his army. In this the Court of Saint-Germain's had two objects: to reinforce itself in Flanders, where it had weakened its troops by sending a large detachment into Catalonia, in which country the Prince of Condé was to command this campaign; and to prevent the Protestant party from domineering to an excessive degree in Germany, and destroying the Catholic party in that country. The Holy See had been actively employed, and had set in motion all the secret springs of its policy. Turenne, who was encamped, made a fruitless representation of all the disadvantages attached to such a movement: 1st, France, by availing herself of the superiority she possessed in Germany, might speedily force the house of Austria to make peace, and all the influence which the Catholic party would lose by the weakening of that house, would be gained by France, which country would always have it in her power to stop the progress of the Protestants: 2dly, the troops of Weimar, composed of Germans, to whom at least six months' pay was due, would make a difficulty of passing the Rhine; there was a risk of the dispersion of this little army, to which the victory of Nordlingen was owing, and which was so valuable on account of its courage and military spirit. But in the beginning of

May, Anne of Austria repeated her orders by a letter under her own hand; obedience was indispensable.

The army repassed the Rhine at Philipsburg, and reached Saverne on the 6th of June; this was the last halt in Germany. The officers of the troops of Weymar assembled and waited on the Marshal to demand their pay. It was impossible for him to satisfy them, but they would listen to no promise; accordingly they raised their camp and returned across the Rhine. Turenne followed them with 5000 men, overtook them at the passage of the Rhine, and deliberated whether he should charge them; he preferred, however, mild measures; he suffered them to effect their passage, and crossing, himself, to the right bank with a few men, he went to the lodgings of Count de Rosen, their commander, took up his residence with him, and continued his functions of general-in-chief as if nothing had happened. The insurgents resolved to march down the right bank; they appointed deputies in whom they placed confidence to direct their movements. On their arrival at Ettlingen in the country of Baden, Turenne sent for 100 men from Philipsburg, who came in the night, pinioned Rosen, and carried him off to Philipsburg. The insurgents divided into two parties: almost all the

officers and sub-officers and two whole regiments declared for Turenne; the others, to the number of 1500, elected officers, crossed the Necker, and directed their march on Tauber. He followed them, came up with them at Konigshoffen, charged them, killed 300, and took 300 more: the remains of them retired on the Mein, and a great number enlisted in the Swedish army. This expedition being concluded, Turenne again passed the Rhine, and advanced rapidly into the country of Luxemburg, where he arrived in the beginning of September. He received orders to halt, which determined the Archduke to send a detachment from his Army of Flanders to guard the Luxemburg.

The Duke of Bavaria broke his engagement; he joined the Imperialists with his army, and his force thus became superior to the Swedish army, which he defeated and drove beyond the Weser. He then marched to the Rhine and laid siege to Worms. Turenne received orders to manœuvre against him; in the beginning of December he compelled him to raise the siege of Worms, and wrote to the Duke of Bavaria, that, notwithstanding the convention of Ulm, he intended to treat him as an enemy.

II.

Observation VIII. — The French armies have constantly been cheated by these petty princes of the Germanic body. It would have been more advantageous to France if all Germany, except Austria and Prussia, had been divided into three other monarchies sufficiently powerful to defend their territories, enforce respect to their neutrality, and check the ambition of Austria, Prussia, and France herself; for that power, which we suppose bounded by the Rhine and the Alps, could have no interests to dispute on except in Italy. If the peninsula be monarchical, the welfare of Europe requires it to form a single monarchy, to hold the balance between Austria and France, and also between France and England, by sea. Europe will never be tranquil until things are thus settled: *natural boundaries.*

CHAPTER V.

CAMPAIGN OF 1648.

I. Invasion of Bavaria; action of Zusmershausen (May 16); treaty of peace signed at Munster, called the treaty of Westphalia (October 24).—II. Observations.

I.

On the 23d of February 1648, Turenne passed the Rhine at Oppenheim to join the Swedish army; he had 8000 men, 4000 of whom were cavalry, and twenty pieces of cannon, independently of the garrisons in the fortresses of the Danube, the Necker, and the Rhine. The Imperial army was apprehensive of being placed between two fires; it evacuated all Hesse, and retired under the guns of Ingolstadt. After having effected this junction at Gelnhausen, near Hanau, on the 23d of March, he proceeded to the Rednitz; the Swedish generals wished to enter Bohemia, but he refused. After some days' hesitation, he prevailed on them to con-

tinue with him his march on Lauingen, where he passed the Danube on the 15th with a van of 3000 horse. Being covered by marshes, he reconnoitred the enemy's army, which was not on its guard. He brought his infantry up in the night, and in the morning marched forward. General Melander, who had succeeded the Archduke in the command of the Imperial army, began his retreat. Turenne overtook his rearguard; commanded by Montecuculi, at Zusmershausen; the action was obstinate. Melander retrograded to succour his rearguard; he was killed; his troops hastily evacuated the field of battle, and repassed the Lech with ali possible haste. Turenne manœuvred on the Lower Lech, passed it at Rain, and, without stopping to besiege that place, marched on the Iser, and surprised Freysing and the bridge there. The Court of Bavaria abandoned the capital in consternation, and retired to Salzburg. From Freysing, he marched on the Inn, made an attempt on Wasserburg, but found it too strongly occupied, and returned on Muhldorf, where he failed in every endeavour to construct a bridge, all the boats having been carried off; nevertheless he stayed there three weeks, and laid Bavaria under contribution; the country was ravaged with all the animosity by which religious wars are distinguished. This conduct is a stain on his memory.

Piccolomini, who had hastened from Flanders, collected an army at Passau; on which news Turenne returned to the Iser; both armies watched each other for thirty days, without the occurrence of any affair of importance. But in the mean time the Swedish general Konigsmark, who, after the passage of the Lech, had advanced into Bohemia, gained some successes, and took Prague, which obliged Piccolomini to detach a body of troops for the defence of that kingdom.

Turenne was unwilling to winter in so remote a country; according to the practice of those times, he removed nearer to France, repassed the Lech on the 10th of October at Landsberg, and the Danube, on the 15th, at Donawerth. On the 24th of October peace was signed at Munster. This was the famous treaty of Westphalia, which was the standard of the law of nations in Europe for a century. Shortly after, the French army marched towards the Rhine, and the Swedes towards the Elbe.

II.

Observation IX. — There was no military event in this campaign but the action of Zusmershausen. Turenne was the first French general that ever planted the national colours on the banks of the Inn. In this campaign and

that of 1646, he traversed Germany in every direction, with an activity and boldness which form a contrast to the manner in which war has since been carried on. This was the result of his talents and of the good military principles of that school, and was also owing, in part, to the great number of partisans and allies which he found every where. Germany was then divided into two parties; the Catholics, and the Protestants whom France supported in order to humble Austria, then at the head of the Catholics.

CHAPTER VI.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1649, 1650, AND 1651.

I. 1649. Turenne declares against the King; he is abandoned by his troops; the peace of Ruel; he is included in the Regent's pardon, and returns to Court.—II. 1650. New commotions; Turenne once more raises the standard of revolt; he treats with Spain, and commands the Spanish army.—III. Battle of Rethel (Dec. 15).—IV. 1651. The Princes are set at liberty; Mazarin leaves France; Turenne quits the enemy's ranks, and returns to Court.—V. Observations.

I.

THE treaty of Munster or Westphalia had restored peace in Germany, but the war with Spain still continued. Hostilities were proceeding in Flanders and Catalonia; a civil war broke out in France; the Regent quitted Paris, and assembled an army, the command of which she intrusted to the Prince of Condé. He surrounded the capital. The Prince of Conti and the Dukes of Longueville and Beaufort commanded the Parisian army; the coadjutor, the Duke of Elbœuf, the

Duke of Bouillon and a great number of nobles sided with the Fronde. Marshal Turenne, influenced by his elder brother, the Duke of Bouillon, betrayed the Court and the duty he owed to it, assembled the officers of his army, and harangued them for the purpose of inducing them to join in the rebellion. He obtained their promise of support, and issued a manifesto against the Regent, her who had successively promoted him to every military rank. It was from her that he had received the baton of a marshal of France, and the command of the army at the head of which he then was. Anne of Austria declared him guilty of Leze-majesté, and wrote a circular to all the officers and commandants of fortresses, forbidding them to obey him. The French troops remained faithful to their government; they abandoned Turenne, who was obliged to take refuge with some friends in Holland. In proportion to the joy with which the news of this marshal's declaration for the Fronde, and of his march on Paris with his army, had been received in that capital, was the alarm and consternation excited there by the intelligence of his flight into Holland. The peace of Ruel, concluded a few months afterwards, brought Turenne back to court. The Regent had included him in the general pardon.

II.

In the winter of 1650, new troubles broke out. The Prince of Condé, the Duke of Beaufort, and the Duke of Longueville, were arrested by order of the Regent, and confined in the Donjon de Vincennes. Turenne with the Duchess of Longueville retired to Stenay, a place belonging to the prince, and raised the standard of revolt. Several princes and princesses of the house of Condé, the Duke of Bouillon, and the Duke of Larochefoucault, fled to Bourdeaux, and induced the inhabitants of that great city to take up arms. On the 10th of April, Turenne concluded a treaty with the Court of Spain, which engaged to supply him with 200,000 crowns to levy troops, 300,000 for their support, and 600,000 per annum to be divided between him, the Duchess of Longueville, and their principal adherents; and moreover to place under his command 5000 Spaniards, 3000 of whom were to be cavalry, and to furnish garrisons for the frontier places that should be taken: whilst the garrisons of places taken in the interior of the kingdom were to be supplied by Marshal Turenne's army.

In consequence of this treaty, Turenne appeared before Catelet, towards the middle of June 1650, at the head of 18,000 men. After

a siege of three days, the place capitulated. He then laid siege to Guise, which he also took. The Archduke arrived from Brussels to take the command of the Spanish army; Turenne was now only second in command. In the beginning of August, the Spanish army crossed the Oise. Turenne wished to lead it to Paris; the Spanish generals were more circumspect. Marshal du Plessis Praslin, commanding the royal army, was encamped at Marli. The Archduke took possession of Rhetel, Chateau-Porcien, and Neufchatel; but having refused to proceed farther, Turenne passed the Aisne at the head of 4000 men, beat the Marquis d'Hocquincourt, who was at Fismes with ten regiments of cavalry, covered by the Vesle, took 500 prisoners, and drove him on Soissons. He intended to march on Vincennes to set the Princes at liberty, but being informed that they had been removed to the Castle of Marcoussi on the Orleans road, he relinquished that hope, and rejoined the Spanish army near Neufchatel. Towards the end of September, this army invested Mouzon, which place surrendered in the middle of November. The army then proceeded into Flanders, to go into winter-quarters. Turenne remained on the frontier of the Aisne with 8000 men.

III.

The Court had appeared before Bourdeaux, and received the keys of that place on the 8th of October. The Regent, on her return to Paris, immediately gave orders to Marshal du Plessis Praslin to take the field with 16,000 men, and to lay siege to Rhetel, which town he invested on the 9th of December. Turenne had left 1800 men there, but the besiegers pushed on their works with such activity, that the place capitulated in a few days. In the mean time, Turenne had left the banks of the Meuse to hasten to the succour of the town, before which he arrived, after four days' march, on the 13th of December, an hour before sun-set, and was informed that it had just capitulated. The next day he ordered a retreat, marched four leagues, and gained the valley of Bourg. Marshal du Plessis marched the whole night of the 14th on Gerneville, where he found that Turenne was only three leagues before him; he instantly resumed his march. The two armies came in sight on the 15th, at three in the morning. Turenne left the valley, and gained the heights on the left; the king's army followed him in a parallel direction over the hills on the right; in this manner both armies marched for two hours; Turenne was desirous not to fight; Marshal du Plessis, on the contrary, was impatient to en-

gage. Seeing that it was noon, and that his enemy was escaping from him, he descended into the valley between the Bourg de St. Etienne and that of Sommepi, at the spot called Champblanc. The two armies formed in line; Lieutenant-general the Marquis d'Hocquincourt commanded the left of the royal army, General Rosen the centre, and the Marquis Villequier the right. Lieutenant-general Lafauge commanded the right of Turenne's army, the Count de Ligneville the left, and the Marquisses of Duras, Beauveau, Boutteville, and Montansier, the centre. The forces under Marshal du Plessis were double the number of Turenne's; but the latter, perceiving that all the royal infantry had not arrived, descended into the valley to meet the Marshal; his left, at the head of which he marched, charged the right of the French; the two wings were intermixed; the victory was doubtful; but the right of the Spanish army, commanded by Lieutenant-general Lafauge, was broken by the Marquis d'Hocquincourt, who after having entirely routed it, and taken Lafauge prisoner, advanced against the wing commanded by Turenne, charged it whilst it was still engaged with the right of the French, and, after a long and sanguinary battle, obtained the victory. The Spaniards, surrounded on all sides, gave way. Turenne and

the lieutenant of his guard were left alone in the midst of the French squadrons; he escaped, nevertheless, and reached Montmedi, whence he proceeded to Bois-le-Duc, where he rallied the remains of his army; 1200 men had been left on the field of battle, and he could scarcely collect a fourth of his troops.

IV.

During the winter of 1651, negotiations for peace took place; the princes were released from prison on the 13th of February. Mazarin left the kingdom, and the parliament issued a decree declaring him a disturber of the public tranquillity, and banishing him. Turenne attempted to become a mediator with the Spaniards, and to induce them to make peace, but without success. In the beginning of May, having received letters assuring him of his pardon, he returned to court. During the whole of the year 1651, new intrigues were constantly forming at Paris. The Prince of Condé left the court, went to his government of Guienne, and recommenced the war. Turenne remained faithful to the King. Mazarin quitted Cologne and the banks of the Rhine, and returned to court. Marshal d'Hocquincourt commanded the royal army against the Prince of Condé; it was not until the beginning of 1652 that Turenne was

invested by the King with the command of the army, conjointly with Marshal d'Hocquincourt.

V.

Observation X.—1. Turenne's conduct in this affair was not honourable. Being the King's subject he ought not to have taken up arms against his master, whose minority could be no justification; Turenne had acknowledged the Regent, had for many years commanded her armies, and was loaded with her favours. In siding with the Fronde, he obeyed the influence of the head of his family, the Duke of Bouillon, and in that point of view there might be some excuse for him; but then he should have resigned the command of the army confided to him by the Regent, and joined the standard of the Fronde as a private individual. But to tamper with his army was a piece of treachery, which can neither be justified on the principles of morality nor by military rules. He was severely punished, for his soldiers abandoned him, and remained faithful to the voice of duty and to their oaths.

2. After the peace of Ruel, Turenne again took part against the Court. He was not at that time employed; he listened to the advice and obeyed the impulse of the head of his house, and yielded to the influence of the Duchess of Longueville. He retired to Stenay, and declared for the Princes, who were oppressed and

kept in confinement by the Court. There are some palliative circumstances in Turenne's conduct on this occasion; but a few months after, he was obliged to treat with the enemies of France, to place himself at the head of Spanish armies, to aid them in taking the frontier places, and ravaging his native country. This great crime is repugnant to the principles of religion, morality, and honour. Nothing can justify a general who takes advantage of the knowledge he has acquired in the service of his country in order to make war against it, and deliver up its bulwarks to foreign nations.

Observation XI.—1. He gave battle at Rhetel injudiciously; as soon as he was informed of the surrender of Rhetel, finding his object unattainable, he should have retreated. He ought to have marched at least seven leagues that day; he would not, in that case, have been overtaken by the French army, or compelled to give battle to a superior army. But he marched only four leagues.

2. When Marshal du Plessis descended into the plain and drew up in line, Turenne might still have avoided the battle by accelerating his movement. He formed no reserve in the rear of his wings, which was the cause of his overthrow. When once broken, his cavalry could not rally; he would have had a better chance of success with a less extended order of battle.

CHAPTER VII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1652.

I. Operations and manœuvres of the King's army, under the command of Marshals de Turenne and d'Hocquincourt; action of Bleneau (April 7).—II. Operations of the King's army, commanded by Marshal de Turenne alone; siege of Etampes; armistice granted to the Duke of Lorraine.—III. Battle of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine (July 3).—IV. Camp of Villeneuve, Saint-George's; the Court returns to Paris. —V. Observations.

I.

THE Court remained, during part of the winter, in Poitou and Anjou, to pacify those provinces. Marshal d'Hocquincourt commanded the army: the Cardinal formed a new one out of troops arrived from Champagne, and intrusted the command of it to Marshal Turenne, who was to act in concert with Marshal d'Hocquincourt's army. The two armies, when united, were not very numerous; they scarcely amounted to 9000 men, most of whom were cavalry; but the Court was afraid to place itself at the discretion of a

single general. The Court proceeded up the Loire, to be nearer to Paris; all the towns on the river opened their gates except Orleans. The Court stationed itself at Gien, to reach which place it had proceeded along the Loire, and lain at Sully. The Army of the Fronde, 14,000 strong, commanded by the Duke of Beaufort, was cantoned between Montargis and the Loire; that general, having been informed of the road which the Court had taken, formed a plan for seizing it, and sent Lieutenant-general Sirot with four regiments to Jargeau, to secure the bridge over the Loire. In the mean time, Turenne, apprehensive of the danger which the Court might incur in the vicinity of the river, went to Jargeau, where he fell in with Sirot's troops, at the very moment when they were entering the place. Although he had but 200 men with him, he boldly engaged, and maintained his ground until the evening, when his army arrived. This action, unimportant in itself, made a great impression on the Regent. Lieutenant-general Sirot was killed. The royal armies passed the Loire, and cantoned themselves at Briare and Bleneau. It was now April; forage was scarce, and the disjunction of the army was completed.

The Prince of Condé was in Guienne; he left the command and the direction of the affairs of his party in that province to the Prince of Conti,

and set out at full speed with a few of his officers. After escaping a thousand dangers, he reached the camp of Lorris, near Montargis, marched against that town the following day, took possession of it, returned immediately to attack Marshal d'Hocquincourt's cantonments, took the quarters of a number of dragoons who were cantoned on the canal, collected his infantry in Bleneau, rallied as many of his cavalry as he could, and effected his retreat on Saint-Fargeau. The moment Turenne heard of this, he mustered his troops, and advanced with his infantry on Bleneau. During this nocturnal march Condé's army and his passed each other in opposite directions and unperceived; in the morning they were mutually discovered by the noise of the drums and trumpets. Turenne's army consisted of only 4000 men: how was he to keep in check an army of thrice that number, and commanded by Condé? He took the position of the pond of la Bousiniere; this was a defile formed by the pond on his left and a wood on his right. He placed his troops behind this defile, planted a strong battery to play upon the middle, did not cause the wood to be occupied by his infantry, to avoid being forced to engage against his inclination, and passed the defile with ten squadrons. As soon as Condé's army approached, he repassed the defile. The prince, much surprised to meet

with the royal army in position, deployed, and took possession of the wood; he appeared for some time irresolute, but at length entered the defile. The Viscount then faced about with his cavalry, and overthrew the head of the enemy's column, before it could deploy. At the same moment he unmasked his battery, which carried disorder into Condé's ranks; he repassed the defile and took up a position; he had marched all night. In the evening, Marshal d'Hocquincourt joined Turenne with all the men he had saved and rallied out of his army. Notwithstanding this junction, and the arrival of some reinforcements sent from Gien, the royal army was still inferior; but the disproportion was no longer so great. A few days after, the Prince of Condé returned to Paris, where the affairs of his party required his presence; he left his army under the command of Tavannes.

The Court went to Saint-Germain, on the right bank of the Seine, a few weeks afterwards, by way of Auxerre, Sens, Fontainebleau, and Melun; the two marshals performed a march of forty leagues to protect it; they encamped successively at la Ferté Aleps and Chartres. The marshal's opinion was that the Court would venture to enter Paris; but Mazarin was apprehensive for his personal safety, and opposed this step. The Prince of Condé's army was assem-

bled at Etampes, whilst he himself was at Paris. Under these circumstances Mademoiselle passed through both armies, in order to proceed from Orleans to Paris. Turenne seized this opportunity of attempting to surprise the enemy: he did not completely succeed, but he defeated several regiments, made a great number of prisoners, and obtained an advantage which would have been more important, but for the erroneous manœuvres of d'Hocquincourt. The Cardinal was sensible of this fact, and sent General d'Hocquincourt into Flanders, under pretence of some movements made by the Spaniards, and confided the whole army to Turenne.

II.

The spirit of faction ran high in Paris, and the malcontents had great confidence in the army which was at Etampes. To disgrace that army and destroy its military character, the Regent ordered the town to be besieged. Turenne invested it, and having no army in the field to apprehend, he formed no lines of circumvallation, but drew lines of countervallation at the distance of a musquet-shot from the place, flattering himself that the want of provisions would soon settle the affair; when he suddenly heard that the Duke of Lorraine had entered Champagne, that he was marching on the capital, that

he was in league with the leaders of the *Fronde*, and that his principal object was to compel the royal army to raise the siege of Etampes; he therefore resolved to attack immediately, and assaulted the place several times without entire success. He was so destitute of necessaries, that the Court was obliged to send him its horses for the service of the army. Hearing that the Duke of Lorraine had reached Charenton, and was preparing to pass the Seine, he lost not a moment, but raised the siege and marched on Corbeil; the horses belonging to the Court were employed in drawing the artillery of the batteries which he evacuated. He crossed the forest of Senars, passed the little river of Yeres at Brunoy, marched by night round Gros-Bois, and by daybreak arrived on the camp of the Duke of Lorraine, whose left was supported on Villeneuve Saint-Georges, and his right on the first woods of la Grange. He had covered himself by six redoubts which he had raised and palisaded in the night; his army consisted of 10,000 men. Turenne pitched his camp opposite Villeneuve Saint-Georges.

The principal engagement which the Duke of Lorraine had formed with the Fronde, was to effect the raising of the siege of Etampes; his object was fulfilled: he possessed no territories, Lorraine being entirely occupied by one of the

King's armies; he had nothing left but his army, which he did not wish to expose to ruin, in a serious engagement. He had still some of Mazarin's agents in his camp; the English Pretender also repaired thither. At length, just when Turenne's army came within cannon-shot, he signed the ultimatum, consented to an immediate cessation of hostilities, to give up his bridge over the Seine, and to quit France within fifteen days. He began his march for this purpose without delay, and passed the Yeres. An hour afterwards, the Prince's army arrived on the Seine, on the side opposite Villeneuve Saint-Georges, and, instead of the Army of Lorraine, perceived that of the King on the opposite bank. If the army of the Princes had joined the Duke of Lorraine, the numerical superiority of the Fronde would have been so great, that the Court could have done nothing but retire on Lyons, as Burgundy was not to be depended upon.

III.

Condé posted with all possible despatch from Paris, placed himself at the head of his army, and stationed it between Saint-Cloud and Turenne, guarding the bridge of Saint-Cloud. On the 1st of July, Turenne passed the Marne at Meaux, and advanced on Epinay; Marshal de la Ferté joined him: the Court went to Saint-Denis.

Turenne constructed a bridge opposite Epinay, availing himself of an isle formed by the Seine, to enable him to attack Condé on both banks; but the Prince raised his camp, crossed the Bois de Boulogne, and presented himself at the barrier of la Conference. The Parisians refused him admission into their city; he turned the walls. Turenne, who followed him closely, marched on la Chapelle, and arrived in time to charge Condé's rear-guard. The Prince had intended to proceed to Charenton; but, being hard pushed, he threw himself into the faubourg Saint-Antoine, behind the intrenchments which the citizens had constructed round their faubourg, to protect themselves against the marauders who infested the vicinity of the capital; these intrenchments rested, on one side, on the foot of the hills of Charonne, and on the other side, on the Seine; they were 1800 toises in circuit. This faubourg formed a *patte d'oie;* the principal streets abutted on the city gate, below the Bastille, the cannon of which fortress commanded the whole faubourg, and enfiladed the three debouchés; besides which, barricades were formed in the middle of each of these three streets, and the Prince of Condé had the principal houses occupied and embattled by detachments of infantry. Turenne attacked this faubourg; he penetrated it at three points; the right, commanded by the

Marquis de Saint-Megrin, entered by the rue de Charenton; the centre, under the marshal, took possession of the barrier du Trone; and the left, under the Marquis de Navailles, marched along the river side, making for the place of Arms. The retrenchments offered no resistance, and the action commenced at the barriers. Saint-Megrin got possession of that of Charonne, and routed the troops opposed to him; his cavalry imprudently set off into the street, and reached the market-place, whence they were driven back by Condé, who defeated them, at the head of fifty chosen officers. On the left the royal troops reached the barrier, and even got possession of the jardin de Rambouillet; but the Dukes of Beaufort and Nemours advanced at the head of the young men of Paris, and repulsed them. Navailles had taken the precaution of having the heads of the streets occupied by strong parties, which afforded him the means of preserving the barrier. Turenne himself made his way into the principal street, and reached the abbey de Saint-Antoine, but was repulsed by the Prince, who came up at the head of some officers of his household, and drove him back beyond the barrier. In a few moments Turenne returned into the street, with fresh troops. A great number of single combats now served to prove the valour of both parties, but at length Mar-

IV.

A few weeks after this battle, an army of 20,000 Spaniards, with the Duke of Lorraine, who had joined them, entered Picardy, and marched upon the capital to the aid of the Fronde. The Court, which still remained at Saint-Denis, was extremely alarmed at this intelligence, as it was in danger of being placed between the Spanish army and Paris. Rouen and Dijon refused to receive it; it seemed to have no resource but to take refuge at Lyons; but Turenne strongly opposed this desperate measure, which must have led to the loss of all the fortresses in Picardy, infused new activity into the civil war, and raised the Fronde, whose partisans at Paris were falling off, in public opinion. In fact, massacres had taken place at the hotel de Ville after the entrance of the Prince into that capital, which had rendered the inhabitants more desirous to see an end put to the civil war, and the King reinstated in his palace. Turenne advised the Regent to fix her Court at Pontoise, where, with her guard, she would be in safety; it appears, moreover, that the Frondeurs paid great respect to the King's residence. The marshal proceeded with the army to Compiegne, to oppose the march of the Spanish army, which was double the strength of his own, but

which was not interested in striking decisive blows. In fact the Archduke approached the Oise, gained some advantages over the Duke d'Elbœuf, who suffered himself to be surrounded with 5 or 600 men, and then returned into Flanders, leaving the Duke of Lorraine, with a detachment of the Spanish army, to winter in Champagne. This storm being thus conjured, Turenne approached Paris, and encamped at Gonesse, where he remained a month. He was speedily informed that the Duke of Lorraine was again marching on the capital; he marched to meet him, and encamped at Brie-Comte-Robert, whence, conceiving that the Duke of Lorraine's plan was to join the Prince of Condé's army at Villeneuve Saint-Georges, he proceeded thither without delay, and arrived at the moment when the enemy's quarter-masters were entering the place to fix the quarters of the troops. The Duke of Lorraine having thus missed his junction at Villeneuve Saint-Georges, marched on Ablon, where, a few days later, he effected his junction with the Prince of Condé. Turenne took up the position of Villeneuve Saint-Georges, with his left resting on the village, his right on the woods of la Grange, his front covered by the six redoubts which the Duke of Lorraine had had constructed a few months before, and which he connected by curtains. He constructed two bridges

over the Seine, and covered them by a good *tête-de-pont*. Condé, without availing himself of the superiority in point of numbers which he had acquired by his junction with the Army of Lorraine, took up a position at Limeil, and intrenched himself at the distance of a cannon-shot from the royal army. The Duke of Lorraine incamped at Brie-Comte-Robert, keeping the King in a manner enveloped: the latter could not obtain provisions from the right bank of the Seine; but by means of the possession of Corbeil and its *tête-de-pont*, the troops foraged on the left bank, and constantly kept themselves plentifully supplied. At length, after the lapse of six weeks, during which nothing of importance had occurred, matters seemed ripe in Paris. Mazarin yielded to the storm, and retired to Bouillon, which tended to reconcile the minds of the people of the capital to the Court: nothing now restrained them but the idea that Turenne was surrounded in his camp. The Regent consequently sent him orders to leave it, in order to accompany her in her entrance into the capital. Condé had fallen sick, and had been removed to Paris. Turenne had fourteen bridges thrown over the Yeres, passed it on the 5th of October in the evening, marched on Corbeil and Chaumes, passed the Marne at Meaux, and encamped near Senlis. The Court quitted Meulan, whither it

had gone, went to Saint-Germain's, stayed there four days, and entered Paris on the 21st of October, passing by Saint-Cloud and the Bois de Boulogne. The King was on horseback; he crossed the faubourg Saint-Honoré. All the cities in the kingdom followed the example of the capital. The two parts of the parliament, that of Pontoise, and that which remained at Paris, united; the civil war was concluded. Condé, with the Spanish army and that of Lorraine, retired into Champagne; he continued to serve against his country. Louis XIV. was received at Paris with enthusiasm. The Duke of Orleans, his uncle, retired to Blois; the coadjutor was arrested a few months after. As soon as Turenne had seen the King re-established in his capital, he set out with the army for Champagne. He drove Condé and the enemy's army out of the kingdom, and laid siege to Bar-le-Duc. Mazarin went to his camp. He had resided at Sedan ever since his departure from the kingdom. The lower town of Bar-le-Duc was carried by assault, the upper town sustained a siege of twelve days. The Prince of Condé came with the cavalry as far as Vaubecourt; Ligny at the same time surrendered to Marshal de la Ferté. The Marshal wished to have besieged Sainte-Menehould and Rethel; but it was the depth of winter, and there was nothing in the vicinity of these towns to shelter

the army. Chateau-Porcien opened its gates after seven days' siege; but in the mean time Condé took Vervins, which determined Turenne to continue the campaign and to lay siege to that town, which he retook. The army then went into winter quarters in February. The soldiers, during this latter part of the campaign, loudly expressed their resentment against the Cardinal; there was a scarcity of provisions, the winter was very cold, and the men were often reduced to eat horseflesh and cabbage stalks, which latter they called the Cardinal's bread.

V.

Observation XII. — 1. Turenne had warned Marshal d'Hocquincourt that his quarters were exposed.

2. His able and successful manœuvre to impose on Condé was considered, at the time, as the greatest service he could have rendered the Court. In fact, had he suffered himself to be intimidated, the Court would have been compelled to quit Gien, which would have had an unfavourable influence on political affairs; but it is evident that the marshal had no intention to maintain his position; he had made every preparation for retreating, in case Condé had decided on attacking him, as is proved by the precaution he took to withdraw all the posts stationed in

the wood, in order to avoid exposing them, and being forced to engage against his will: for when once an affair has commenced partially, it gradually becomes general. He kept his troops together, sufficiently near the defile to render its passage dangerous to the Prince, and to annoy him by the fire of a battery planted so as to play through the whole length of the defile, but sufficiently removed to prevent the compromising of any part of his force. This circumstance may appear trifling, but it is one of those trifles which are the indications of military genius.

3. This delicate manœuvre, executed with so much talent and prudence, cannot, however, be recommended. As soon as Turenne had mustered his cavalry, he should have retired towards Saint-Fargeau, and not have returned and marched forward until after his junction with Marshal d'Hocquincourt. The rules of war require *a division of an army to avoid engaging, alone, a whole army which has already obtained victories.* It is risking a total and irretrievable overthrow; the Prince of Condé had above 12,000 men, and Turenne only 4000.

4. The rendezvous for the two armies in quarters, was fixed too near the enemy; this was an error: *the point of junction for an army, in case of surprise, should always be fixed in the rear, so that the troops may reach it from all the cantonments before*

the enemy. On this principle it should have been fixed between Briare and Saint-Fargeau.

Observation XIII.—Turenne's march against the Prince of Lorraine was attended with every possible advantage.

1. He himself got out of difficulties by it, for at the camp of Etampes he was between the two armies, whereas when he reached Gros-Bois he had passed them both.

2. He obtained the opportunity of engaging the Duke of Lorraine by himself, and defeating him.

3. The interest, character and disposition of that Prince authorized Turenne to expect that he should easily be able to make him adopt the course most suitable to the King, as soon as he could meet with him alone.

Observation XIV.—Turenne's stay at the camp of Villeneuve Saint-Georges during six weeks, in presence of two armies superior in strength, was very hazardous. What motive could have induced him to incur so much danger? His camp was not too strong to be forced, and such an occurrence would have been his ruin, and that of the Court party. His situation appeared so critical that it retarded the submission of Paris.

Observation XV. — 1. The Prince of Condé did not display, in this campaign, the daring spirit which distinguished the General of Frey-

burg and Nordlingen; he ought not to have suffered himself to be overawed at Bleneau by demonstrations; even when united, the two royal armies were inferior to his; he ought to have been convinced, as by demonstration, that there could not be any considerable force before him; he contented himself with an insignificant advantage; and stopped short at preliminaries, without pushing his enterprise to a conclusion. With a little of his habitual daring, he must have obtained the last favours of fortune: he neglected to gather the fruits of his own calculations, and of Marshal d'Hocquincourt's error.

2. After his junction with the Duke of Lorraine, as he had such a superiority of strength, it is not easy to understand why he was satisfied with intrenching himself on the heights of Limeil, instead of attacking the King's army: he might have had as much artillery as he pleased, being so near Paris; and nothing but a decisive victory could, under the circumstances, retrieve his affairs and maintain his party in the capital; *Condé, on that day, was not sufficiently daring.*

CHAPTER VIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1653.

I. Turenne, by his marches and encampments, prevents the Archduke from passing the Oise.—II. Observations.

THE preceding campaign had ended in February; the army had been sent into winter-quarters on the Loire and in Poitou; and could not take the field this year until a very late period. The campaign began with the siege of Rhetel, which place capitulated on the 8th of July, after three days' open trenches.

In the mean time an army of 30,000 men had entered Picardy; it threatened to advance into the heart of the kingdom; there were but 16,000 men to oppose it, 10,000 of whom were cavalry. A great ferment prevailed in Paris. Bourdeaux was in arms, and the approach of the Prince of Condé towards the capital was likely to be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Turenne advanced to meet the enemy on the 18th of July: he was encamping at Ribemont

near la Fere, when the King and the Cardinal came to his camp to hold a council on the alarming conjuncture in which they stood. Several measures were proposed: some were for throwing 5000 infantry and 1000 cavalry into the frontier fortresses, and annoying the march of the enemy with 5000 horse and 1000 foot, picked troops, carrying off his convoys, and threatening his communications; others positively rejected the idea of weakening the army, and proposed, on the contrary, to take up a position behind the Oise, to defend the passage of that river, and when it should be forced, to centralize all the reserves and succours which the depôts and the provinces might afford, on Paris. Turenne did not approve of either of these measures; both had their disadvantages: it was impossible to defend the passage of a river like the Oise, yet when the enemy should have forced it, he would boast of a victory which would have a great moral influence over the spirit of the army, and over the opinion of the capital. His proposal, which was adopted, was to remain in corps-d'armée, to march beside the Spanish army for five or six leagues, to carry on a war of marches and movements. Thus the soldier would have no reason to thing himself inferior to the enemy; the season would wear away; and, as long as an action was avoided, there would be means of

opposing every attempt. The King returned to la Fere. The Spanish army, encamped at Font-Somme, raised its camp on the 1st of August, passed between the French army and the Somme, and proceeded, by Saint-Simon near Ham to Roye, which place it besieged; it manœuvred between the Oise and the Somme. Turenne left his camp at Ribemont, marched along the Oise, encamped on the 3d of August at Fargnier, and on the 5th at Noyon, where he found that the little town of Roye, which, having no garrison, was defended by the townsmen, had opened its gates after two days' open trenches. After the taking of that town, the Spaniards appeared undetermined whether to proceed to their left or right, on the Oise or on the Somme: the former road would bring them nearer to Paris; the latter would carry them farther from that city. They adopted the latter course, marched up the Somme, and encamped at Bray. The King's army was at Eppeville, near Ham, on the 10th, when it was ascertained by means of an intercepted letter, that a considerable convoy was setting out from Cambray for the enemy's camp. The royal army immediately passed the Somme at Ham, and encamped at Manancourt, at the source of a rivulet which falls into the Somme at Mont Saint-Quentin near Peronne. The cavalry marched to meet the convoy, which, being apprised of the movement of the French, returned

into Cambray. The enemy's general, finding that the French infantry was thus insulated, marched towards it to take advantage of this circumstance, and threw bridges over the Somme, which he passed. But Turenne, with his cavalry, returned to his camp at Manancourt, raised it, approached Peronne, and stationed himself near Mont Saint-Quentin. On the 13th of August, the Spanish army made a forced march, passed Bapaume in the night, and at nine in the morning arrived between Manancourt and Peronne. All the French reconnoitring parties having been taken, the army only received intelligence of the enemy from its scouts. Great alarm was excited, the marshals hastily drew up their army in order of battle. La Ferté occupied the left, in one of the worst positions possible, being commanded on all sides by heights which could not possibly be disputed with the enemy. The apprehensions of the generals spread to the soldiers; and it was considered certain that if they remained on this disadvantageous ground they must be beaten. In the mean time the enemy was approaching. Turenne gave orders to march forward, and to gain the mountain, where he was certain to find positions preferable to those he now occupied. In fact he found a good one 2000 toises from that which he had just left; its left rested on an almost inaccessible acclivity, near the village of Buires, and its front was covered by a rivulet

which falls into the Somme at Peronne. This position was very narrow. He formed the army in five lines. It had been several hours drawn up, when the Spanish army appeared at three o'clock in the afternoon. The Prince of Condé wished to attack immediately, but the Spanish generals were of a different opinion: their troops, they said, were too much fatigued, and they wished to give them the night to rest themselves. The King's army availed themselves of this delay, by covering their position with intrenchments; and on the following day, the 14th, the Spanish generals did not think proper to incur the dangers of an attack. The two armies remained three days opposite each other; on the 18th, the Spaniards decamped, and marched up the Somme to surprise Guise. Turenne, perceiving their design, threw 2500 men into Guise. The Spaniards, thus anticipated, relinquished their enterprise, and encamped at Caulincourt, a village between Ham and le Catelet. The King's army encamped at Golancourt, one league from Ham, on the left of the Somme, being thus four leagues distant from the enemy, with the Somme between them. The two armies watched each other for a fortnight, until the 1st of September, when the Spanish army again marched on its left, and advanced on Rocroy, which place it invested.

Turenne had only the choice of two measures:

either to advance on Rocroy to annoy the enemy and retard the siege, or to attack a place himself which might compensate for the loss of that town. He determined on the latter step; advanced with all possible despatch on Mouzon, a fortified place on the Meuse between Sedan and Stenay, which he surrounded on the 2d of September without forming lines. Mouzon opened its gates after seventeen days' open trenches. Upon this he immediately marched on Rocroy, but that town had just capitulated. Neither army did any thing more during the rest of this campaign; and in December they both went into winter-quarters.

II.

Observation XVI.—1. This campaign consisted entirely of manœuvres, and is very interesting. The Prince of Condé did not command the Spanish army, and the Archduke was unwilling to compromise his army; his intention was to take a few fortresses to complete the Flemish frontier, to keep up the war in Picardy and Champagne, and, if a good opportunity should occur, to beat the French army without risk. This plan was conformable to the interest of Spain. But what the Prince of Condé wished, was to march to Paris at all hazards, to support the Fronde party, encourage the revolt of Bor-

deaux, and increase the number of the disaffected, which was already very considerable.

Under these circumstances, the line of conduct adopted by Turenne was proper; but it would have been very dangerous in any other conjuncture. To march by the side of an army of twice your own strength, is always a very difficult operation; there are few positions strong enough to protect an army so inferior in number. Nor does it appear that he took the precaution to pitch his camp every evening in a chosen position: on the contrary, he frequently encamped in very bad positions, where his army was in imminent danger, as at Mont Saint-Quentin. He was indebted to chance for the good position which he took up a few hours after, and which was not so strong but that it would have been forced if the Prince of Condé had ruled.

2. When surprised at Mont Saint-Quentin, the first idea that would have occurred to an ordinary general would have been to cover himself by the Somme, repassing it at Peronne, from which place he was not above half a league distant; but what would have happened in that case? The enemy would also have passed the Somme, and it would have been necessary to remain in position and risk an engagement to stop him. In the mean time this movement of retreat would have operated on the courage of

the troops and on that of the enemy in an inverse proportion. To pass the Somme would have adjourned the difficulty, but at the same time increased it; the evil of the moment would have been warded off, but only by rendering the state of affairs worse. Turenne ventured every thing, and marched to meet the enemy; he was certain that, by this movement, he should disconcert them, increase their irresolution, and gain a day, because they would have to make some alteration in their line of march, which had been taken on the supposition that he would occupy Mont Saint-Quentin. After having seen and reconnoitred the enemy, it would be time enough, during the night, to take a determination. It was, moreover, probable that in this hilly country, the army would find a good position, capable of being intrenched in a few hours, and the reputation of the army would have been preserved; a point which is so essential to the strength of an army. Turenne intrenched himself; that great captain often made use of field-works; but his army contained too much cavalry, and too small a proportion of infantry, for him to derive all the advantage possible from the science of the engineer. In this war of marches and manœuvres he should have intrenched himself every night, and placed himself in a good posture of defence; the natural positions commonly met with are insuf-

ficient to shelter an army from another that is more numerous, without the aid of art.

There are military men who ask what is the use of fortified places, intrenched camps, and the art of the engineer? We will ask them how it is possible to manœuvre with inferior or equal forces, without the aid of positions, fortifications, and all the supplementary resources of art? It is probable that if the Prince of Condé had commanded, he would have attacked on the very evening of his arrival, which would have disconcerted Turenne, who had an inferior army, and who had adopted the plan of a campaign of observation, which required that he should never compromise himself.

Achilles was the son of a goddess and of a mortal: this is emblematical of the genius of War; the divine part is all that is derived from the moral considerations of the character, talents, and interest of your adversary; of opinion; of the spirit of the troops, who are strong and victorious, or feeble and beaten, according to their own opinion: the earthly part is arms, intrenchments, positions, orders of battle, and all that belongs to the combination of physical means.

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1654.

I. Siege of Arras; Turenne forces the lines (August 24).—II. Marches and manœuvres during the autumn.—III. Observations.

I.

TURENNE opened the campaign of 1654 by besieging Stenay, a fortified place belonging to the house of Condé, which determined the Archduke to undertake the siege of Arras. This place was strong, but its garrison was very weak; he invested it on the 3d of July with 32,000 men. In the mean time the French army approached the Somme, encamped at Peronne, and threw some succours into Arras before the Spanish lines were completed, which were not finished until the 14th of July. From Peronne the French directed their march between Cambray and Arras, and on the 17th reached Mouchy-le-Preux, a village a league and a half from Arras, and within a cannon-shot of the lines of circumvalla-

tion. Here the army, consisting of 16,000 men, took a position, with its right on the Scarpe, and its left at Cogeul; its flanks being thus perfectly supported by these two natural obstacles. Turenne covered his front by strong lines, and fixed his head-quarters at Mouchy-le-Preux. He might have occupied this position by noon; but fearing an immediate attack, he halted farther off, and did not reach the position of Mouchy until the close of the day, so that he had the whole night to intrench himself. The extent of this camp was 2500 toises; it was pitched on both sides of the road from Bouchain to Valenciennes. The presence of the army inspired the besieged with courage. The governors of all the neighbouring fortresses inundated the country with detachments, for the purpose of intercepting the convoys of the Spaniards, and obstructing their communictions. In fact, they were unable to obtain ammunition and provisions without employing their cavalry and bat horses to carry them. This extraordinary care to cut off all their convoys gave rise to many skirmishes and affairs of cavalry. One of the convoys was accidentally destroyed; it was crossing the plain of Lens, several hundred strong, each horseman carrying a sack of gunpowder behind him. An unlucky soldier having, in spite of prohibitions to the contrary, lighted his pipe, the powder

took fire; men, horses, and every thing were destroyed, except three or four maimed horsemen who were picked up by the French party. But as the Spaniards had had sufficient time to supply their camp abundantly, they did not proceed less vigorously with the works of the siege on account of this accident. On the 14th of July, they had opened the trenches; the governor defended himself intrepidly. The Court pressed Turenne to attack the lines, in order to disengage the place, but this operation was not agreeable to the opinion of the army. The lines were strong, consisting of a very deep ditch nine feet wide and well palisaded, before a kind of esplanade covered with twelve rows of wolf-holes, behind which were the fossé and lines of the usual construction.

In the mean time Stenay had capitulated; Marshal d'Hocquincourt's army arrived on the 17th of August under Arras, which reinforcement, considering the losses the besiegers had sustained in a month's open trenches, replaced the two armies upon an equality in point of number. Marshal d'Hocquincourt took possession of St. Pol, and encamped on the 19th at Aubigny: Turenne went to meet him with 1500 horse. In returning to his camp the same day, he passed along the Spanish lines within range of grape-shot; he was fired upon, and

some of his men were killed. This excited some observations from those who accompanied him, to which he replied: *This march would indeed be imprudent, if made before Condé's quarters: but I have reasons for reconnoitring the position well; and I know enough of the Spanish service to be certain that before the Archduke can be informed of it, and can have communicated it to the Prince of Condé, and held his council, I shall have returned into my camp.* This belongs to the divine part of the art of war.

By the 24th of August the place was reduced to the last extremity, through the want of gunpowder; the Marshal passed the Scarpe after sunset with his army and that of Marshal de la Ferté, and joined Marshal d'Hocquincourt. Each of these three armies attacked a different quarter, and also had a false attack made on the opposite quarters. The enemy was surprised; he did not fire his alarm until the French infantry, being within 100 paces of his lines, lighted the matches of their musquets, which produced a kind of illumination throughout the whole line, and unmasked his march. Marshal de la Ferté's attack failed; that of Turenne succeeded: he penetrated the lines at the depth of five battalions, and instantly had the fossés filled with fascines, and passages formed for his cavalry. The Prince of Condé, whose quarters were on the opposite side, has-

tened up with his squadrons; at day-break, the position of the French was critical, as they had dispersed to pillage the tents; but the Prince was not supported by the Archduke, who beat a retreat. The Spaniards lost all their baggage, 63 pieces of cannon, and between 3 and 4000 men killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; the loss of the French army amounted to 400 men *hors de combat*. This military exploit raised the reputation of Marshal Turenne to the highest pitch throughout Europe. The Court left Peronne, and remained several weeks at Arras.

II.

The Cardinal retained Marshals d'Hocquincourt and de la Ferté at Court, in order that Turenne alone might remain intrusted with the command of the army. On the 6th of September, he marched on Quesnoy, took the town, and ordered the fortifications to be repaired. He occupied a camp before Binch, and moved on Maubeuge, where he narrowly escaped being surprised by the Prince of Condé. On reaching the camp he had fixed on, at night, his baggage got into confusion amongst the columns, and the army passed the night in disorder. A few days after he took up a position at Cateau-Cambresis, where he remained, took the two Castles of Anvillers and Girondelle near Rocroy, and

went into winter-quarters. In the course of these three months he had several petty conflicts in procuring forage. He had the foraging parties supported by above 1500 horse, commanded by a lieutenant-general, and on some occasions the escort even amounted to 4000 cavalry, 1000 infantry, and several pieces of cannon; but notwithstanding all these precautions he always lost men. In the course of these marches and countermarches he appointed a new order of duty; there were three lieutenant-generals for the day; one commanding the van, another the infantry, and the third the cavalry of the rear-guard.

III.

Observation XVII.—1. The Marshal attacked the Spanish lines by night, in order to mask his movement; but nocturnal marches and operations are so uncertain, that although they sometimes succeed, they more frequently fail. The Prince of Condé, who was at the most distant quarter from the point of attack, nevertheless arrived in time to keep the French in check; and if the Spaniards had possessed his resolution, or been under his command, it is doubtful whether the result of the attack would have been the same. The principal defence of lines is the fire that can be kept up: the Archduke's army was superior in cavalry; it was double that of

Turenne at the time of his arrival, and before the junction of la Ferté and d'Hocquincourt. It is impossible to conceive how the Archduke could fail to attack and defeat Turenne's army. He thought to take the town in his presence without risking a battle.

2. Ought an army which is besieging a place to cover itself by lines of circumvallation? Ought it to await the attack of an army of succour in its lines? Ought it to divide itself into two armies, one charged with the siege and the other to protect it, and called the besieging army and the army of observation? Within what distance from each other is it proper for these two corps-d'armée to remain?

The Romans and Greeks, the great captains of the 15th and 16th centuries, the Duke of Parma, Spinola, the Prince of Orange, the great Condé, Turenne, Luxembourg, and Prince Eugene, covered their sieges by lines of circumvallation. The example of the ancients can be no authority to us, our arms being so different from theirs. That of the great generals of the 15th and 16th centuries is more respectable; but armies at that time carried but little artillery into the field, and the use of howitzers was unknown.

Those military men who recommend to have no lines, and no field-works, or very few, advise a general who is to besiege a place to beat the

enemy's army in the first instance, and to become master of the country. This advice is, no doubt, excellent, but the siege may last some months, and the enemy may return, at the most decisive moment, to the relief of the place. But a general may wish to take a fortified place without running the risk of a battle; in that case, what line of conduct ought he to pursue?

An army which means to carry on a siege before an enemy's army, ought to be strong enough to keep in check the army of succour, and carry on the siege at the same time. Engineers require the besieging army to be seven times the number of the garrison. If the army of succour be 80,000 men, and the garrison 10,000, it will require, therefore, an army of 150,000 men to besiege a place; and by reducing the besieging army to the minimum, that is to say, to four times the strength of the garrison, it would still require 120,000 men: but if there are only 90,000, the army of observation can only consist of 50,000 men, and will not be independent, but must keep itself in a situation to be succoured in a few hours by the besieging army; but if there are but 80,000 men, there will only remain 40,000 for the army of observation, which must then remain at the siege, and even in the lines; it would expose itself too much by removing to a distance from them.

The divisions employed in the works of the siege are stationed round the place, each guarding a part of the circumference. You will encamp them so that one line may face the fortress to restrain the sallies of the garrison, and another may face the country, the better to observe all that may arrive thence, and intercept all that may offer to enter the town, whether couriers, convoys of provisions, or reinforcements of men. To accomplish these ends the more efficaciously, it is natural for the troops to cover themselves by lines of countervallation and circumvallation, which occupies them only a few days. The profile used by Vauban for the lines of countervallation No. 1, is two and a half cubic toises to every toise in length, and for the countervallations No. 6, sixteen. Six men can construct the former in eight hours, and three men the latter, in four hours: then only will all communication between the country and the place be impracticable, the blockade secured, all surprise rendered impossible, and the army may sleep in quiet. If a detachment of from 3 to 12,000 men, or a corps of 25,000 detached from the army of succour, or coming from any other point, were to perform its movement undiscovered by the army of observation, and appear at day-break, they would be stopped in the first instance by the lines, which they could not force until they had

reconnoitred them well, and collected fascines, tools, and made every necessary arrangement. But cannot the army of succour itself gain six, nine, or twelve hours on the army of observation, and present itself before the place? In all these cases, if the besiegers are not covered by lines of circumvallation, the place will be succoured, the besiegers, magazines, and park of artillery will be in great danger, the works will be filled up, and twelve hours after, when the army of observation arrives, it will be too late, the mischief will be irretrievably done. It is therefore necessary, in order to besiege a place before an enemy's army, to cover the siege by lines of circumvallation. If the army be so strong, that, after leaving before the place a force four times as strong as the garrison, it remains as numerous as the army of succour, it may separate to a greater distance than one march; if it remain inferior after that detachment, it should station itself at the distance of five or six leagues from the siege, in order to be in a situation to receive succours in one night. If the besieging army and the army of observation together be only equal to the army of succour, the whole besieging army ought to remain within the lines or near them, and proceed with the works of the siege, pushing them on with all possible activity.

At the siege of Arras the Spanish army consisted of 32,000 men, of whom 14,000 were infantry, 10,000 musqueteers, and 8000 pikemen. It could therefore only employ the fire of 10,000 musquets to defend a line of 15,000 toises circumference. Yet the Archduke continued his siege for thirty-eight days in the presence of Turenne, who was encamped at cannon-shot distance from him; he therefore had thirty-eight days to take the place in; but, supposing he had neglected to cover himself, he would not have been able to carry on his siege twenty-four hours. These retrenchments therefore enabled the Archduke to continue the trenches and batter the place during these thirty-eight days.

In 1708, Prince Eugene besieged Lisle, in the sight of the Duke of Burgundy's army, which he could not possibly have done but for the protection of his lines. In 1712 he besieged Landrecy in the presence of the army of Marshal Villars, who, sensible of the vast importance of preventing the fall of that bulwark of France, presented himself several times to force his lines of circumvallation, but did not deem it possible; Eugene quietly continued his siege in the sight of Villars; he was advancing when Villars took possession of Denain, and changed the fortune of the war. Prince Eugene had all his supplies brought up the river Scarpe; they were landed at Marchiennes,

leagues from his camp, from which it was separated by that river. He ought, in the first place, not to have had the lines of Paris constructed, but to have carried on his communications by means of convoys well escorted: once a month would have been sufficient; 3dly, To have secured the bridge of Denain by a good work impregnable by a *coup de main*, and to have encamped his reserve between that work and his camp, on the right of the Scheldt, supporting his *tête-de-pont;* he would thus have been in a situation to maintain it, and Villars would not have been able to place his troops along the Scheldt to besiege Marchiennes.

The King of Prussia made no lines of circumvallation round Olmutz, and accordingly the place obtained succours both of provisions and troops, and received news from Daun several times every week.

When Turenne besieged Dunkirk, he covered himself by lines of circumvallation; but as soon as he saw the army of succour, commanded by Don John of Austria, in position within reach of his camp, he marched against it and defeated it.

In 1794, if the Duke of York, when he besieged Dunkirk, had covered himself by a good line of circumvallation, his army of observation would have attached no importance to his communications with Ypres; it would have been

sufficient for him to have preserved them with the siege, inasmuch as he was master of the sea. He would have had time enough to take the place before the French army could have been ready to force his lines.

In 1797, when Generals Provera and Hohenzollern presented themselves to compel the French to raise the siege of Mantua, where Marshal Wurmser was shut up, they were stopped by the lines of circumvallation of Saint-Georges, which gave Napoleon time to arrive from Rivoli to frustrate their enterprise, and compel them to capitulate with their troops.

Ought a besieging army to await the attack of an army of succour in its lines of circumvallation? Feuquières says, *We ought never to await the attack of an enemy in our lines of circumvallation, but we should march out of our lines and attack him.* He relied on the instances of Arras and Turin. At Arras, however, the besieging army went on with their siege for thirty-eight days before Turenne's army, and therefore had thirty-eight days to take the town in: but Prince Eugène was obliged to turn all the lines of circumvallation which covered the siege, to attack the right, where the Duke of la Feuillade had neglected to have any lines constructed; which proves the importance this great general attached to lines as an obstacle.

a fortified place which he used as his depôt; but instead of victualling his camp from the depôts of Marchiennes, by means of convoys, once or twice a month, escorted by part of the army ordered on that service, he formed lines from Marchiennes to his camp, composing a species of caponniere seven leagues in length, which the soldiers called the road to Paris. The whole extent of these lines was, therefore, fourteen or fifteen leagues. As they passed the Scheldt at Denain, he placed a reserve of twenty-four battalions there, to protect the road to Paris, and keep the garrison of Valenciennes in awe; this corps was thus separated from the rest of the army by the Scheldt: it is true that this reserve was covered by lines, but they were of little importance, and as weak as those of the road to Paris. Communications took place every day between Marchiennes and the camp, without escort. On the 24th of July, at the first dawn of day, Villars threw two bridges of pontoons over the Scheldt, a league from Denain, crossed the lines of the road to Paris, which were of no strength and undefended, and met with no opposition. The Austrian reserve, almost surprised, ill-covered, and attacked by a whole army, was driven to the Scheldt, and laid down its arms. When Prince Eugene arrived to its succour, he found himself separated from it by the Scheldt;

he was a helpless spectator of the overthrow of that part of his army. Villars immediately after caused Marchiennes to be besieged by Marshal de Montesquiou; he protected this siege by taking up a position on the left bank of the Scheldt, with his army. Prince Eugene had no choice but to march against Villars's corps, but for that purpose it was necessary for him to pass the Scheldt: it was, moreover, a great change in the state of affairs, since it was Villars, the day before, who had to force the lines of Landrecy, and now it was Prince Eugene, who, after losing his reserve of twenty-four battalions, had to attack the French army posted behind a river, and resting its left on Valenciennes. Montesquiou took Marchiennes in four days; he there found all the magazines of the Austrian army, and made 4000 prisoners. Eugene raised the siege of Landrecy. Villars, a few weeks afterwards, laid siege to Douay. Prince Eugene encamped within cannon-shot of his lines, and, deeming them unassailable, retired. If Villars had formed no lines, he must have raised the siege. The Prince committed several errors at Landrecy: 1st, In attempting daily communications with his depôt at Marchiennes, without an escort, placing his confidence in lines so extensive, so weak and so ill-guarded; 2dly, In placing his reserve on the left bank of the Scheldt, three

But if we were to mention all the attacks on lines which have failed, and all the places which have been taken under the protection of lines, either in the presence of their succours, or after the armies of succour had reconnoitred them, judged them unassailable, and withdrawn, it would be seen that lines have performed a very important part; they constitute a supplementary source of strength and protection by no means to be despised. When a general has obtained an opportunity of investing a place by surprise, and has gained a few days upon his adversary, he ought to avail himself of the advantage by covering himself with lines of circumvallation. He will thus have improved his position, and acquired a new degree of strength, a new element of power, in the general mass of affairs.

The plan of awaiting an attack in the lines ought not to be proscribed; nothing can be absolute in war. May not your lines be covered by ditches full of water, by inundations, forests, or a river, wholly or partially? May you not be superior to the army of succour in infantry and artillery, and very inferior in cavalry? May not your army be composed of brave fellows more numerous than the enemy, but inexperienced and unfit to manœuvre in the plain? In any of these cases do you think it is necessary either to raise the siege and abandon an enter-

prise on the point of terminating successfully, or to run into certain destruction, by leading brave troops, unacquainted with manœuvres, to face a good and numerous cavalry in the plain?

Those who are for banishing lines of circumvallation and all the aid which the engineer's art can afford, would gratuitously deprive themselves of auxiliary sources of strength which are never injurious and often indispensable. But, it is said, 1st, An army behind the lines is encumbered in its movements, whilst in the open field it is moveable. 2dly, Night is wholly favourable to the enemy who attacks, and who keeps the field. 3dly, This army can make its principal efforts and attacks wherever it pleases. 4thly, It has nothing to apprehend from withdrawing its troops from any part of its line. 5thly, Any one of its attacks that happens to succeed, separates the besieging army in its lines, and leaves it no means of forming a junction again, by which means it is obliged to take to flight, or to abandon its camp and lines, because it has no ground to rally upon between the lines and the place. 6thly, The army which awaits the enemy in its lines, may almost always be attacked at every point of the circumference; it can have none of its flanks secure, and can never be in a condition to resist an enemy who has once forced them.

But is it then impossible to plan camps and lines of circumvallation, and to form fortifications to protect them without any of these disadvantages? so that, 1st, The army may be left free in its movements; 2dly, The difficulties arising from nocturnal operations may fall wholly on the assailants; 3dly, That in whatever point the army may be attacked, it may always remain entire; 4thly, That it may be able to resume offensive operations, and alarm the enemy with respect to those parts of his camp, from which he may remove his troops; 5thly, That when penetrated in one point, the army shall not be necessarily disorganized on that account, or obliged to abandon its camp and park, and the siege, but may be able to form, without perceiving the want of depth in its camp; 6thly, and lastly, That in whatever point of the circumference it may be penetrated, it may not be deprived of the advantage of supporting its wings and flanks, of forming in order, and marching against the enemy before he is well established.

The problem may be resolved; the principles of field-fortification stand in need of improvement; this important part of the art of war has made no progress since the times of the ancients; nay, it is now inferior to what it was 2000 years ago. The engineers must be encouraged to

bring them to perfection, and to carry this branch of their art as far as the others. It is undoubtedly easier to pronounce sentence, and issue dogmatical condemnations from one's closet; besides, this system is sure to flatter the soldiers' inclination to idleness; both officers and privates dislike handling the pick-axe and spade; they therefore strive to outdo one another in echoing and repeating such notions as these; "Field fortifications are more injurious than use-"ful; there ought to be none constructed; victory "belongs to him who marches, advances, and "manœuvres; the soldier ought not to work; is "not war attended with fatigue enough?"— Flattering, yet despicable arguments!

CHAPTER X.

CAMPAIGN OF 1655.

I. Turenne's manœuvres on the banks of the Scheldt.—
II. Observations.

I.

The King's troops left their winter-quarters and assembled at the camp of Guise on the 10th of June, and on the 18th they invested Landrecy. The Spanish army encamped at Vadencourt near Guise, to intercept provisions on their way to the besieged; but they were abundantly supplied. But the Court, which was at La Fere, being alarmed by the parties sent out by this army, retired to Laon. Landrecy opened its gates after seventeen days' open trenches. The Spanish army then withdrew to a position between Mons and Valenciennes. The King placed himself at the head of Condé's army, which marched down the Sambre as far as Bussiere, retrograded from that place, crossed Avesnes, and invested la Capelle; at last, by a third counter-movement, it passed

the Sambre, and reached Bavay on the 11th of August. The intention was to pass the Haine, but the enemy had covered the opposite bank with intrenchments from Saint-Guislain to Condé. Turenne proposed to pass the Scheldt below Bouchain, and, leaving Valenciennes on the right, to march on Condé, where the army would pass the Scheldt a second time, and thus find itself in the rear of the enemy, after having turned his intrenchments, which would fall of themselves. This plan was followed, the army retrograded on Bouchain, and passed the Scheldt on the 13th at Neuville. The Spaniards followed the movements of the French, posted themselves at Valenciennes, passed the Scheldt below that town, took up a position with their right towards the wood of Saint-Amand, and their left towards the place, and began to repair the old lines of Mont Auzain. Turenne marched towards them by the left bank of the Scheldt; on his approach their resolution failed them; they raised their camp, and retreated, first on Condé and afterwards on Tournay: their rear-guard was closely pursued by Lieutenant-general Castelnau. The King encamped on the 16th at Fresnes, near Condé, repaired the bridges, and surrounded that place, which capitulated on the 19th. Its garrison, 2000 strong, re-entered the Spanish army. It was the custom, in this war, not to make the

garrisons prisoners, which favour was granted to expedite the surrender of the fortresses. It was during this siege that a foraging party, commanded by the *mestre-de-camp* Bussy Rabutin, with 1500 horse, having imprudently engaged in the pursuit of two squadrons which drew him into an ambuscade, would have been entirely destroyed, if the cavalry had not had the presence of mind to regain a defile in the rear in good order; they got off with the loss of a hundred men and a standard. On the 20th the army invested Saint-Guislain, a small place between Condé and Mons. The King and the Cardinal were present at this siege. It was difficult to form the lines of circumvallation, on account of the waters. The place was invested at night, so that the general's quarters were afterwards found to be under the cannon of the ramparts; they were obliged to remove at daylight. On the 25th the place capitulated. In the mean time the Spaniards divided their armies; the Archduke encamped at Notre Dame de Ham, Condé, and Tournay; the troops of Lorraine at Ath; the Prince de Ligne at Mons. At the end of November the troops went into winter-quarters, after having, since the 14th of September, occupied several camps, for no purpose, except to consume all the forage in the vicinity of them.

II.

Observation XVIII.—Turenne constantly observed the two maxims: 1st, *Never attack a position in front, when you can obtain it by turning it.* 2d, *Avoid doing what the enemy wishes; and that simply because he does wish it. Shun the field of battle which he has reconnoitred and studied; and more particularly that in which he has fortified and intrenched himself.*

Observation XIX.—In the course of this campaign, the *mestre-de-camp* Bussy, who commanded the escort of a foraging party, of 1500 chosen cavalry, marched through a defile to forage in a fine plain; he was surprised by a corps of cavalry of thrice the strength of his party, which would probably have been destroyed, had not the old troopers, with one accord, cried out, *To the defile!* By performing this movement with rapidity and coolness, the general saved his division. This is the advantage of veteran troops: they anticipated the order, and did the only thing that could have saved them.

CHAPTER XI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1656.

I. The King's army besieges Valenciennes; the Prince of Condé forces the circumvallation of Valenciennes.—II. Observations.

I.

In 1656, Don John of Austria, natural son to Philip IV. took the command of the Spanish army. In the beginning of June, Turenne assembled his army and invested Valenciennes; Marshal de la Ferté encamped on Mont Auzain, the household troops and those of Lorraine on Mount Huy, and Turenne's army by the side of the road from Mons to Baray. Marshal de la Ferté's quarters were separated from the rest of the army by the Scheldt, and by great inundations, of 1000 toises in width, which had induced Turenne to plant a double row of palisades along the lines on that side; but la Ferté on his arrival, out of a mere spirit of contradiction, had them pulled up. The Spanish army assembled at Douay, marched on Valenciennes towards the end of June, to compel the French to raise the siege; they approached within half cannon-shot of the lines of circumvallation, near the quarters of

the Lorraine troops, with their left resting on the Scheldt, over which they threw ten bridges, and their right on a rivulet on which they placed the same number. In this position they remained eight days intrenching themselves; they were 20,000 strong; the royal army was more numerous. The approaches went rapidly on, notwithstanding the presence of the enemy. The Spaniards sent back their baggage to Bouchain, passed the Scheldt on the 16th early at night, and attacked Marshal de la Ferté's lines. They reached the edge of the fossé undiscovered, attacked the lines throughout a front of ten battalions, and carried them without much resistance. Turenne hastened to the spot with two regiments, and followed by four more; but it was too late; the enemy had filled up the lines and communicated with the town. Marshal de la Ferté's army was in the greatest disorder; he himself had been taken with 4000 men, and above 400 officers. Marsin, with 4000 men, had made a false attack on Turenne's quarters, but had been warmly repulsed. Half the troops on duty in the trenches were lost; they were unable to evacuate them in time. The siege was raised. Turenne retreated on Quesnoy, where he took up a position. Just as he was quitting his lines he received a reinforcement of 1500 men, and on arriving under Quesnoy he was joined by 2000

more. Great diversity of opinion prevailed in his army, but he put a good face on the matter, and awaited the enemy in his camp, although he had no tools to intrench himself with.

The Spanish army soon made its appearance, and remained two days in position without daring to attack. In the mean time, 3000 men, part of the remains of Marshal de la Ferté's army, who had rallied on Landrecy, joined the army; the Spaniards then raised their camp, and marched on Condé. Turenne sent 1000 horse, with a sack of corn behind every saddle, to revictual that place; it was nevertheless taken.

After its surrender, Turenne passed the Scheldt, and marched into the plains of Lens, wishing to draw the war into Artois, where the King had a great number of fortified places. He was followed fifteen days afterwards by the enemy, on whose approach he retired on Houdain, drawing his provisions from Arras and Bethune; from that place he continued his movement on la Bussiere, between Houdain and Bethune, where he had reconnoitred an advantageous position; but fearing that the enemy, in advancing to Lens, might intercept his communications with Arras, he returned on that town. The Spanish army arrived before him, and took up a position within a quarter of a league of him. In the course of the night Turenne had several retrenchments cou-

structed. The position, order, and attitude of the French troops overawed the enemy, who decamped the next day and retreated on Lens, harassed by the French cavalry. From Lens the Spaniards went to invest Saint-Guislain. The French army approached the Somme, took la Capelle, and forced the enemy to raise the siege of Saint-Guislain. During the siege of la Capelle, the Spaniards had approached within a league of the lines of circumvallation, but had not dared to attack them: they had suffered the place to be taken in their sight. The French army remained in Cambresis until November, when it again passed the Somme, and went into winter-quarters.

The firmness of Marshal Turenne, after the disasters of Marshal de la Ferté in the lines of Valenciennes, saved the honour of the arms of France. In reward for so many services, the King made him colonel-general of the cavalry, which charge constantly remained in his house from that period.

II.

Observation XX.—1. The army commanded by Turenne was superior both in number and quality to the Spanish army: how came he to allow it to approach his quarters at Valenciennes, and not to march out of his lines to give it battle? His lines were far from equal to those of Arras;

and Marshal de la Ferté's position was evidently unsupported, separated from the rest of the army by a river and an inundation of 1000 toises: this circumstance alone ought to have determined him to engage.

2. But the stand he made after this check is much to be admired; the fact is, however, that the courage of his soldiers, as well as of those of Lorraine and the household troops, was unabated, as they had never fought, the rout of Marshal de la Ferté having taken place on the other side of the marsh; but what proves that the praises lavished upon him were merited is, that he was the only one of all the officers who was of opinion that it was advisable to wait for the enemy in the position of Quesnoy. This was because he had more talent than they; men think only of avoiding a present danger, without troubling themselves about the influence which their conduct may have on subsequent events: with common minds the impression of a defeat wears out but slowly and gradually. But what would have been the consequence if the opinion of the majority had been followed? — 1st, The marshal would not have been joined by the remains of la Ferté's army; and 2dly, a precipitate retreat would have intimidated the French army, which would have thought itself very inferior to the enemy, who would have grown more enterprising.

CHAPTER XII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1657.

I. Turenne takes Saint-Venant; he causes the siege of Ardres to be raised, and obtains possession of Mardick.—II. Observations.

I.

During the winter of 1657, France and England concluded an offensive and defensive league against Spain. Cromwell engaged to send 6000 infantry into France, on condition that Dunkirk should be besieged and surrendered to him. Charles II. whom France had acknowledged King of England, and the Duke of York, his brother, who was a lieutenant-general in the service of France, retired amongst the Spaniards, and raised several Irish regiments for the service of Spain. In the month of May, Turenne took the field. Perceiving that the Spaniards were directing their attention to the maritime places, he suddenly advanced on Cambray, and invested it; but Condé crossed the Meuse with all his cavalry, and reached Bouchain at ten o'clock in

the morning of the very day on which Cambray was invested. At eleven at night, he advanced under the place, with 3000 horse, overthrew the King's cavalry, and at day-break on the 31st of May, entered the covered way under the citadel, which produced the raising of the siege. Marshal de la Ferté besieged and took Montmedy. The Spaniards made a fruitless attempt upon Calais. Turenne, who had approached the sea, surrounded Saint-Venant on the 6th of August, and laid siege to that place. The Spanish army left its camp at Marienburg, and on the 20th of August reached Calonne on the Lys, near Saint-Venant; but, not thinking it expedient to attack the French lines, marched to Ardres, and besieged that town. Saint-Venant beat a parley on the 27th. Turenne immediately marched to the relief of Ardres, and forced the enemy to raise the siege. On the 3d of October he besieged Mardick, which he took in a few days, and delivered up to the English, agreeably to the treaty. The Spanish army encamped under the cannon of Dunkirk. In November both armies went into winter-quarters; that of Turenne cantoned in the Boulonais.

II.

Observation XXI.—The conduct of the Prince of Condé on this occasion was admired, and this

action was reckoned one of his most brilliant. If the marshal had had forty-eight hours before him, and had been protected by his lines, his adversary's manœuvre would have failed. In the preceding chapter we have seen that when Marshal Turenne besieged la Capelle, he was indebted to his lines of circumvallation for the taking of that place; for Don John having approached within cannon-shot, reconnoitred them, but durst not attack them. There was a second instance of this kind at Saint-Venant; the place was taken owing to its circumvallation, in the presence of the enemy's army. Thousands of similar instances might be mentioned in the 15th and 16th centuries, and in every nation of Europe. And yet there are people who ask what is the use of lines of circumvallation. These works have been brought into disrepute, and it is laid down as a principle that they ought never to be formed!

CHAPTER XIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1658.

I. Siege of Dunkirk. Battle of the Downs (June 14)—II. Marches and manœuvres during the remainder of the campaign.—III. Observations.

I.

In the course of the winter, Marshal d'Hocquincourt betrayed his King and country, and went over to the enemy under the most frivolous pretences. The siege of Dunkirk had been determined on by the Courts of Paris and London; the burghers raised the sluices, and the whole country as far as Bergues was converted into a lake. The garrison consisted of 3000 picked men. Turenne first marched to Cassel, then passed the Lys at Saint-Venant, approached the Colme, passed it without impediment, and advanced on Dunkirk, crossing the flood by means of a great number of fascines, hurdles, and

planks, the water being far from deep. The infantry crossed it carrying their arms, the water reaching only to their waists. This siege was attended with unusual difficulty, from the circumstance of there being no wood about the town; but the English squadron cruising in the roads brought every thing that was necessary by sea. Turenne did not forget to form lines of circumvallation and countervallation, which were supported on the sea from East to West. The greatest difficulty was to secure the strand; for this purpose a double estacade was constructed, behind which gun-boats were placed. When these works were finished, the English admiral landed 6000 English, who formed the brigade commanded by Morgan, an officer of reputation. The French army daily received reinforcements. The trenches were opened with two attacks, one made by the French, and the other by the English. The news of these events reached Brussels in rapid succession, and created the greatest alarm at the Archduke's court. Dunkirk was of the utmost importance to Spain; and the Archduke resolved to risk every thing to preserve that place. His army assembled at Ypres on the 10th of June, and on the 13th appeared in sight of Dunkirk, and took up a position on the Downs, at the distance of a league from the besiegers, with the right towards the sea and the left to-

wards the canal of Furnes. The Spaniards were so certain that their mere appearance would relieve the place, that they presented themselves without artillery and without tools to intrench themselves with; their park having been accidentally delayed on the march. Marshal d'Hocquincourt, having proceeded to reconnoitre the French lines, was killed in a skirmish: a just punishment for his crime. On the 14th of June, at day-break, Turenne formed his army beyond his lines; the left, composed of the English, was supported on the sea, the right, commanded by the Marquis de Crequi, rested on the canal of Furnes. Turenne drew up his army in three lines; the first, consisting of ten battalions and twenty-eight squadrons, fourteen of which were in the left wing, and fourteen in the right, and the artillery in front; the second of six battalions and twenty squadrons, ten in the right wing, and ten in the left; and the third in reserve, consisting of ten squadrons: the army, thus formed, occupied a league. Several English frigates and gun-boats lay along the shore, and annoyed the right flank of the Spaniards. Turenne's army consisted in all of 15,000 men, 6000 of whom were cavalry; the Spanish army amounted to 14,000 men, including 8000 cavalry. Don John placed himself on the right, the Prince of Condé on the left; all the infantry,

consisting of fifteen battalions, was drawn up in a single line; the cavalry of the right was formed in two lines behind the infantry; that of the left in six lines, which disposition was rendered necessary by the nature of the ground. This army had no artillery. Its right was broken by the English; the Prince of Condé made more resistance on the left; at one moment he even appeared likely to penetrate into the place, and ran great personal risk; but at length his troops were broken, and the victory of the French was complete. The fugitives were pursued as far as the ramparts of Furnes. The French army took 4000 prisoners; its loss was trivial. Turenne returned into his lines, and pushed on the siege with activity. On the 24th of June the place surrendered; this was the tenth day after the battle, and the eighteenth of open trenches. Turenne immediately surrounded Bergue, which place, after a siege of a few days, proposed to capitulate; but, as he refused to allow the garrison to rejoin their army, they disbanded, and a great number of them escaped across the morasses. The French army entered the place.

II.

The Spaniards held a council at Nieuport. Don John proposed to station the army along the canal, between Nieuport and Dixmude, in

order to dispute the passage; others proposed to disperse the infantry in the fortresses, and protract the war. This plan was adopted; the Prince of Condé threw himself into Ostend, the Count of Fuensaldes into Nieuport, Don John into Bruges, and the Prince of Ligne into Ypres. On the 3d of July, Turenne took possession of Furnes, which made no resistance; he then appeared before Dixmude. The Spaniards had been ten days at work repairing the fortifications; nevertheless the place surrendered on the 6th of July. These successes were suspended for a few days by a dangerous sickness which threatened the life of the King, who was then at Calais, and the delay was very advantageous to the Spaniards. On the 4th of August, Marshall de la Ferté besieged Gravelines; Turenne covered the siege, which lasted twenty-six days. After the fall of that place, he took Oudenarde; at that siege he formed no lines; it was not, indeed, worth while; Oudenarde held out only forty-eight hours. The season was not yet far advanced; it was thought that the army would march on Brussels, but Turenne preferred approaching the maritime towns: he advanced on Menin, and cut to pieces a detachment of 2000 men, commanded by the Prince of Ligne before Ypres, which town he seized, as well as many other small places; and after having conquered the

whole country between the Lys and the Scheldt, he left 5000 infantry in garrison in the places taken, and reconducted his army into France, where he went into winter-quarters. The peace of the Pyrenees was not signed until the 7th of November 1659, but it was preceded by a truce between the two crowns which was signed in the beginning of the year. This peace concluded a war which had lasted twenty-four years. Alsace, Rousillon, and Artois, were definitively ceded to France.

III.

Observation XXII.—1. The battle of the Downs was Turenne's most brilliant action. He had three great advantages: 1st, a numerical superiority: 15,000 men in the field against 14,000; 9000 infantry against 6000, and ground ill adapted to horse, which rendered the superiority of the Spaniards in cavalry of no use to them. 2dly, He had artillery, and his enemy had none. 3dly, The English ships at anchor in the roads cannonaded the right flank of the Spaniards, and swept the strand, and the more effectually, as Don John had no cannon to keep the English boats at a distance. Turenne was victorious, as was to be expected.

2. His order of battle was parallel; he had no manœuvre to execute, nor any thing out

of the ordinary course to perform. As soon as he received intelligence that the enemy was approaching the lines, he resolved to attack him, before he knew that he was coming without artillery. He had profited by his experience at Valenciennes. When he had resolved to attack, it would have been wrong to defer the action for a single day, as that would have afforded the Spaniards time to intrench themselves.

Don John deserved his defeat for advancing within sight of Turenne without artillery or tools to intrench himself with. It was not with such culpable negligence that Turenne presented himself before the lines of Arras. He might have occupied the position of Mouchy by ten o'clock in the morning; but he took care not to do so; he remained all day behind a rivulet, and in the evening took up his position: he therefore had the whole night to intrench himself in.

Observation XXIII.—After the taking of Dunkirk, and so brilliant a victory as that of the Downs, the junction of Marshal la Ferté, who had just taken Montmedy, and with the inestimable advantage of commanding the sea, Turenne might have done more than he did. He ought to have struck a grand blow, and taken Brussels, which would have rendered the French arms far more illustrious, and accelerated the conclusion of peace. An event of such import-

ance would have produced the fall of all the small places. Turenne infringed the rule which says, "Avail yourself of the favour of Fortune, while she is in the humour; beware that she does not change, through resentment of your neglect: she is a woman."

Observation XXIV.—The conduct of the Spanish garrison of Bergues is remarkable. The besiegers refuse to let them march out with their arms, and without being made prisoners of war; they disperse, each shifts for himself, and escapes over the morasses; five-sixths of them rejoin their army. Why were these noble resolutions not foreseen? The keys of a place are at any time worth the liberty of its garrison, when the garrison is resolved not to leave it otherwise than free.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAMPAIGN OF 1667.

I. The King recommences the war; and enters Belgium, with Turenne under him. He takes Lisle, Douay, and Oudenarde.—II. Observations.

I.

THE death of Philip IV. put an end to the peace of the Pyrenees. Louis XIV. made some pretensions to claims on Belgium; after long and fruitless negotiations, he determined on war; and collected, in April 1667, an army of 35,000 men, including 10,000 cavalry. He gave the command to Turenne, and went to Amiens to place himself at the head of his troops, declaring the Queen Regent. He divided his army into three corps; the main body, composed of the principal forces with which he marched, advanced on Charleroi; the corps of observation of the right, commanded by the Marquis de Crequi, directed its march on Luxembourg; and the corps of observation on the left, under Marshal d'Aumont, marched along the sea-side. The King took Douay, Oudenarde,

and other small places without striking a blow, and laid siege to Lisle. Marshal d'Aumont took possession of Bergues, Furnes, Armentieres, and Courtrai. Lisle was a very strong place, and had a garrison of 6000 picked men; the inhabitants, warmly devoted to Spain, reckoned 20,000 men capable of bearing arms. The place was invested in August; the lines of circumvallation were immediately formed; they were very extensive, which determined the King to recall the Marquis de Crequi's corps. On the 28th of August, the garrison capitulated, after ten days' open trenches; it was reduced to 2400 men, and was sent to Ypres. In the mean time the Prince of Ligne and the Count de Marsin had advanced to succour the place. The King attacked them, made 1500 prisoners, and took five standards and five pair of kettle-drums from them. The plenipotentiaries were assembled at Aix la Chapelle; they signed a treaty of pacification, which put an end to the war.

II.

Observation XXV.—At least one half of an army, at this period, was composed of cavalry; they had little artillery, one piece and a half to 1000 men; the infantry was drawn up in four ranks, the fourth being armed with pikes.

At present four fifths of every army are in-

fantry; one fifth at most is cavalry; there are four pieces of artillery to every 1000 men, one fourth of which are howitzers; the infantry is drawn up in three ranks; pikes and spontoons are abolished. The fire of the third rank is allowed to be very imperfect, and even hurtful to that of the first and second; the front rank is required to place one knee on the ground in firing by battalion, and in independent firing the third rank charges the musquets of the second. This order is bad; the infantry ought to be drawn up in two ranks only, because the musquet allows of firing only in this order; it would be necessary for this weapon to be six feet long, and chargeable at the breech, to enable the third rank to fire with effect. In drawing up the infantry in two ranks, they would require a supernumerary rank of a ninth, or one man to a toise, and to place a reserve in two lines at twelve toises behind the flanks.

It was Vauban who effected the abolition of pikes as useless; all Europe sooner or later imitated this alteration, with good reason; fire-arms are the principal weapons of the moderns.

CHAPTER XV.

CAMPAIGN OF 1672.

I. Campaign of Holland; passage of the Rhine, the King, Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg being present.—II. Marches and manœuvres after the King's departure, to protect his allies, the Bishops of Munster and Cologne, and to cover Alsace.—III. Observations.

I.

Holland had attained the highest degree of prosperity: she was mistress of the commerce of India, and possessed upwards of 12,000 ships; Amsterdam was the storehouse of the world, and the centre of commerce. Holland concluded the treaty of the triple alliance, with England and Sweden, against France, and treated with every court in Europe to induce them to join this league. After long negotiations, France laid this storm, and succeeded in detaching England and Sweden from the triple alliance, and in combining with the Bishop of Munster and the Elector of Cologne, enemies to Holland. She also secured the neutrality of Austria and Sweden, and, in concert with England, declared war against Hol-

land. In the course of April 1672, the King went to Charleroi; his army, consisting of 110,000 men, was assembled on the Sambre; the Duke of Luxembourg was detached with a body of troops to proceed into Westphalia, there to join the forces of the Bishop of Munster, and to attack East Friesland: 30,000 men were placed under the command of the Prince of Condé; the rest of the army was commanded by Turenne, under the immediate command of the King.

On the appearance of this threatening storm, the different parties in the Republic were violently agitated. The Orange party gained the day, and the Prince of Orange was proclaimed Captain-general and High-admiral. He equipped a fleet of seventy-two ships, which he intrusted to De Ruyter; he raised numerous militia forces, with which he garrisoned the fortresses, and he assembled an active army of 25,000 men. Spain sent him a reinforcement of 6000 infantry, who landed at Ostend. A corps of Spanish cavalry entered Maestricht, which increased the garrison to 12,000 men. Turenne did not think it expedient to waste his time in besieging this place, but preferred neglecting it and marching on the Lower Rhine, proceeding up the left bank through the states of the Elector of Cologne. This plan being adopted, he set out with 20,000 men, surrounded the little town of Maseyck, which cut

off the communications of Maestricht with Holland, and left 5000 men there to keep in check the 12,000 of the garrison of Maestricht. The Prince of Condé passed the Rhine; the King and Turenne marched down the left bank; the fortresses belonging to the Elector of Cologne opened their gates to the French army. In the beginning of June, Wesel, Burich, and Rheinberg were invested, and surrendered in a few days; the Prince of Condé besieged and took Emmerich; the Prince of Orange stationed his forces on the Yssel; the season was very dry, and the waters of the Rhine uncommonly low. At the point where the Yssel separates from the Rhine, and beyond the point at which the Waal begins, opposite the fort of Tolhuys, there is a practicable ford. The Prince of Condé passed it with his cavalry, and overthrew the Dutch troops that defended the left bank. The next day the army passed over a bridge. Condé, being wounded by a musquet-shot in the hand, relinquished his command. The King, with the main body of the army, marched on the Yssel, opposite Doesburg. Turenne, in a few weeks, got possession of the whole country as far as Naarden and Utrecht; the Duke of Luxembourg occupied all Friesland; Groningen, Dewinter, and Zwol, fell into his power. Amsterdam surrounded itself with floods, and found safety in the waters. The Prince of

Orange covered the important position of Utrecht as long as he could; but at length he was compelled to give it up, and the King entered it on the 5th of July. In the mean time these unparalleled conquests filled the Court of London and all Germany with alarm. The King of England sent plenipotentiaries to the camp of Louis XIV.; and, in concert with the French plenipotentiaries, they offered peace to the Republic. The conditions were the payment of a subsidy to France and England, to reimburse the charges of the war; the acknowledgement of the salute and of the English flag, and the cession to France of the places she had taken on the Meuse. The Republic refused these proposals, and England continued to make common cause with France.

II.

The King quitted the army on the 12th of July, to return to his capital, leaving the command to Turenne. A few days after, a dreadful insurrection broke out at the Hague; the people massacred the Grand Pensionary De Witt and his brother; the Prince of Orange was declared Stadtholder. But the Emperor, the Elector of Brandenburg, and several German princes, alarmed at the progress of the French armies, and the dangerous state of Holland, took up arms

without delay. Montecuculli and the Duke of Bournonville marched from Egra, towards the end of August, at the head of 18,000 men, 6000 of whom were cavalry, and encamped at Erfurth on the 13th of September. The Elector of Brandenburg, surnamed the Grand Elector, set out from Potzdam, and arrived at the same time at Lypstadt; the two armies joined at Mulhausen in Thuringia, nine leagues from the Weser; they amounted together to 40,000 men. Turenne, fully sensible how much it concerned the honour of his master's arms to support the Bishop of Munster and the Elector of Cologne, marched from Holland with 12,000 men, went up the Rhine as far as Wesel, placed a garrison in that fortress, as well as at Emmerich, Rees, and Nuys, and on the 10th of September entered the country of Munster. A few days afterwards he received a reinforcement of 4000 men, which, added to the troops of Munster and Cologne, made his army equal to that of the Imperialists, who were marching towards the Rhine, apparently with the intention of carrying the war to the left bank of that river. The Prince of Condé, with 18,000 men, was in Alsace, and the Duke of Duras on the Meuse, with a corps of observation. Turenne marched up the Rhine, crossed the duchy of Berg, and proceeded to the Lahn; the enemy had advanced on the Mein. The

two armies remained in presence until the 12th of October, when the Imperialists took up a position on the left bank of the Lahn; the Grand Elector fixed his quarters at Giessen, where he was joined by the Duke of Lorraine. Turenne determined to repass the Rhine at Andernach, and extended his army into the electorate of Treves, which was secretly in alliance with the Emperor, and which he laid under contribution. Montecuculli, having fallen sick at the commencement of the campaign, had returned to Vienna; the Grand Elector commanded the army; he at first seemed to intend to penetrate to the left bank of the Rhine by the bridge of Coblentz, which the Elector of Treves had given up to him. Soon afterwards he altered his demonstrations, and directed his march on the bridge of Mentz, but was refused a passage. The Prince, as well as the Elector Palatine, had adopted the system of neutrality. The Grand Elector then hastened by forced marches to Strasburg. Condé anticipated him; and by placing a few boats laden with fire-works under the bridge, burnt it down. At length, on the 3d of November, the Grand Elector constructed a bridge at cannon-shot distance below Mentz, passed to the left bank, and got into the Luxembourg country. Turenne, manœuvring on his communications, determined him to repass the Rhine. All these marches and

countermarches produced no result but the devastation of the electorates of Mentz and Treves and the Palatinate, which excited the loudest complaints from the sovereigns of those states. Thus ended the campaign of 1672. France protected her allies, the Elector of Cologne and the Bishop of Munster, and defended Alsace and the left bank of the Rhine.

III.

Observation XXVI.—Louis XIV. took the field with 100,000 men, three-fourths of whom were infantry, and with a battering and field train of artillery. This was a new era in the military art.

1. The defensive forces of Holland consisted only of militia, and of 25,000 soldiers of the line; how could she make head against 130,000 men? the Elector of Cologne and the Bishop of Munster making common cause with France.

2. The passage of the Rhine is a military operation of the fourth order, for at that point the river is fordable, being diminished by the Waal, and was only defended by a handful of men.

3. The army took sixty fortified places in a short time; but there is no glory in conquest where there is no danger: these places were only garrisoned by ill-armed militia.

4. When masters of Utrecht and Naarden, the French might have possessed themselves of

Amsterdam, which would have ended the war. They knew not how to profit by occurrences.

5. Louvois thought proper to send back 20,000 prisoners, who were immediately armed again and increased the army of the Prince of Orange.

6. He had the army dispersed in fifty fortresses, by which means it was so much weakened that it could perform nothing. They should have demolished forty-five of these places, carried all the artillery belonging to them into France, and preserved four or five to facilitate the communications of the army.

7. Turenne enjoyed the principal share of the King's confidence, and it is to him that these errors ought to be ascribed. It does not appear that he opposed their commission publicly and with energy. He might have entered Amsterdam on the very day that his troops entered Naarden.

Louis XIV. was a great king. It was he who raised France to the first rank amongst the nations of Europe; he was the first of her kings that had 400,000 soldiers, and a hundred ships at sea: he added Franche Comté, Rousillon, and Flanders to France: he placed one of his children on the throne of Spain. But the revocation of the edict of Nantes, the dragoonings, the bull *Unigenitus*, the two hundred millions of debt, Ver-

sailles, Marly, that worthless favourite Madame de Maintenon, Villeroi, Tallard, Marsin, &c. !— But has not even the sun its spots? Since Charlemagne, what king of France can be compared to Louis XIV., in every point of view?

Observation XXVII.—Turenne's march on the right bank of the Rhine, to support the King's allies, was at once politic and military; he was insensible to the murmurs of his army. The soldiers were reluctant to commence a winter campaign in a distant country, at a moment when they were anxiously expecting to go into winter-quarters. His marches from the gates of Amsterdam to those of Munster, Cologne, and Treves, were rapid, and worthy of remark.

CHAPTER XVI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1673.

I. Winter campaign; Turenne takes Unna, compels the enemy to raise the siege of Soest, passes the Weser, and obliges the Grand Elector to sign a treaty of peace in April.—II. Marches and manœuvres in June, July, August, September, October, &c. Montecuculli deceives Turenne, and joins the Prince of Orange at Bonn.—III. Observations.

I.

THE Grand Elector again passed over to the right bank of the Rhine, marched on Wetzlar, left a corps of observation there, and divided his army into three corps, which advanced on Westphalia in three different directions, and besieged Werle; but the Marquis of Rennel, commanding the troops of the Elector of Cologne, compelled him to raise this siege, laid an ambuscade for him, defeated him, and took one of his divisions; upon which he determined to collect his army at Lipstadt. On this intelligence Turenne passed the Rhine opposite Wesel, hastened to the aid of the Bishop of Munster, and joined the two armies of Cologne and Munster. The Grand Elector, whose army was reduced to

20,000 men and thirty pieces of cannon, marched on Soest, which place he invested on the 4th of February. Turenne, with the armies of France, Munster, and Cologne, invested Unna; that town capitulated on the 5th of February. He then marched against the Grand Elector, but the latter raised his camp, and abandoned part of his besieging artillery. Turenne entered Soest in triumph on the 25th of February. The Prussian and Austrian soldiers were much exasperated against each other, and frequent conflicts occurred between them; which circumstance, added to the rapidity of Turenne's movements, induced the German generals to disjoin their army. But notwithstanding the ice, snow, and inclemency of the season, Turenne followed the Prussian army, took all the Grand Elector's fortresses, caused the Munster troops to invest Lippstadt and Minden, and passed the Weser over the stone bridge of the town of Hexter. The Dukes of Brunswick had assembled 12,000 men to enforce respect to the neutrality of their territories; the Imperial Army had retired into Franconia; that of the Grand Elector into the principality of Halberstadt; this prince in person had repassed the Elbe, and returned to his capital. Turenne returned into the county of La Marck, and fixed his head-quarters at Soest. He abandoned the countries belonging to the Grand

Elector, situate in Westphalia, to his troops, who speedily enriched themselves. These events induced the Grand Elector to sue for peace, which was signed on the 10th of April.

Having thus got rid of the Prussians, Turenne marched into Thuringia to attack the Austrians who were assembling in Bohemia, and threatening to proceed to the Rhine. On the 1st of June he encamped at Wetzlar, and took up a position on the right bank of the Rhine.

II.

In the mean time Louis XIV. had surrounded Maestricht, which capitulated on the 23d of June. The Prince of Condé wished to besiege Bois-le-Duc, but the Dutch having inundated the whole country as far as Bergen-op-Zoom, he was obliged to raise the siege. England, Spain, and the Emperor signed a treaty of alliance with Holland at the Hague. Montecuculli marched from Egra, on the 26th of August, and entered Franconia. Turenne, at the head of 20,000 men, marched to Aschaffenburg, on the Mein, and took possession of all the bridges over that river, as far as Wurtzburg bridge, which the Prince Bishop undertook to guard. Montecuculli's army had increased to 40,000 men, through the junction of the armies of Saxony and Lorraine. Turenne, after having waited for him a long time in

his camp at Aschaffenburg, marched to meet him, passed the Tauber at Megentheim, and approached the Austrian army encamped at Rothenburg. Montecuculli, in order to cover his retreat, pretended to accept battle, and encamped behind the morasses between Wurtzburg and Oschenfurth. Turenne occupied the position of the Chartreuse of Tengelhausen; the two armies remained fifteen days in presence of each other. Montecuculli gained over the Prince Bishop, and passed the river over Wurtzburg bridge. All Turenne's manœuvres were now frustrated; he therefore marched down the bank of the Mein. In the course of October he received a reinforcement of 4000 men.

The declaration of war changed the theatre of hostilities, which were removed from Holland into Belgium. The Prince of Orange, with 25,000 men, marched up the left bank of the Rhine as far as Bonn, and invested that town. Montecuculli proceeded along the right bank of the Mein to Mentz, where he passed the Rhine, pretending an intention of marching into Alsace by the left bank. Turenne was deceived, and hastened with all possible despatch to Philipsburg; but Montecuculli without delay embarked his infantry on the Rhine, which he descended as far as Cologne, and joined the Prince of Orange. They then pushed on the siege of Bonn with

great activity. Turenne, greatly mortified at having been deceived, descended the Rhine and crossed the Hundsdruck; but Bonn had already capitulated after nine days' open trenches. Both armies went into winter-quarters: the French into Alsace, and the enemy into the Palatinate, and the electorate of Mentz.

III.

Observation XXVIII.—The Marshal made longer marches in this campaign than in the preceding one. During the winter of 1672–3, he marched from the Lower Rhine to the Weser, braving the frosts of the Northern regions. 1st, He saved the Elector of Cologne and the Archbishop of Munster, the King's allies; 2dly, He defeated the Prussian army and compelled the Grand Elector to detach himself from the Emperor, and to make his peace. He therefore made a good use of his time, and turned his forced marches and severe fatigues to a good account.

Observation XXIX.—Montecuculli completely deceived and imposed upon Turenne. He got rid of him, and sent him marching into Alsace, whilst he himself proceeded to Cologne, and joined the Prince of Orange, who was besieging and taking Bonn. Turenne's conduct on this occasion has been censured. 1st, He manœuvred at too great a distance from his enemy. 2dly,

He did not act according to Montecuculli's movements, but ascribed to him an intention of entering France, without any foundation whatever. Yet Holland was the centre of the military operations. Yet no one knew better than Turenne that war is not a conjectural art; he ought to have regulated his movements by those of his adversary, and not by his own ideas. 3dly, Montecuculli would have been insulated in Alsace, and would have had to engage the united armies of Condé and Turenne; whilst under the walls of Bonn he found himself on the grand rendezvous, where the momentous question was to be decided, far from Condé's army, and covering Holland and Belgium. This march established the reputation of Montecuculli. The error committed by Turenne on this occasion was a blemish to his glory; it was the greatest fault of which this distinguished commander ever was guilty. Montecuculli was an Italian, a native of Modena; the Capraras of Bologna are of his family.

CHAPTER XVII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1674.

I. Turenne crosses to the right bank of the Rhine; action of Sintzheim (June 16).—II. Battle of Entzheim (October 4).—III. Camp of Dettweillers.—IV. Turenne evacuates Alsace, and repasses the Vosges. Action of Turckheim (January 5). Conquest of Alsace.—V. Observations.

I.

This year, all the princes of the empire who had hitherto remained neutral, made common cause with the Emperor. The Elector of Cologne and the Bishop of Munster broke off their alliance with the King, and added their troops to the Imperial Army. Bavaria and Hanover were the only German states whose princes persisted in the system of neutrality. The King entered Franche Comté in April, and took possession of that province; the Prince of Condé carried the war into Belgium; Marshal Scomberg commanded the army on the Pyrenees, and Turenne the Army of Germany. The Duke of Lorraine, whose army was reduced to 2000 horse, marched on the forest towns, intending to pass the Rhine, in order to penetrate into

Lorraine, but he failed; he then marched up the right bank, and joined Count Caprara's army on the Necker. Turenne encamped at Hochfelden, near Saverne, where he heard that the Duke of Bournonville was assembling an army at Egra, to reinforce Count Caprara. He resolved to prevent their junction, passed the Rhine at Philipsburg, on the 12th of June, with 9000 men and six pieces of cannon, and reached Vissloch on the 15th; he continued his march on Eppingen on the 16th, but, on reaching Hoffheim, he discovered the Imperial Army on the heights of Sintzheim, a little town situate on the Eltzbach, half way between the Necker and Philipsburg. The two armies were equal in number: that of Count Caprara amounted to 9000 men, including 5000 cavalry; that of Turenne also consisted of 9000 men, of whom only 700 were cavalry. Turenne ordered his infantry to attack Sintzheim, and by his great superiority in this kind of force, he carried this post notwithstanding the obstinate defence that was made. He passed the defile, attacked the enemy's cavalry, marching in several lines, with his squadrons intermixed with small battalions of infantry. Caprara was beaten, and forced to abandon the field of battle; he lost 2500 men, 500 of whom were taken prisoners. The loss of the French amounted to 1500 men *hors de combat*.

II.

Some days after this victory, Turenne repassed the Rhine and encamped at Neustadt, where he received sixteen battalions and 6000 horse, which increased his army to 18,000 men. On the 3d of July he repassed the Rhine, leaving Heydelberg on his right, and proceeded to Wailhingen on the Necker. In the mean time the Duke of Bournonville joined the remains of Caprara's troops at Worms: which raised his forces to 15,000 men. He marched on Manheim, but retreated, to avoid a battle, on seeing Turenne, who being master of the whole Palatinate, set fire to two towns and twenty-five villages, by order of Louis XIV. The Elector Palatine was uncle to Turenne; from the top of his castle of Manheim he witnessed this conflagration, and heard the cries of his wretched subjects whom the soldiers were slaughtering; he sent a challenge to the Marshal, which is dated the 27th of July. A few days afterwards, Turenne repassed the Rhine, and encamped at Landau. The Imperial Army stationed itself between Mentz and Frankfort, where it remained a month, and was joined by the contingents of the empire. The Duke of Bournonville, having then 35,000 men, approached Philipsburg; on the 1st of September, he repassed the Rhine, and directed his march by the right bank

on Strasburg, of which place he took possession on the 24th of September, by means of a secret intelligence established with the magistrates of that town. This news disconcerted Turenne, who marched up the Rhine, and encamped at the gates of Strasburg, with his left towards the Ill, his right on morasses; and the village of Wantzenau behind him. The Duke of Bournonville came out of Strasburg, and encamped at St. Blaise, with his right on the Rhine, intercepting the road to Saverne. Turenne had 25,000 men; the Germans nearly 40,000. They waited for the Grand Elector, who was on his march with 25,000 men; in consequence of which the Marshal, notwithstanding his inferiority, resolved to risk a battle. He raised his camp at midnight, passed the river of Souffel at Lampertheim, leaving Strasburg on his left; he marched in three columns, took possession of the town of Achenheim, passed the Bruch, and discovered the enemy's camp behind Entzheim, with its right supported on a large wood on the Strasburg side, its left on a small wood of 1000 paces by 500, and the village of Entzheim in front of the centre. The French army marched all night, and formed in the plain on the left and in advance of the village of Hulsheim. Thus, on the 4th of October, the two armies were in presence of each other. The right of Turenne's army was formed

by seventeen squadrons under the command of the Marquis de Vaubrun; four squadrons of dragoons were intermixed with platoons of infantry; nineteen battalions of infantry were in the centre, commanded by Lieut.-general Foucault; twenty-one squadrons of dragoons or heavy cavalry, were on the left, likewise intermixed with platoons of infantry; the second line was formed on the right by fourteen squadrons, on the left by fifteen squadrons, and in the centre by seven battalions, the cavalry being likewise mixed with platoons of infantry; in the third line was the corps of reserve, of seven squadrons and three battalions. The enemy's right, commanded by Count Caprara, consisted of twenty squadrons; the centre, of twenty battalions, was commanded by the Duke of Bournonville in person: the Duke of Holstein commanded the left, twenty-one squadrons strong; twenty battalions in the centre, and nineteen squadrons in each wing, formed the second line; the third was composed of eleven battalions in the centre, twenty squadrons on the right, and twenty squadrons on the left.

Turenne began the action by sending the Marquis de Boufflers, with eight squadrons of dismounted dragoons, supported by a battery, to attack the little wood on the right of the enemy. Both armies, sensible of the

importance of this position, successively sent reinforcements to their troops engaged at this point. The French, however, carried the first line of the intrenchments which the enemy's general had had constructed before this wood; they took three pieces of cannon; but they could not force the second line, which was defended by eight pieces of cannon. Turenne was obliged to order the corps of reserve, and six battalions of the second line, to advance; the carnage soon became dreadful. The second intrenchment was forced; the Germans were driven from the wood, and lost their cannon. The Duke of Bournonville then ordered seven battalions of Lunenburg troops to advance to retake the wood. Turenne, on his side, ordered up the rest of the battalions of his second line, and thus the action was renewed for the third time. The Germans had one advantage: their lines were nearer to the wood than those of the French, and they were therefore supported by their cavalry and artillery. Turenne, perceiving this, brought forward the cavalry of his second line into the position of that of his first, which he advanced still farther. At length the enemy was vanquished, and obliged to relinquish the position of the wood. The Duke of Bournonville, seeing that Turenne's efforts were made on that side, sent Caprara with all his cavalry from the right, to

make their way between the first and second lines of the French, whilst he himself, with the cavalry of the right of his line, and with his second and third line, marched forward against Turenne's cavalry of the left. Foucault, who commanded the centre of the first line, seeing the double movement of the enemy, formed his infantry in two lines, and ordered six battalions to march forward, supported by some artillery, which stopped short the cavalry commanded by the Duke of Bournonville. In the mean time Caprara continued his movement; he overthrew several squadrons, and turned on the rear of the cavalry of the left, and the infantry of the centre. The Count de Lorge and the Count d'Auvergne rallied the cavalry of the reserve, broke that of Caprara, and repulsed it: the rest of the battle consisted of cannonading. Both armies beat a retreat during the night. Turenne repassed the Bruch, and encamped at Achenheim, one league from the field of battle, on which he left twenty squadrons. The Duke of Bournonville retired under the cannon of Strasburg, abandoning two pieces of cannon in his positions, besides the eight pieces lost at the attack of the wood. The French lost 2000 men; the Germans double that number: several standards, kettle-drums, and colours, were the trophies of the victor.

III.

On the 7th of October, Turenne took up a position more in the rear, and removed three leagues farther, covering himself by the little river of Massig, and covering Saverne and Haguenau; he occupied the castle of Wasslonne, belonging to the Strasburghers. On the 14th of October the Grand Elector passed the bridge of Strasburg with 20,000 men, whereby the Imperial Army was increased to upwards of 50,000 men. Immediately after this important junction, the Duke of Bournonville again pitched his camp at Entzheim. Great alarm now prevailed in France: the King called out the *arriére ban*. The Imperialists had the choice of three measures: to give battle to Turenne, to cut off his communications with Saverne, and thereby reduce Haguenau, or to besiege Philipsburg; but they did nothing at all, and remained inactive in their camp until the 18th, when they advanced towards Turenne, who retreated, and encamped at Dettweillers. This was a difficult march, and the enemy would have gained some advantages, if Turenne had not ordered a brigade of dragoons to alight at a defile, which stopped the enemy's cavalry short. The army was reinforced by 6000 horse of the *arriére ban*, under command of the Marquis de Crequi; Turenne fortified his camp

at Dettweillers, where he was covered by the Zorn; his left extended to Hochfelden. The enemy surrounded the little castle of Wasslonne, which had a garrison of 150 men; this siege lasted a day and a half; the Grand Elector wished to make the garrison prisoners of war, but they refused to submit to this treatment, and rejoined their army, according to the custom of the time. Turenne received a new reinforcement of thirty-five squadrons and eight battalions; the Count de Saulx also brought him twenty-four squadrons and ten battalions; he ordered them to halt in Lorraine. He was then meditating the operation which he executed two months afterwards.

As soon as the Grand Elector was informed of the numerous reinforcements which the French army was receiving, he returned to his camp of Saint-Blaise under Strasburg. On the 20th of November Turenne cantoned his cavalry two leagues behind the Moder, and pushed his headquarters to Ingweiller, communicating with Lorraine by the pass of la Petite-Pierre, and occupying the castle there. It seems that his principal object was to cover Haguenau, fearing that the enemy would get possession of that place. But the latter had no such intention, and spread themselves into Upper Alsace.

IV.

On the 29th of November, Turenne re-entered Lorraine, and entirely evacuated Alsace; he fixed his head-quarters at Lorquin; the Allies went into winter-quarters. On the 5th of December he sent forward Count de Saulx with 14,000 men, whom he had brought from Flanders, and began his march with the rest of the army, passing along the foot of the Vosges on the Lorraine side. On the 27th he reached Belfort; his head-quarters had been successively at Blamont, Bucaret, Domptail, Padoux, Eloyes, and Longuet, where he remained eight days; he then went to Remiremont, which place was occupied by 400 Lorrainers, whom he dislodged. This march remained wholly unknown to the enemy. On the 29th he advanced his head-quarters to Grunn, marched on Mulhausen, where he met one of Bournonville's divisions, composed of infantry, baggage, and 6000 horse, who, having been alarmed, had raised their cantonments, and were marching on Colmar to rejoin the Grand Elector. He attacked this division, defeated it, and forced it to retreat on Bale. The following day he took possession of Brunstatt, and made a regiment of infantry, of 1000 men, prisoners. The Grand Elector, whose head-quarters were at Colmar, had rallied his whole army into that position, the

left on Colmar, the right on Turckheim; his line was 3000 toises in extent, and his front, covered by a small river, had been intrenched. Turenne marched against him in two columns, with upwards of 40,000 men; the Allies had more than 50,000; but his army, entirely composed of French troops, was of a superior quality. On the 5th of January Count de Lorge, who commanded the right, marched as far as a church opposite Colmar, to draw all the enemy's attention to their left, whilst Turenne marched with Lieutenant-general Foucault on Turckheim. The action began an hour before night. Turckheim was carried; the Grand Elector sent off his baggage towards Schelestadt, and at night began his retreat. The next morning, at daybreak, Turenne entered Colmar, where he took 3000 sick and stragglers. The Grand Elector made a halt of three days at Schelestadt; he resumed his march on the 11th, passed the Rhine at the bridge of Benfelden, and returned into Germany. The French, being thus masters of all Alsace, went into winter-quarters in that country.

V.

Observation XXX.—In this campaign, Turenne, contrary to his usual custom, engaged in several actions and fought one great battle; his march against Caprara, when he passed the Rhine at

Philipsburg, to surprise him previously to his junction with the Duke of Bournonville, was admirable. Caprara thought him forty leagues off, when he discovered him with his army formed in line opposite his camp; the numerical superiority of the infantry secured him the taking of Sintzheim, and the passage of the defile. Caprara committed an error in accepting battle; he ought to have repassed the Necker, and marched to meet and join the Duke of Bournonville.

2. The Duke of Bournonville surprised Turenne by gaining several marches upon him, and taking possession of Strasburg. The French ministry had been remiss in not ordering the occupation of that place. What had they to hesitate about? Nearly the whole empire was at war, and the hostile disposition of the citizens of Strasburg was known; the possession of the place was indispensable to the security of the frontier; but Turenne ought to have watched this important point. He was on the left bank of the Rhine, and the enemy on the right; he ought to have kept a division near Strasburg, so as to have been able to anticipate the enemy, particularly as there was no other point on this whole frontier calculated to excite his solicitude in a similar degree. The Duke of Bournonville was only six hours before him.

3. At the battle of Entzheim, Turenne ought to have refused his left, which would have rendered the able manœuvre, executed by the Duke of Bournonville, impracticable. If the Marshal had joined to his extreme left all the infantry which he injudiciously dispersed amongst his squadrons; had he placed them in the wood with some cannon, covering them with retrenchments and trees cut down, the left of his cavalry would have had an *appui;* he would not have run the risk of losing the battle; this would have compensated for his inferiority in cavalry. The best way of protecting cavalry is to support its flanks. The plan of mingling platoons of infantry with cavalry is bad, and produces nothing but disadvantages; the cavalry loses its activity, and is obstructed in all its movements; it loses its power; the infantry is endangered, and on the first movement of the cavalry, remains without support.

4. If, after the taking of the little wood which the enemy had defended with all his means, Turenne had pushed his advantage, the battle would have been decisive. He might, at all events, have lain on the field of battle, but he fell back a league and a half the same day. On this occasion he carried his circumspection so far, that it amounted to timidity, although no

man was more sensible of the influence of opinion in military affairs.

Observation XXXI.—Garrisons, in that age, did not consider any capitulation honourable unless they obtained permission to rejoin their armies, carrying their arms and baggage, and without being made prisoners of war. The small garrison of the castle of Wasslonne, although amounting only to 150 men, was right in stipulating for its return to the army it belonged to, and the Grand Elector was a gainer by granting it those terms, because the possession of this castle, which they might have retained two or three days longer, was advantageous to him. This custom may be renewed whenever commandants of places think proper to require it; any general would allow a fatigued and disabled garrison to march out, in order to spare his men the necessity of an assault, an attack of barricadoes and streets; but it will be necessary for the garrison to have given proofs of its resolution and fidelity.

Observation XXXII.—At the end of November, when the enemy heard that Turenne had received great reinforcements, they returned to their camp under Strasburg. Had he marched towards them after the arrival of the detachment from Flanders, they would have repassed the Rhine; their army was composed of contingents, commanded by the

princes to whom the troops belonged, who had no interest in compromising them, and who would have refused to fight. Hostilities had ceased in Flanders and in the Luxemburg, and the reports of the reinforcements received by Turenne might have been exaggerated as much as he pleased. Besides, these reinforcements were in fact very considerable. The Grand Elector, therefore, would not have committed himself, for the sake of retaining Alsace, which was of little importance to him, against an army equal to his own.

Observation XXXIII.—It was on the 27th December that Turenne reached Belfort, and it was on the 5th January that he fought the battle of Turckheim, being nine days after his arrival, and six days too late. It is fourteen leagues from Turckheim to Colmar; the cantonments being once mustered at Belfort, the manœuvre was unmasked, there was not an hour to lose. Had Turenne marched with more rapidity, he would have obtained important successes; but the enemy's troops had time to rally from all their quarters, so that he found all their army united on the field of Colmar; he ought to have prevented this junction. The whole spirit of this operation consisted in reaching the bridge of Strasburg before the army had rallied. Turenne failed in this; such a manœuvre would have been fruitful in

grand results, and certain of success. If, instead of debouching by Belfort, that is to say, by the extremity of the Vosges, Turenne had debouched by the middle of the Vosges, direct on Colmar and Strasburg, he would have arrived before the cantonments could have rallied. On this occasion he evinced more talent in the conception than in the execution of this fine plan.

Observation XXXIV. — The Grand Elector ought to have given battle at Colmar; he was in an excellent position, his whole army had rallied, and his retreat on Strasburg was secure. The possession of Alsace was undoubtedly worth a battle, but not to him or to the princes of the North of Germany; there was nothing to compensate for the risks they would have run and the losses they would have suffered in accepting battle. The Prussians were at the head of the Protestant party, the enemy of Austria, which was extremely poor. The following year, when Montecuculli arrived to enter Alsace with the Imperial Army, he stated this positively in his proclamation to the people of Alsace, to prove the difference there was between his army and that of the Grand Elector.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1675.

I. Marshal Turenne is killed by a cannon-ball, at Susbach.—
II. Observations.

I.

THE King raised six armies this year. The Prince of Condé commanded in Flanders, and Turenne in Germany; the army of the latter consisted of 25,000 men. Montecuculli commanded the enemy's army; he had orders to reduce Alsace, and to make amends for the pusillanimity which the Grand Elector had shewn the preceding year. He kept up a secret correspondence with Strasburg, the magistrates of which city were devoted to him. On the 27th of March Turenne encamped under the walls of that place, in order to overawe the citizens. Montecuculli commenced operations, descended the Rhine by the right bank, gave out that he was going to besiege Philipsburg, but constructed a bridge at Spire, and passed to the left bank.

Turenne, neglecting this leading movement of the enemy's general, crossed to the right bank; for this purpose he threw a bridge over at Ottenheim, four leagues above Strasburg, and marched on the Kintzig; he encamped at Willstet, with his right to that village and the Kintzig, and the left on Ekcartsweir and the rivulet of Schuller, thus covering Strasburg, from which place he was two leagues distant, and his bridge at Ottenheim, which was four leagues from him, and where he had constructed a *tetê-de-pont*, which was guarded by several battalions. After several days' hesitation, Montecuculli was obliged to follow Turenne's movement; he repassed to the right bank, prolonged his left along the Kintzig, his left wing being a league and a half from the French camp. Montecuculli, whose army was somewhat more numerous than that of the French, threatened the bridge of Ottenheim by the position which he had taken up; he continued his movement, and marched on the Abbey of Schuttern, extending his left as far as the Lahr; by menacing the bridge of Ottenheim, he wished to compel Turenne to repass the Rhine, or to uncover Strasburg. The Marshal's position was sufficiently complicated; he had to defend his bridge at Ottenheim and that of Strasburg at the same time. In case of his quitting his camp at Willstett, Montecuculli would enter Strasburg and

pass the Rhine there; yet if he should not persist in occupying Willstett, his bridge at Ottenheim and his retreat would be compromised. He detached Count de Lorges with a division to take up a position at Altenheim, half way from the camp of Ottenheim. This movement scattered his forces; he felt this, and on the 22d of June raised his bridge and removed it down opposite Altenheim, where it was within two leagues of Strasburg, and therefore easier to defend. Montecuculli then despaired of the success of his plan; he changed his battery, and returned to his camp at Offenburg, and on the 28th proceeded to Urloffen, threatening to surprise Strasburg. Turenne immediately proceeded to Bodersweier. Montecuculli again relinquished the idea of surprising Turenne's bridge or that of Strasburg; he ordered the magistrates of Strasburg to furnish a bridge of boats, as well as a supply of ammunition. He then marched down the Rhine with his army, and encamped in the plain of Scherzheim, in hopes of receiving the convoy from Strasburg. Turenne followed him and encamped in the plain of Freistett, resting on the Rhine, which position placed him between Strasburg and the enemy. But the Rhine is very wide at this spot, and covered with a great quantity of islands; and it was to be feared that Montecuculli would receive his bridge and his convoy. These isles are, in fact, very numerous

opposite Vantzenau, but there are only three currents fit for navigation. Turenne had an estacade constructed, the isles occupied, and several redoubts raised and lined with heavy artillery, which put an end to all Montecuculli's hopes of obtaining his bridge and his convoy. But Turenne was in a painful situation; the season was very rainy and the waters of the Rhine very high; his camp was marshy and unwholesome; that of the Germans, on the contrary, was in an excellent situation; they obtained great part of their provisions from Offenburg. On the 15th of July, Turenne commenced his march, passed the Renchen at a ford which was but little known, and cut off Montecuculli not only from Offenburg but even from Caprara, which obliged Montecuculli to raise his camp and to remove behind Susbach, covered by a little rivulet, in order to restore his communication with Caprara. Turenne followed his movement, encamped opposite Susbach, and proposed to attack him, when on the 26th of July, a cannon-ball put an end to the life of this great man. After his death, the Lieutenants de Lorges and de Vaubrun commanded the army, but did not agree together: one wished to retreat on the bridge of Altenheim, and the other on the camp of Willstett; but at length they resolved to throw the flour they had collected at Willstett into the water, and retired on Altenheim. The Imperi-

alists followed and attacked them; the conflict was tedious and obstinate; the French remained masters of the field of battle, but lost 3000 men; the enemy lost 5000; but on the following day the army again passed to the left bank of the Rhine.

II.

Observation XXXV.—This campaign lasted two months; and Turenne gained every advantage. Montecuculli wished to carry the war into Germany, by the bridge of Strasburg, the inhabitants of which city had sold themselves to him. Turenne wished to secure Alsace, which country he had conquered in the preceding campaign, and to oblige Montecuculli to repass the Black Forest. When Turenne was killed, Montecuculli was repassing the mountains. Turenne, therefore, was victorious.

2. Montecuculli made the first move, by crossing the Rhine, to carry the war to the left bank. Turenne took no notice of this leading operation; but took the lead himself, passed the Rhine, and obliged Montecuculli to return to the right bank. This first victory of this campaign was a substantial advantage.

3. The Marshal encamped at Willstett, covering Strasburg, which was two leagues behind his camp; and his bridge of Ottenheim, which was four leagues on his right. Montecuculli

placed himself behind the Kintzig, one league and a half from the French army, resting on the fortress of Offenburg, in which he had a garrison. Turenne's position was bad; he ought rather to have given battle than to have exposed himself to the loss of the bridge of Ottenheim and his retreat, or to that of the bridge of Strasburg.

4. If Montecuculli had thought fit to advance by an uninterrupted nocturnal march of six hours directly on Ottenheim, taking his line of operations on Freyburg, he would have forced the bridge of Ottenheim, before the whole of Turenne's army could have covered it; but he did nothing of the kind; he trifled, and contented himself with prolonging his right; he thought that manœuvres would be enough to determine Turenne to abandon his camp at Willstett, and to uncover Strasburg. Turenne penetrated his plans; he contented himself with prolonging his right near Ottenheim, which rendered his position very bad.

5. At length he comprehended that he was hazarding his army; he raised his bridge of Ottenheim, which he brought within two leagues of Strasburg and of his camp at Willstett, placing it at Altenheim. It was still too far from Strasburg: it should have been constructed within a league of that city. In this campaign this great captain committed the error of placing his bridge four leagues from Strasburg, and at a later pe-

riod, when he raised it, he was again to blame for bringing it only two leagues nearer.

6. In the mean time Montecuculli changed his plan, and being determined to pass the Rhine below Strasburg, he ordered pontoons in that city, and went to Scherzheim to receive them. Turenne took up a position at Freistett, occupied the isles, and had an estacade constructed. Thus the projects of his adversary were again frustrated.

7. When Montecuculli allowed his antagonist to employ himself three days in constructing a bridge, he ought to have raised retrenchments on the Renchen; although so near his camp, he suffered himself to be cut off from Caprara's corps and from Offenburg. Turenne had obliged him to quit the valley of the Rhine, when a ball put an end to that great man's life.

8. Turenne proved himself, in this campaign, incomparably superior to Montecuculli: 1st, by compelling him to follow his lead; 2dly, by preventing him from entering Strasburg; 3dly, by cutting off the bridge of Strasburg; 4thly, by cutting off the enemy's army on the Renchen; but he committed an error which might have produced the destruction of his army, if he had had the Prince of Condé to deal with: this was the construction of his bridge four leagues above Strasburg, instead of placing it only a league from that city.

REVIEW

OF THE

WARS OF FREDERIC II.

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CHAPTER I.

CAMPAIGN OF 1756.

I. Invasion of Saxony; blockade of the camp of Pirna (Sept. 24).—II. Battle of Lowositz (Oct. 1); capitulation of the Saxons (Oct. 14); winter-quarters.—III. Observations.

I.

Austria, France, and Russia, were inimically disposed towards Prussia. Austria regretted the loss of Silesia; France cherished a feeling of resentment on account of the peace of Dresden, which had caused the disasters of Marshal Bellisle, who was abandoned in Prague; the Czarina, prevailed upon by Maria Theresa, was endeavouring to interfere in the affairs of Europe. "It "is time to curb the ambition of the powers of the "second order," was the cry at Vienna, Paris, and Saint-Petersburg. When Frederic perceived the approach of this storm, he attached himself to

England, concluded a treaty of alliance with that power, and secured large subsidies. This being done, he lost no time, and in the summer of 1756, seeing that his enemies were still dissembling, because they were not ready to take the field, he commenced hostilities without any foregoing declaration, and invaded Saxony in time of peace. His military establishment was considerably augmented; he had had ten years to turn to account the experience which he had acquired in the four campaigns of the war of the Pragmatic Sanction, and the resources with which the rich provinces of Silesia had furnished him. He had no less than 120,000 men under arms, well organized, well disciplined, and extremely active, independently of his garrisons, his depôts, and all accessary means for keeping so considerable an army in activity, and repairing its losses.

Austria had a military establishment of less than 40,000 men, ill organized and equipped; her old troops had been destroyed in the war against the Turks. Frederic had therefore an opportunity, in this campaign, of attempting any enterprise with impunity. He collected two armies, one in Saxony, consisting of seventy battalions and eighty squadrons, making 64,000 men, including the artillery and sappers; the other in Silesia, amounting to thirty-three bat-

talions and fifty-five squadrons, consisting of about 30,000 men; and he employed 20,000 men in different corps of observation on the Vistula, in Pomerania, and on the Lower Elbe. The Army of Silesia assembled at Narchod, under the command of Marshal Schwerin; the three corps d'armée of Saxony assembled, at Frankfort on the Oder, Magdeburg, and Wittemberg; they commenced their march on the 30th of August; that of Magdeburg by Leipsic, Chemnitz, and Dippodiswalda; that of Wittemberg by Torgau and Meissen; and that of Frankfort by Elstwarda, Bautzen, and Stolpen. Great alarm was excited at Dresden; the Elector took refuge in the fortress of Kœnigstein; the Electress and the court remained at the palace. The Saxon army, 18,000 strong, encamped at Pirna, to await the determination of the Court of Vienna. The acquisition of Dresden was an important conquest to the King of Prussia; he found the Elector's arsenal and all his military stores in that city. The place was strong; it afforded him a point of appui, of which he stood in need, and completed the frontier of the Elbe, the whole of which, from Magdeburg, was now in his power. All negotiations for bringing back the Elector and effecting the submission of his army, having failed, the King advanced, and surrounded the camp of Pirna with forty-two

battalions and ten squadrons. He then formed an army of observation of twenty-eight battalions and seventy squadrons, took the command of it himself, and fixed his head-quarters at Ausig in Bohemia. Marshal Schwerin advanced one day's march with the Army of Silesia, to observe the debouché of Kœnigsgratz.

II.

The Court of Vienna, on the first intelligence of the assembling of the Prussian army, had collected all its troops and formed them into two corps; one, under the command of Prince Piccolomini, encamped near Kœnigsgratz, to oppose Schwerin's movement; the other, commanded by Marshal Braun, mustered in the first instance at Kollin, and afterwards passed the Moldaw and encamped at Budyn on the Eger, to extricate the Saxons at the camp of Pirna.

On the 30th of September the King left his camp at Ausig, and marched against Braun; he arrived with his van-guard, eight battalions and fifteen squadrons strong, on the evening of the 30th at the village of Lowositz, where he met with the Austrian army, which had passed the Eger and was encamped behind some morasses in sight of Lowositz. He took up a position, with his van at the village of Tirmitz, and made the rest of his army, 25,000 strong, join him in

the course of the night. At break of day, Braun ordered a strong corps of cavalry to debouch in the plain. The King's army got under arms; the left, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, occupied the heights of Lobosch; and the right, under Prince Henry, the heights of Homolka; his line of battle was from 1800 to 2000 toises in extent. Marshal Braun's front was covered by a marshy rivulet; his right rested on the Elbe, his left on Tschiskowitz; the extent of his line of battle was 2500 toises. He was sensible of his oversight in not having occupied the heights of Lobosch; and he therefore had them attacked by a division of eleven battalions, which was repulsed. The Prussians took possession of Losowitz; the Austrians resumed the position they had occupied in the morning. It was impossible to attack them there in front, but in consequence of manœuvres on their left, they evacuated the position, repassed the Eger, and resumed their camp at Budyn, having lost from 2500 to 3000 men, while the Prussians had lost from 3000 to 3500. Both armies claimed the victory; Marshal Braun, because he had not been forced in his camp; and the King, with more reason, because he had carried the village of Losowitz, and obliged his enemy to relinquish the project of succouring the Saxons by the left bank of the Elbe. But on

the 11th of October, Braun detached a corps of 8000 men by the right bank, opposite Kœnigstein, and in sight of the Prussian army, to favour the deblockading of the camp of Pirna. The Saxons passed the Elbe; but, being surrounded on all sides by the Prussians, they capitulated on the 14th. The Elector had permission to retire into his kingdom of Poland; the Saxons were incorporated into the Prussian army, which evacuated Bohemia, and took up its winter-quarters in Saxony and Silesia.

III.

Observation I.—It has been asserted by some military writers that the King of Prussia was to have penetrated through Moravia on Vienna, and concluded the war by the taking of that capital. They are mistaken: he would have been stopped by the fortresses of Olmutz and Brunn; on reaching the Danube he would have found all the forces of the monarchy collected to dispute the passage with him, whilst the Hungarian insurrection would have attacked his flanks. So rash an operation must evidently have exposed his army to certain destruction. To invade Saxony, take possession of Dresden, disarm the Saxon army, enter Bohemia, occupy Prague, and winter there, was all that he could or ought to have intended. But he operated ill: he disregarded

several of the principles of war, which are seldom infringed with impunity; and this was the reason that he failed, notwithstanding the winning of a battle.

The camp of Pirna is 25,000 toises in circumference; the 18,000 Saxons were reduced to 14,000 soldiers of all descriptions, on their arrival at the camp. The Prussian forces being of four times this strength, and furnished with as much artillery as could be wished for, as the arsenal of Dresden was at their disposal, the King ought, in four days, to have forced this camp, and made the Saxons lay down their arms; after which he should have entered Bohemia, leaving only a garrison of six battalions, and six squadrons in Dresden. The camp of Pirna is defended on the East by the Elbe, a river which is not fordable, from sixty to eighty toises wide; on the west by a marsh of great depth and steepness, between thirty and forty toises wide; and at the head, by the fortress of Kœnigstein, and some woods and ravines which communicate with the frontier of Bohemia. It forms a great triangle, two sides of which are each between 10 and 11,000 toises in length, and the remaining one between 3 and 4000. The 14,000 Saxons were not enough to man such an extent of line. If the King had had nine attacks made, three on each side, only one being a true one, in one of

the points where the ravine is salient, by placing there two batteries of fifty guns each, he would have succeeded in taking the ravine. It would have required a quarter of an hour to construct a slope there, by which he might have made two-thirds of his army, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, debouch : the Saxons, driven under the walls of Kœnigstein, would have capitulated. An army of 40,000 men may, no doubt, defend itself successfully in the camp of Pirna against an army of 60 or 80,000. But 14,000 men could not defend themselves there against 60,000 abundantly provided with artillery ; a corps so feeble could not have defended such a position, unless the ravine and the Elbe, which cover the camp, had been 2 or 300 toises wide, which would have allowed the batteries of the camp to take positions distant 200 toises from the bank, without having any thing to apprehend from the Prussian batteries planted on the opposite side, and yet extremely powerful against all that might have approached the bank on which they were placed.

Observation II.—The King entered Bohemia with two separate corps d'armée, acting at a great distance from each other. Schwerin's army was operating at the extremity of Silesia, whilst the King was penetrating by the left bank of the Elbe. This manner of invading a country with a double line of operation is faulty. Schwerin

was much stronger than Piccolomini, both in number and by the composition of his troops. Had his forces been joined to the King's on the field of Lowositz, the reinforcement which Piccolomini had brought to Marshal Braun would have been far from compensating for the degree of strength which the Prussian army would have gained. The King might therefore have entered Prague in September with 90,000 men, made himself master of that important place, and fixed his winter-quarters in Bohemia, driving the wrecks of Braun's and Piccolomini's troops beyond the Danube, or at least beyond the mountains of that kingdom. The consequence of these two errors was, that he had on the field of Lowositz an inferior force to that of the enemy, although on the whole field of operations his forces were triple to theirs. It was also this that obliged him to fix his winter-quarters in Saxony and Silesia. He certainly obtained great advantages by this campaign, but he might have gained still greater.

CHAPTER II.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF 1757.

I. Situation of the Armies.—II. Battle of Prague, (May 4).—III. Blockade of Prague; Battle of Kollin, (June 18); Evacuation of Bohemia.—IV. Observations.

I.

The campaign of 1757 commenced on the 15th of April, and ended on the 15th of December; it lasted 240 days, and is divided into two periods. The first contains the marches, manœuvres, and actions which took place from the 15th of April to the 15th of July; the second, those between the 15th of July and the 15th of December. In the former interval the King fought two great battles; the battle of Prague, which he gained on the 4th of May, and that of Kollin, which he lost on the 18th of June. This period is the subject of the present chapter. In the year 1756, neither France, Sweden, Russia, nor the Empire, brought any army into the field: they spent the whole year in preparations and demonstrations. The first part of the campaign of 1757 passed in

the same manner. The King had only to make head against the Austrian armies. The Prussian army was better trained, composed of old troops, and more numerous. In the beginning of April it was formed into four corps: the first, under the command of Prince Maurice, at Chemnitz; the second, under the King, at the village of Lockwitz, at the gates of Dresden; the third, under the Prince of Bevern, at Zittau in Lusatia; the fourth, under Marshal Schwerin, in Silesia. The Austrian army, under the command of Marshal Braun, was in Bohemia. The Duke of Aremberg, with the first corps, formed the left, on Egra. Marshal Braun, with the second corps, was at the camp of Budyn, before Prague; the third corps, commanded by the Count de Konigseck, was at Reichemberg; the fourth, commanded by General Daun, in Moravia. The four corps d'armée of the King of Prussia amounted to 100,000 men under arms, of whom 65 or 66,000 were infantry, from 16 to 18,000 cavalry, and the rest artillery, sappers, miners, &c. forming 108 battalions and 160 squadrons; exclusive of 26 battalions and 40 squadrons which were assembling in Pomerania, to keep Russia in check. The four Austrian armies were less numerous, very inferior in quality, and in want of many necessaries. Frederic resolved to take advantage of his being four months before-

hand with the Russians, in order to strike a decisive blow, and place himself in a situation to face the other two armies, when they should arrive in line. He invaded Bohemia, and besieged Prague; executing, this campaign, what he had not been able to perform during the last.

II.

The corps commanded by Prince Maurice, forming the right of the Prussian line, began to manœuvre in April. He menaced Egra, and advanced in two columns by Comotau on the Eger. The King of Prussia passed the mountains at Peterswald, arrived on the Eger, at Lowositz, and on the 23d of April operated the passage of the river at Koschitz, at the head of those two corps d'armée united. Marshal Braun, who had been joined at his camp at Budyn, behind the Eger, by the Duke of Aremberg, retreated to the camp of Prague, as soon as the King had passed the Eger. The Prussian army followed him, and arrived before Prague on the 2d of May. But Prince Charles of Lorraine, who had taken the command of the Imperial Army, had already encamped on the heights of Ziska, on the right bank of the Moldaw.

The Prince of Bevern passed the mountains between Zittau and Reichemberg, where he was stopped by the excellent position occupied by

Count Konigseck, who obliged him to manœuvre several days to dislodge him, which was not effected until after an obstinate engagement. Count Konigseck retreated on Liebenau, where he took up an equally formidable position. In the mean time Marshal Schwerin, who had marched from Silesia, having found no enemy before him, debouched in Bohemia by Trotenau, and proceeded to Jung-Bunzlau, in the rear of Count Konigseck's position; which forced the latter to abandon it, to repass the Elbe, and to direct his march on Prague, where he joined the Prince of Lorraine. Schwerin, at the head of his corps and of that of the Duke of Bevern, followed this movement, and encamped on the 4th of May on the right bank of the Elbe, at Bunzlau, opposite Brandeis; and as the enemy did not occupy the opposite bank, he sent a vanguard over. The Prince of Lorraine expected, in the course of a few days, the arrival of General Daun, who was bringing him a reinforcement of 30,000 men from Moravia, which would have equalized the two armies.

Frederic was fully sensible of the importance of preventing this junction. On the 5th of May, at day-break, he constructed a bridge a league and a half below Prague, at the village of Podbaba, without meeting with any resistance, although only 2000 toises from the Austrian camp,

and stationed himself with twenty battalions and thirty-eight squadrons at Crimitz on the right bank of the Moldaw. Marshal Schwerin passed the Elbe, and advanced to Mischitz. The two Prussian armies this night were only three leagues from each other. On the 6th, at day-break, they effected their junction at the village of Prosick. The King's army formed its line, the right at Prosick, the centre before Gibel, and the left beyond Sattalitz, occupying a series of hills extending 4500 toises, and crossing the road of Brandeis, which was its line of operations. The Prince of Lorraine had his left on the Ziska, near the Moldaw, and his right on the heights of the village of Kyge, occupying a line of 4500 toises. The King had sixty-four battalions and 123 squadrons on the field, amounting to about 60,000 men; Marshal Keith having remained on the left bank of the Moldaw, before Prague, with twenty-six battalions and twenty-six squadrons; and nine battalions and eleven squadrons having been detached on the double line of operations, to cover the magazines. The Prince of Lorraine had nearly 70,000 men; but 10,000 had remained in Prague, to defend that town and watch Marshal Keith. These two armies were equal in number in the field. The left of the Austrian army was near the Moldaw; the right of the Prussians was on the same river.

The armies were separated by a space of 3000 toises, in which was a deep valley, with a rivulet formed by the discharge of several ponds running in the midst of it, the banks of which are steep and marshy: this rivulet arises beyond the pool of Sterboholy, 6 or 7000 toises from Prague, turns at that distance, passes by the villages of Sterboholy, Podehernitz, Hostawitz, Hortlorzes, and Lupetin, and falls into the Moldaw, near Lobau, about 2000 toises below Prague.

The King judged that this rivulet would be a sufficient protection to the front of the enemy's army, and ordered a march on the left to outflank them. The Prince of Lorraine perceived this intention in time to oppose it; he made the infantry of his right execute a change of front by a backward wheel; by this movement it formed a line perpendicular to the extremity of the centre; and resting on the heights of Sterboholy, it formed an elbow of 1500 toises, which he prolonged to the extent of 2000 more, by sending the cavalry of his left to join it, which took up a position in the plains of Sterboholy, and spread as far as the little rivulet which passes Hostiwortz. His line thus occupied the two sides of a right angle, one of which was perpendicular to Prague, and the other parallel, and each of them from 3000 to 3500 toises in length. The King halted his troops as soon as the extre-

mity of his right had arrived even with Kyge, the centre opposite Podehernitz, and the left before Sterboholy; he sent the cavalry of his reserve to reinforce that of Schwerin, in the plain of Sterboholy. This movement left his line of operations, the road to Brandeis by Gibel, uncovered; and his army was now on both sides of the road to Kollin, by which General Daun was the same day coming up to Bohemisch-Brodt, eight leagues from the field of battle. Beyond the rivulet which covered their right, and nearly 1000 toises from the right angle, the Austrian infantry occupied positions commanded by the village of Gibel. The King had these detached posts attacked, and overthrew them, whilst Marshal Schwerin, with the left wing, passed the rivulet at Sterboholy and Podschernitz; the cavalry in the villages, the artillery on the dykes, and the infantry in the marshes. He met with great difficulties in this operation; several regiments sunk knee deep; but the right of the Austrians did not take advantage of this accident, remaining on the hills to rectify its alignment. At one o'clock in the afternoon, Schwerin attacked them with the bayonet, and reached their position; but being overwhelmed with grape shot, his troops gave way, and abandoned the height. Braun pursued him 1250 toises. The left and centre of the Austrian army

remained motionless. The Prussian cavalry debouched into the plain of Sterboholy, made an unsuccessful charge at first, but rallied, renewed the fight, and routed the Austrian cavalry, which abandoned the field of battle. The Prince of Lorraine's right was now entirely uncovered, at the moment when the King was entering the village of Kyge, and attacking the left. The Prince of Bevern, who marched in the centre, perceived a void at the angle of the two lines; he threw himself into it, and began a most obstinate conflict. Marshal Schwerin, having rallied his infantry, brought it back into action. He was killed at the head of his regiment, but his troops continued the attack against the right of the Austrians, who, being taken in flank by the King, and outfronted by the cavalry, gave ground, and fell into disorder, which decided the success of the day. The Prince of Lorraine abandoned all his positions; he covered his retreat by the troops of his centre and left, which had not engaged, but being constantly outfronted on his right, 12,000 men were cut off from Prague, and had great difficulty in reaching Marshal Daun's camp. The loss of the Austrians was 16,000 men and 200 pieces of cannon; Marshal Braun was mortally wounded. The Prussians lost 12,000 men.

III.

By this battle the Prince of Lorraine's army had suffered a diminution of 30,000 men; he still had 40,000 men; but the courage of the troops was damped. The King blockaded Prague on both banks of the Moldaw; this place is 7000 toises in circumference. His line of countervallation was 15,000 toises in extent; its quarters were separated from each other by a large river. He hoped in vain that the want of provisions would speedily oblige his enemy to capitulate. The blockade lasted six weeks; but on the 18th of June it was raised in consequence of the battle of Kollin.

Marshal Daun was informed of the disasters of the Prince of Lorraine on the 7th of May. He remained several days at Bohemisch-Brodt to collect the fugitives, and, after having rallied the 12,000 men who had not been able to enter Prague, he retrograded fourteen leagues, and encamped under the walls of Kollin. The King having ordered a corps of 25,000 men, commanded by the Prince of Bevern, to follow him, he continued his retreat as far as Goltzjenkau, one league in advance of Haber, and twenty-four from Prague. On the 12th of June, having received some reinforcements, Daun returned to a position one league in advance of Kollin,

where he encamped, at the village of Kirchenau, with his left at Swoyschitz, and his right at Chotzemitz, with the road from Prague to Kollin before him; the Prince of Bevern now retreated in his turn. The King immediately hastened from the camp of Prague with a reinforcement: he advanced his head-quarters, on the 14th, to the little town of Kaurzim, three leagues from Kirchenau: he encamped there, with his left resting on the road leading from Prague to Kollin, at the village of Planian, drawing provisions from Nimburg, a little town to the left of the Elbe, at the distance of five leagues. He remained there during the 15th and part of the 16th, to allow time for his reinforcements and provision-waggons to come up. On the 16th, as he was about to commence his march to proceed to the position of Swoyschitz, to keep Marshal Daun in check, whom he supposed to be at Janovitzi, he was informed that the Marshal was at Kirchenau; it was thenceforth impossible to execute this movement without cutting his way through the Marshal's forces. On the 17th, he marched by his left, and encamped on both sides of the road to Prague, having Planian in his front, and Kollin three leagues farther off. He was thus encamped perpendicularly on the left of the Austrian army. At day-break on the 18th he commenced his

march, with his left in front; the van-guard, commanded by General Ziethen, fifty-five squadrons and seven battalions strong, being in front. The army marched in three lines; the first, wholly composed of infantry, marched by the high-road from Prague to Kollin; the others, more to the left, marched between the road and the Elbe; General Daun had made some movements during the night; at day-light the Prussians could only see a few vedettes, but, as soon as they had passed Planian, they perceived the Austrian army formed in line; upon which they halted. The van had arrived even with Slatislanz, 3000 toises beyond Planian; the main body was between Nowomiesto and Planian. The Austrian army was formed, with its left on Brezan, its centre at Chotzemitz, and its right at Krezor: it thus occupied a curved line of 3500 toises; the right towards Kollin, the left towards Prague, surrounding the road from Prague at Kollin, which was the chord. It was in several lines; the second line occupied the ridge of the heights; the first was half-way down, with the three intrenched villages before it, manned with infantry and covered by artillery. Its left was 500 toises from the great road from Planian to Kollin, on which the Prussian army was marching. The centre, or the village of Chotzemitz, was 1000 toises from that road; and the right, or the village

of Kresor, 500 toises. Thus the two armies were near each other, and formed in a singular manner. The King found that he outflanked all the enemy's left; and the enemy's line formed a semicircle, of which the diameter or chord was part of the road from Planian to Kollin, occupied by Frederic, who, at one o'clock in the afternoon, ordered the troops to continue their march. The King thus put himself in march on the chord of a semicircle, crowned on the heights by the Austrian army, which he could not do without defiling under the fire of howitzers and musquetry. General Nadasty, who commanded the Austrian cavalry, thereupon stationed himself within 2000 toises of Kollin, across the road, thus barring the road to Kollin against the Prussians, and compelling them to remain under the fire of his army. Daun ordered all his troops to advance to the extremity of the position, and poured a shower of balls, bullets, and shells upon the Prussian columns in march. The skirmishers of the troops posted in the villages advanced; the Croats and the Prussian army began to exchange a fire of musquetry; the Prussians still endeavouring to continue their movement. The van being farthest advanced, succeeded in clearing the 3000 toises, and in outfronting the Austrian right; after passing Kresor, they turned to the right, marched on the extreme right of

the Austrians, and took possession of the village of Kresor; but the Prussian army was so far advanced, and so dreadfully galled by the musquetry, that the columns were obliged to face to the right, form in line, and make a charge to repulse the enemy's troops that were firing upon them. The latter were supported. The Prussians made unavailing attempts to carry the heights, which were at the same time attacked on the right; but the Austrians had every advantage of position. The attack of the Prussians was an incidental unpremeditated affair; they had to climb almost perpendicular mountains, and to cross paths and ravines that were almost impracticable: they performed prodigies of valour; but were compelled to give way, and lost their artillery, and great numbers of prisoners, killed and wounded. They fell back on Planian, and effected their retreat on Nimburg. Marshal Daun returned to his camp, where he remained several days singing *Te Deums*. The loss of the Prussians amounted to 15,000 men, and that of the Austrians to 5000. Thus out of every two men in his army, the King had one put *hors-de-combat*. On the 19th Frederic raised the siege of Prague, and went to Brandeis, whither the artillery was carried to be embarked on the Elbe. As it had only four leagues to go, it arrived the same evening, the 19th. Marshal Keith, who was on the left bank, remained twenty-four hours

longer, and effected his retreat on Leutmeritz, where he passed the Elbe. Being hotly pursued, he lost between 4 and 500 men.

The King then divided his army into two bodies, both on the right bank of the Elbe. He encamped near Leutmeritz, with the majority of his troops, sending the Prince Royal of Prussia with the second corps, at first behind the Iser, to Scheditz, and afterwards to Boemisch-Leipa, behind the Poltz; at which place he was ten leagues from the King, and six or seven from Zittau, where the magazines were. At length, on the 1st of July, the Prince of Lorraine determined on a plan. He marched from Prague, and crossed the Elbe near Brandeis, at Czelakowitz, advanced on Munchengratz, behind the Iser, and thence to Hunerwasser, turned the Prince Royal's position at Boemisch-Leipa, took possession of Nimes and Gabel, and thereby intercepted the communication with Zittau, which the Prince Royal could only reach by a circuitous route; and after having burnt his waggons, arrived there on the 22d, a little before the Austrian troops, who bombarded Zittau in the presence of the Prussians, and some of the magazines were burnt. The Prince of Prussia retreated by Loebau on Bautzen. On the 29th July, Frederic left his camp at Leutmeritz, and joined the camp at Bautzen, and a few days afterwards encamped at

Bernstadtdel between Loebau and Gorlitz. The Prince of Lorraine was encamped before Zittau, keeping a garrison in Gorlitz, thus cutting off the road to Silesia. In the night of the 15th of August, Frederic marched to Hirschfeld, between Zittau and Gorlitz; cutting him off by this position from the fortress of Zittau. He took possession of Gorlitz, reconnoitred the Prince of Lorraine's camp, which he deemed unassailable, and finding that this prince refused battle, he returned to Hirschfeld, left the command of the army to the Prince of Bevern, and on the 24th of August marched for the Saale with a detachment of sixteen battalions and thirty squadrons. Thus ended the first period of this campaign.

Observation III.—Frederic's plan to obtain possession of Prague and Bohemia was a good one in 1756; it was so still at the beginning of 1757. There, as in a great intrenched camp, he would have covered Saxony and Silesia, keeping Austria and the Empire in check. He ought to have succeeded in this enterprise; every chance was in his favour: he had the first move, troops superior in number and quality, and the advantage of his own audacity and great talents. Nevertheless he failed.

2. He marched to the conquest of Bohemia with two lines of operations, with two armies sixty leagues from each other, and which were

to join, forty leagues from their point of departure, under the walls of a fortified place, in presence of the enemy's armies. It is a principle that the junction of several corps ought never to be made near the enemy; yet the King succeeded in all these operations. His two armies, although separated by mountains and defiles, surmounted all obstacles without experiencing any disaster. On the 4th of May they were only six leagues apart, but were still separated by two rivers, the fortress of Prague, and the Prince of Lorraine's army, 70,000 strong. Their junction seemed impossible, yet it was effected on the 6th of May, at day-break, within 300 toises of the Austrian camp. Fortune overwhelmed Frederic with her favours; whereas he had placed himself in a situation to be defeated in detail, before his two armies could join, and to have each of them separately driven from Bohemia.

3. As the King abandoned his line of operations, by the left bank of the Elbe, and took up one by Brandeis and the right bank, he should have made Marshal Keith pass to the right bank of the Moldaw, and kept him on his extreme right, covering, at all events, his line of operations on Brandeis. He would have gained a threefold advantage by this: in the first place his whole army would have been united, and he would have had nothing to fear from the enter-

prises of the Duke of Lorraine; 2dly, he would have had 20,000 more men on the field of battle at Prague; an immense advantage; 3dly, his line of operations on Brandeis would have remained secure, and could not have been compromised as it actually was.

4. During the battle of Prague, the King abandoned his line of operations and retreat, the Brandeis road, and placed himself across the road to Kollin, occupied by Marshal Daun, six leagues behind. If the Prince of Lorraine had ordered his left to engage, and Gebel to be occupied, whilst Marshal Daun approached, the King would have been surrounded.

Observation IV.—The Prince of Lorraine allowed the King of Prussia to arrive before Prague and Marshal Schwerin before Brandeis, at six leagues distance from each other, without having seized the opportunity of marching to meet the latter on the right bank of the Elbe, joining Count Konigseck, and overwhelming him with forces of double his numbers, whilst the King was measuring the ramparts of Prague; or, *vice versâ*, of attacking and beating the King, after joining Count Konigseck, whilst Schwerin, still on the right bank of the Elbe, was separated from the King by the Moldaw and the Elbe.

2. He wants two days to enable Marshal Daun to reach the camp of Prague, which would have

increased his army to 100,000 men, and he does not conceive the possibility of gaining these two days by defending the Moldaw against the King, who passes it within 2000 toises of his camp, or by disputing the passage of the Elbe with Schwerin, who crosses that river four leagues from his camp.

3. After the King had passed the Moldaw in the night of the 5th, the Prince of Lorraine should have returned into Prague, at seven in the evening, leaving 15,000 men in his position at Ziska to mask his movement, and should have reached the King's bridge by dawn of day, burnt it, attacked Marshal Keith, routed him, pursued him with a hundred squadrons, and returned to Prague in the evening. Marshal Daun would have come up, and if the King had waited for them, they might have attacked him in concert.

4. The defeat of the Prince was owing to his having formed his line unskilfully. He should have placed his left where his centre was, his centre where was his right, his right where he stationed part of his cavalry; his infantry would then have been well supported, and his cavalry nearer the pool of Sterboholy. He should have kept a third of his cavalry and a sixth of his infantry in reserve. And lastly, after having committed the error of paralysing his left, he should have restored it to action by ordering it to march

to the aid of the troops on the height near Gebel, which would have instantly stopped the King's movement, whose right, being unsupported, would have been outflanked.

Observation V.—The King of Prussia's plan of surrounding a town like Prague, containing an army of 40,000 men, (although they had just lost a battle) is one of the most daring and vast ideas which have been conceived in modern times. He employed 50,000 men in this blockade; but he had reason to apprehend that the blockade would be disturbed by Marshal Daun's army; he ought to have employed the six weeks he had before him, in establishing strong lines of circumvallation and countervallation, forming an army of observation, placing it in suitable positions seven or eight leagues off, and intrenching it there; and at the moment of Marshal Daun's advance, to compel him to raise the blockade, he should have reinforced his army of observation with part of the blockading army, and beaten Marshal Daun unobserved by the besieged. The King, however, did nothing in the six weeks which elapsed before Marshal Daun was able to advance.

2. His plan of taking up a position under Kollin, fourteen leagues from Prague, placed him at too great a distance to receive succour in one march from part of the blockading army, and *vice versâ*.

3. At the battle of Kollin, it is difficult to justify his attempt to turn Daun's right by making a flank march of 3000 toises, at the distance of 500 toises from the heights crowned by the enemy's army. This was so rash an operation, so contrary to the principles of war! *Never make a flank march before an army in position, particularly when it occupies the heights, at the foot of which you must defile.* Had he attacked the left of the Austrian army, he was in a very good position for that purpose; but to defile under the grape-shot and musquetry of a whole army, occupying a commanding position, to outflank an opposite wing, is to suppose that army to have neither cannon nor musquets. Some Prussian writers have asserted that this manœuvre would not have failed, but for the impatience of a lieutenant-colonel, who, annoyed by the fire of the Austrian fusileers, gave the word to face to the right and form in line, and thus engaged the whole column; but this is incorrect. The movement made by the Prussian army was prescribed by the first of interests, self-preservation, and the instinct which teaches every man not to suffer himself to be killed without making any defence.

Observation VI.—It may be regarded as a natural consequence of the battle, that the Prince of Lorraine suffered himself to be shut up in

Prague for the first ten days; but his inactivity, from the moment when he ascertained that the King of Prussia had sent a strong detachment against Marshal Daun, and when his troops had recovered their spirits, is censurable. He should have attacked one of the enemy's quarters at day-break with all his forces, defeated it, and returned immediately into the place; he should have performed the same manœuvre several times against different points, and thus destroyed the Prussian army in detail. Or what prevented him from proceeding at night, both to the heights of Ziska, and the heights corresponding with those of Ziska, at the salient part of the bastion of Prague, from constructing ten or twelve redoubts there in the night, and forming in order of battle, at day-break, in a line of 1500 toises, which he might have covered with artillery? He might have employed all the following days in fortifying his camp, or in occupying and fortifying positions which would have increased its extent, and rendered it more offensive. Thus he would have greatly embarrassed his enemy, and been perfectly acquainted with all Marshal Daun's movements, up to the moment when, judging that his approach must draw off a part of the King's forces, he would have compelled him to raise the siege. His situation was such that he ought to have fought, every day, on the two banks, alternately.

Observation VII.—The conduct of Marshal Daun, supposed to have been founded on the resources which he knew to exist in Prague, seems good until after the battle of Kollin; but he is blameable for not having known how to avail himself of his victory: he might as well not have conquered! After twelve days' deliberation, he at length decides to march into Lusatia. It would have been more consistent with the principles of this war, had he marched into Saxony; he would have retaken Dresden, rallied the army of the Prince of Soubise, perhaps that of the Duke of Richelieu, the Swedes and the Russians; he would have assembled 200,000 men at Berlin. The Austrian generals behaved with extreme timidity in this campaign; although their troops fought courageously, the commanders seemed to place no confidence in them. They might have attacked the Prince of Prussia at Zittau, but did not; the King constantly offered them battle after Kollin, and they constantly avoided it.

CHAPTER III.

SECOND CAMPAIGN OF 1757.

I. Second period of the campaign of 1757.—II. Operations of the French and Hanoverian armies; Battle of Hastenbeck (26th July); Battle of Rosbach (Nov. 5).—III. Operations of the Russians; Battle of Jœgendorf (Aug. 31).—IV. Operations in Silesia; Battle of Breslaw (Nov. 22); Battle of Leutzen (Dec. 5); Winter-quarters.—V. Observations.

I.

THIS second period of the campaign of 1757 commences on the 15th of July, and ends on the 15th of December; containing 150 days. It is replete with great events. The French win the battle of Hastenbeck on the 26th of July; they lose that of Rosbach on the 5th of November: the Prussians are defeated by the Russians at Jœgendorf on the 31st of August, and at Breslaw on the 22d of November; but the King immortalizes himself and retrieves every thing by gaining the victory of Leutzen on the 5th of December. He had, during this second period, near 120,000 men in the field, independently of the

garrisons of the fortresses; and was opposed by 180,000 men, of different nations, acting without concert or connexion. In the direction and quality of the troops he had the advantage. It may, therefore, easily be conceived that the campaign terminated in his favour. The three armies of his enemies consisted of, 1st, 50,000 men manœuvring on the Saale, under the command of the Princes of Soubise and Hilburghausen, and composed of 25,000 French and 25,000 of the contingents of the Empire, very bad troops; 2dly, 60,000 Russians, who arrived in August, fought one battle, and then returned home; and 3dly, the army of the Prince of Lorraine, 80,000 strong, acting in Silesia. Amongst these belligerent masses we have not included the army of Marshal d'Estrées, of 80,000 men; nor that of the Duke of Cumberland, opposed to it.

II.

The Court of Versailles had engaged to assist the Queen of Hungary with 24,000 men; the Prince of Soubise took the command of them, passed the Rhine at Dusseldorf, and marched on Saxony, where he joined the army of the contingents of the Empire. He entered Erfurth on the 21st of August. France, being at war with England, wished to take possession of Hanover.

An army of 80,000 men, composed of 112 battalions and 110 squadrons, under the command of Marshal d'Estrées, who had MM. de Chevert, d'Armentieres, and Contades, as his lieutenant-generals, passed the Rhine, crossed Westphalia, and marched on the Weser. The Duke of Cumberland occupied the camp of Biefeld with the Hanoverian, Hessian, and Brunswick army in the pay of England, 60,000 strong. On the approach of the French he repassed the Weser, and on the 22d of June encamped at Hastenbeck, with his right supported on the Weser, covered by a morass, his centre at Hastenbeck, and his left on the heights of Ohsen, a league in advance of the fortress of Hameln, occupying a line of 2500 toises. On the 16th of July Marshal d'Estrées passed the Weser, in six columns, above Hameln; on the 24th he took up a position before the enemy's army, ascertained that they could not be attacked by the heights on the left, and detached Chevert, who, on the 25th, turned the enemy's left with sixteen battalions, and took up a position at the village of Afferde, in their rear. The General, with twenty-four battalions and four regiments of dragoons, occupied an intermediate position. On the 26th Chevert, seconded by d'Armentieres, attacked the extreme left of the Duke of Cumberland. At the same instant, the left of the

French, led by the Marshal himself, presented itself before the Hanoverian centre and right at Hastenbeck, but could not reach that place before five in the evening. Chevert was already master of the heights, whence he had dislodged the enemy's picked men. The Duke of Cumberland's retreat had become difficult, when the hereditary Prince of Brunswick, with 1200 of his troops, supported by a Hanoverian regiment, penetrated through some woods to the centre of Chevert's troops, who were at first thrown into confusion, and abandoned several pieces of cannon. A party of a few hundred horse having made its appearance in the rear of the French army, Marshal d'Estrées was alarmed, and ordered a retreat; Chevert's troops, however, recovered from their consternation, perceived that the Duke of Brunswick had but a few men, and retook their cannon: but during this alarm the Duke of Cumberland effected his retreat, carrying off his artillery. He sustained no material loss. The French gained the victory, and remained masters of the field. The loss on each side was about 3000 men.

A few days afterwards Marshal d'Estrées was succeeded by the Duke of Richelieu, who on the 9th of September signed a convention with the Duke of Cumberland, at Closter-Sewen. The whole Electorate was occupied by the French

army. The troops of Brunswick and Hesse returned into their respective countries without being disarmed or made prisoners of war; the Hanoverians were cantoned. A few weeks after, the Duke of Richelieu moved his head-quarters to Holberstadt.

In the mean time Frederic, alarmed at the arrival of the Princes of Soubise and Hilburghausen on the Saale, had set out, as has been stated, from his camp at Bernstadtdel, on the 15th of August, with sixteen battalions and twenty-three squadrons, leaving the Duke of Bevern, with fifty-six battalions and one hundred squadrons, to defend Silesia. On his march he caused Prince Maurice to join him, with twelve battalions and twenty squadrons, threw four battalions into Dresden, to garrison that city, and advanced on Erfurth, on the 12th of September, with thirty-two battalions and forty-three squadrons. On his approach, Soubise retired to Eisenach; Frederic followed him to Gotha, which place he entered on the 15th of September. He then retrograded on Leipsic, leaving Seidlitz at Gotha, with fifteen squadrons as a corps of observation. The King having had occasion to approach the Elbe to succour Berlin, Seidlitz evacuated Gotha, and took up a position half way between Gotha and Erfurth. Soubise immediately marched in person on Gotha, with his

whole staff, 8000 grenadiers, and a division of cavalry; but scarcely had he established himself there, when Seidlitz, placing his fifteen squadrons in a single rank, marched boldly on his head-quarters, and put the staff to flight, who escaped precipitately to Eisenach. The 8000 grenadiers made their retreat, after a few musquet-shot: the baggage of the head-quarters, and a few prisoners, fell into the hands of the Prussians. This shameful event was the prelude to the defeat of Rosbach.

As the combined Army of France and the Empire refused battle on all occasions, the King of Prussia fixed his head-quarters at Bulstaedt, where he remained till the 10th of October. In the mean time Laddick's staff, with a corps of Austrian partisans, had entered Berlin on the 16th of October, and laid the city under contribution. This intelligence excited the ardour of Soubise; he commenced his march on the 27th, passed the Saale, and fixed his head-quarters at Weissenfels. Frederic returned as soon as this news reached him, assembled several detachments, and marched on Weissenfels with 25,000 men. On the 29th the French evacuated that town on his approach, and repassed the Saale. On the 2d of November the King passed that river over three bridges, at Weissenfels, Merseburg, and

Halle. The allies, on this intelligence, united together in a single camp.

On the 3d of November, the King marched to attack them; but, on arriving near their camp, he perceived that they had changed their position. He retrograded by his left, and encamped with his right at Bedra, his centre at Sehorlau, and his left at Rosbach. The allies, emboldened by this movement, resolved to attack him, and formed the plan of turning the King's left, his right and centre appearing to them too strongly posted. On the 5th they executed this movement, in three columns, and without a vanguard. They outflanked the left of the army, by passing at the distance of 12 or 1500 toises, cutting off the road to Weissenfels, and gaining that of Merseburg. The King, who had observed them for several hours, had made all his dispositions for falling on their flanks and front, taking advantage of the hills which flanked his movement. General Seidlitz, with all the cavalry, and several batteries of light artillery, marched on the extreme left to the right of Lunstedt. Prince Henry, with a brigade of six battalions, drew up in line on his right; the whole army followed; its rear was still at Rosbach, and then became the extreme right of the Prussian army, which had thus made a change of front to the rear, the right in front. The allied army having no van,

was broken by the charges of the Prussian cavalry and by the fire of a numerous artillery. The French and allied cavalry was overthrown on the infantry; the disorder spread through the whole army; in a few hours the Prussians had gained the victory. They had only six battalions engaged, lost only 300 men, and took 7000 prisoners, twenty-seven stand of colours, and a great number of pieces of artillery. This army of contingents fled in the greatest disorder to rally beyond the mountains of Thuringia.

III.

Russia had put in motion an army of 60,000 men, which marched through Poland in four columns: that of the right, commanded by General Fermor, invested Memel, seconded by a squadron of nine ships of war, commanded by Admiral Lewis. Memel capitulated on the 5th of August. Marshal Apraxin commanded in chief: he passed the Niemen and the Pregel, and took up a position. The Prussian Marshal Lehwald was encamped at Insterburg with 30,000 men; he marched to meet the Russians, and encamped, on the 30th of August, opposite their position, which was at the village of Jœgendorf. On the next day, the 31st, the Prussians marched against the enemy, notwithstanding their inferiority in number. They manœuvred in oblique

order to turn the left of the Russians. After an obstinate conflict, they were beaten. Marshal Lehwald retreated to Wehlau. The Russians lost 5000 men; the Prussians 3000. A few days after, on the 11th of September, the Russian general, although victorious, repassed the Pregel and the Niemen, and returned to his country, abandoning all his conquests, except Memel. The Prussian general, having now no enemy before him, returned to the Oder. Fifteen thousand Swedes had landed in Pomerania, and got possession of Anclam, and of the Isles of Osedom and Wollin: they were observed only by the garrison of Stettin; but on the arrival of Marshal Lehwald, they were driven into Stralsund in the beginning of December.

IV.

A few days after the King had left Silesia, the Duke of Bevern abandoned the camp of Bernstadtel, and took up a position on the Mountain of Landseron, near Gorlitz, keeping a division encamped at Bautzen. The Prince of Lorraine occupied the camp of Bernstadtel, sent General Nadasty on the Neiss to secure a bridge, and dislodged the enemy's division from Bautzen, cutting off all its communications with Saxony. On the 7th of September, he had Holtzberg occupied. The Duke of Bevern passed the Neiss,

and marched by Naumburg, Buntzlau, Hainau, and Liegnitz, on the Oder, where he arrived on the 9th of September. The Prince of Lorraine followed him in a parallel direction by Lauban, Lowenberg, Golderg, Jauer, and Hundorff, where he encamped on the 26th. On the 27th the Duke of Bevern advanced on Glogau, passed the Oder there, marched on Breslaw by the right bank, and on the first of October encamped on the banks of the Lohe, covering Breslaw. The Prince of Lorraine invested Schweidnitz; he opened the trenches on the 27th of October; on the 11th of November he took three of the forts by assault; the governor capitulated, and surrendered prisoner with 600 men. Encouraged by this conquest, he resolved to attack the Duke of Bevern in his intrenched camp before Breslaw, who had his right supported on the Oder, at the village of Kosel; his left at Klein-Mochber, on a fine fortified level; the Lohe covered his front: he occupied the villages of Pilnitz and Schmidfeld as *têtes-de-pont*, and by his right he communicated with the suburbs of Saint-Nicolas of Breslaw. His army amounted to between 36 and 40,000 men. Opposite to him, on the right bank, the Prince of Lorraine occupied a parallel position, between Strachwitz and Masselwitz. Both armies had fortified themselves in these positions. After the surrender of Schweidnitz, Nadasty

rejoined his army, and proceeded to the right, threatening to march on Breslaw, and outflanking the left of the Prussian camp. General Ziethen, with seven battalions and fifty squadrons, was detached on the left to oppose this movement.

On the 22d of November the Austrian army got under arms at day-break, and made three attacks on the Lohe, at the same time outflanking the left of the Prussians. At noon they had completed seven bridges over the Lohe; the attack then became very fierce; all Nadasty's efforts on the right were insufficient to make Ziethen give ground; but the Prince of Lorraine took the position of Klein-Mochber. The Prussians lost their ground, and were driven under the walls of Breslaw; they themselves estimated their loss at 6000 men, independently of 10,000 who were taken in Breslaw. The Austrians lost 4000 men.

The day after the battle, the Duke of Bevern was made prisoner whilst reconnoitring. Ziethen took the command of the army; he repassed the Oder, with the remains of his troops, marched down the left bank, and proceeded to Glogau to meet the King, who was returning from Saxony, and having set out from Leipsic on the 12th of November with eighteen battalions and twenty-eight squadrons, reached Purchewitz on the 28th,

where Ziethen joined him on the 3d of December. In consequence of the battle of Breslaw, desertion prevailed to a great extent in the Prussian army; the King could only muster 36,000 men at the camp of Purchewitz. The Austrian forces were estimated at double that number.

On the 4th of December at day-break, the Prussian army marched on Neumarck, where the vanguard routed a corps of 4000 Croats, and made some hundreds of prisoners. The Prince of Lorraine had quitted Breslaw in order to advance, and had encamped on the left bank of the Schweidnitz, with the centre at the village of Leuthen, the right at the wood of Nipern, and the left in a strong position resting on the river.

On the 5th the Prussian vanguard marched on Borna, and made 600 prisoners. The army followed in four columns, filing before the enemy's front through a marshy valley; its movement was covered by fogs and hills; and its march being thus stolen on the enemy, it reached his extreme left, attacked, and broke it. All the efforts of the Austrian generals to form the left again in line in the rear were fruitless, the Prussians constantly came up before the troops were formed. Marshal Daun, seeing their continual progress on the left, marched forward with the right, which he commanded; but his troops were charged by the cavalry, and

broken. The wreck of the Austrian army repassed the Schweidnitz, and endeavoured to rally on the other bank. The Austrians lost 6500 men, killed or wounded, 7000 taken prisoners and 150 pieces of cannon. The Prussian army lost 2000 men. The Prince of Lorraine evacuated Breslaw, where he left 20,000 sick, wounded, and stragglers, who fell into the victor's power; he retreated hastily into Bohemia. Both armies went into winter-quarters.

V.

Observation VIII.—1. Marshal d'Estrée spent three months in proceeding from the Rhine to the Weser, with an army one third more numerous than the enemy, and composed of Frenchmen; he scarcely gained the victory at Hastenbeck, over an army composed of the troops of ten different princes! This proves the bad composition of the French staff at that time.

2. The movement made by Chevert on the eve of the battle was dangerous, and contrary to principle; if it produced no bad consequences, it was because Marshal d'Estrée had a very superior force to that of the enemy.

3. The attack of Chevert and d'Armentieres on the day of the battle, was well planned, and would have been sufficient to produce a decisive victory, had it been supported by sixty squa-

drons of cavalry, useless, indeed, in attacking heights, but necessary for descending them, pursuing the enemy, and deciding the victory.

4. The moral effect produced by the Duke of Brunswick with 1200 men, gave the Duke of Cumberland time to secure his retreat, and had nearly decided the fate of the battle. This proves the inexperience of the French officers; yet Chevert was present.

5. Marshal d'Estrée ordered the retreat very inopportunely. The attack of the Hereditary Prince and the party of cavalry which appeared on his lines of communications, were insulated facts which could have no connexion with each other. His imagination seized on them, and gave a colour to them; he saw in them the key to a plan which the enemy was executing, and which menaced his army; imagination deceived him with a pictured danger. The attack of the Hereditary Prince was only beginning, it was necessary to wait patiently, allow it to take a decided character, and to be wholly unmasked; in fact it was quickly over. And what could the Marshal fear? Chevert had quite as many troops as were necessary to repulse the whole of the Duke of Cumberland's army. The hussars who appeared in the rear could be of little importance except to the suttlers. The French general should, at most, have contented himself with

sending a brigade of light cavalry to repulse them. The first qualification in a General-in-chief is a cool head, which receives just impressions from objects, which is never heated, and never allows itself to be dazzled or intoxicated either by good or bad news: a head in which the successive or simultaneous impressions received in the course of a day of action are classed properly, and only occupy the respective places to which they are entitled; for good sense and reason are the result of the comparison of several sensations taken into equal consideration. There are men who, from their physical and moral constitution, see every thing in a peculiar way; such persons, whatever knowledge, genius, courage, and good qualities they may possess, are not called by nature to the command of armies, or the direction of the grand operations of war.

6. The convention of Closter-Sewen is inexplicable. The Duke of Cumberland was lost; he must have laid down his arms and surrendered; any other terms of capitulation ought, therefore, to have been inadmissible. The Duke of Richelieu was to blame for not disarming and disbanding the Hanoverian troops.

7. The affair of Gotha, where the head-quarters of an army, protected by a division of 8000 grenadiers, and several thousand cavalry, suffered themselves to be terrified and put to flight by

1500 hussars, without ever looking behind them, sufficiently shews what was to be expected from generals of so feeble a character as the Prince of Soubise, and the Duke of Hilburghausen.

8. There is nothing extraordinary in the result of the battle of Rosbach. A Prussian army, consisting of from 22 to 26,000 chosen troops, under able officers, ought to have beaten one of 45 or 50,000 men, composed of troops of the Empire and French soldiers of those times, under such wretched commanders; but what was surprising and disgraceful, was their being beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons. It was not for an army composed of such troops and commanded by such officers, so deficient in talent and resolution, so destitute of energy, to undertake a flank march before a well-constituted army.

9. The King of Prussia's manœuvre was natural, and is less entitled to praise than the enemy's conduct is liable to censure, for it was dictated to him by that imprudent march, made without being protected by a corps of observation in position, or informed of the movements of the Prussians by flankers and a vanguard, so as to be secure from all surprise, in a country full of hillocks and in foggy weather.

Observation IX.—The Duke of Bevern's position, at the battle of Breslaw, was faulty, inasmuch as it did not cover Breslaw. He had for-

tified positions on the right of that town; and the Prince of Lorraine, if he had manœuvred better, would not have fired a musquet before those retrenchments: he would have pushed his right, commanded by Nadasty, still nearer to the Oder, and would have completely turned the intrenched camp, changing his line of operations, abandoning that of Schweidnitz, and taking that of Upper Silesia. The Prussian general had no interest in giving battle, because he expected the King with reinforcements; all that was necessary, therefore, was to preserve a camp covering Breslaw. It is difficult to conceive how the Duke could fail to resolve this problem, when he had upwards of two months to choose and fortify this camp. A good army of from 35 to 40,000 men ought in a few days to render its camp unassailable by an army of double that force, particularly when resting on a great fortress and a considerable river.

Observation X.—The battle of Leuthen was a master-piece of movements, manœuvres, and resolution; it would suffice, alone, to immortalize Frederic, and rank him amongst the greatest generals. He attacks an army of superior strength to his own, in position, and victorious, with an army composed in part of troops which had lately been defeated, and gains a complete

victory, without purchasing it by a loss disproportioned to the result.

All his manœuvres, in this battle, were agreeable to the principles of war. *He made no flank-march before the enemy, for the two armies never saw each other drawn up in line.* The Austrian army, apprised by the actions of Neumarck and Borna of the approach of the King's army, waited to see him take up a position on the heights opposite, whilst he, under cover of a hill and of the fog, and masked by his vanguard, continued his march and attacked the extreme left of the Austrian army.

Neither did he violate a second principle, no less sacred, *not to abandon his line of operations;* but he changed it, which is considered as the ablest manœuvre taught by the art of war. In fact, an army changing its line of operations, deceives the enemy, who no longer knows which is its rear, or which are the vulnerable points to menace it on. Frederic abandoned, by his march, the line of operations of Neumarck, and took that of Upper Silesia. The boldness and rapidity of the execution, and the intrepidity of the generals and soldiers, corresponded with the skilfulness of the manœuvre. For Daun, on this occasion, did all that he should have done, when once engaged, but was unsuccessful. Thrice he

endeavoured to refuse his left and his centre, by a backward wheel to the left into line: he even advanced his right to disturb the line of operations of Neumarck, which he still supposed to be that of the King. He therefore performed all that was prescribed under such circumstances: but the Prussian cavalry and masses constantly came upon his troops before they had had time to form. It must also be allowed that the King was wonderfully seconded by circumstances; all the bad troops, those of the Empire, were on the left of the Austrian army: and the difference between troops is immense.

CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN OF 1758.

I. Operations of the French and Hanoverian armies; battle of Creveldt (June 23); battle of Luternberg (October 7).—II. Operations in Moravia and Bohemia; siege of Olmutz.—III. Operations of the Swedish and Russian armies; battle of Zorndorf (August 21).—IV. Operations in Saxony; battle of Hohenkirch (October 14).—V. Operations in Silesia; winter-quarters.—VI. Observations.

I.

DUKE Ferdinand of Brunswick took the command of the Duke of Cumberland's army, on the 24th of November 1757; he arrived at Stade, his head-quarters, and informed the Duke of Richelieu, who commanded the French army, and had his head-quarters at Luneburg, that the King of England did not acknowledge the convention of Closter-Sewen. Hostilities commenced, but the severity of the season determined both armies to go into their winter-quarters on the 24th of December. By the Duke of Richelieu's orders, the Chevalier de Broglie occupied Bremen on the 16th of January, to support his left. He was

recalled, and succeeded by the Count de Clermont, a prince of the house of Condé, who took the command on the 15th of February. Some days afterwards Duke Ferdinand took the field with an army of fifty battalions and sixty squadrons, composed of Hanoverians, Brunswickers, Hessians, and troops of other petty states. Prince Henry, of Prussia, who commanded in Saxony, seconded his operations with a division of ten battalions and fifteen squadrons: the army under the Count de Clermont, entirely French, consisted of 80 battalions and 110 squadrons, and possessed the fortified places of Minden, Hameln and Nienburg, and Wesel and Dusseldorf on the Rhine. On the 22d of February Duke Ferdinand marched on Verden, and passed the Aller and the Weser on the same day, although both these rivers are extremely rapid. Great alarm was excited throughout the French cantonments; they fell back, the left on Osnaburg, the centre on Minden, and the right on Hameln. On the 8th of March the enemy invested and took Minden, which had a garrison of 5000 men, in sight of the Count de Clermont, who had no rest until after he had repassed the Rhine at Dusseldorf, on the 3d of April, having lost, in a month's campaign, Westphalia, Hanover, and Hesse, his hospitals and his magazines, without having engaged or attempted to engage, although

his forces were superior to those of the enemy. The head-quarters of the French army were fixed at Wesel, and the troops cantoned on the left bank of the Lower Rhine. The Duke of Broglie occupied Frankfort and Hanau with the French contingent, which was at the disposal of the Queen of Hungary; the Prince of Soubise took the command of the army, which being reinforced by 6000 Wurtemberghers, now amounted to 30,000 men.

On the 29th of April Duke Ferdinand passed the Rhine over the bridge of Rees, between Emerick and Wesel; marched on Cleves with the greater part of his troops, leaving the Prince of Issemburg with 5000 men to observe the army of the Prince of Soubise on the Lahn. On the 10th of June Duke Ferdinand arrived in presence of the French army, which had its right supported on the Rhine, its left on the canal of Gueldres, occupying Closter-Kampen as a vanguard on the centre. On the 12th he attacked and took Closter-Kampen after a brisk action. The Count de Clermont immediately evacuated all his positions, and retreated on Nuys. But having received orders from court, he again advanced, and encamped on the 19th behind the vestiges of the canal dug for the purpose of joining the Meuse and the Rhine, with his right on Vicheln and his left on Anradt. This position

was good, and even formidable; its flanks were supported on morasses extending on the right as far as the Rhine. Duke Ferdinand stationed himself opposite the French, with his left at Hulsen, and his right at Kampen; he had thirty-eight battalions and fifty-two squadrons. Although thus inferior in number, he did not hesitate to attack; he left sixteen battalions and twenty squadrons to observe the right of the French, six battalions and six squadrons to observe the centre, and with sixteen battalions and twenty-six squadrons he turned the whole left at a considerable distance, crossing an almost impracticable country, and came round to attack the enemy in the rear. The French cavalry fought with intrepidity, but suffered considerable loss; the Count de Clermont ordered a retreat. This disgraceful day cost him 7000 men. His army rallied at the camp of Cologne. Duke Ferdinand took possession of Dusseldorf, and blockaded Wesel. The Count de Clermont was recalled, and succeeded by Marshal de Contades. Marshal de Belle-Isle was minister at war. The army was soon reinforced and reformed; as was that of the Prince of Soubise, which continued on the Mein. By command of the Prince of Soubise, the Chevalier de Broglie marched on the Lahn, with fourteen battalions and fourteen squadrons, to drive off the Prince of Issemburg.

These two divisions, so unequal in strength, met at Sanderhausen. The Prince of Issemburg was beaten, and lost 1000 men. On the 23d of July the Chevalier de Broglie entered Cassel, whither he was followed by the Prince of Soubise. In the mean time Marshal de Contades ordered Chevert to pass the Rhine with 8000 men, directing him on Wesel and on the bridges of Rees, in order to burn them, which would have compromised the allied army, but Chevert was defeated after a very obstinate action, and obliged to fall back. On the 10th of August Duke Ferdinand passed again to the right bank of the Rhine, and was joined by an English division. Contades moved his head-quarters to Wesel; on the 19th of August he marched by Recklinhausen to join Soubise on Lipstadt; but that prince made a movement in a contrary direction, by marching on Hanover. Duke Ferdinand, whose head-quarters were at Munster, placed himself between the two armies to oppose their junction. He ordered his left wing to march to surprise Cassel, where all the magazines of the Prince of Soubise were; but the latter fell back in time, which gave rise to the battle of Luternberg on the 2d of October, when half Duke Ferdinand's army, commanded by General Oberg, was beaten; the Prince of Soubise took twenty-eight pieces of cannon and 1000 men. Duke Ferdinand himself

passed to the left bank of the Lippe. Marshal Contades attempted to surprise Munster; this was in reprisal for Duke Ferdinand's attempt against Cassel; but he failed, and once more passed the Rhine, taking up his winter-quarters on the left bank. The Prince of Soubise wished to maintain himself at Cassel; but, being abandoned by Marshal de Contades, he resolved to retrograde on the Mein, where he cantoned his troops about Frankfort and Hanau.

II.

During this campaign the King of Prussia acted with three armies, forming together 129 battalions and 218 squadrons; the first, which he commanded in person and with which he entered Moravia, consisting of sixty-four battalions and 128 squadrons; the second, which he left in Saxony under the command of Prince Henry, amounting to thirty-eight battalions and thirty-four squadrons; and the third, which he formed in Old Prussia, to act against the Russians, under the command of General Dohna, twenty battalions and thirty-five squadrons strong; there were also thirty-one battalions in garrison in the fortresses of Silesia, and fifteen squadrons were detached to Duke Ferdinand's army. The large subsidies the King received from England made his recruiting proceed with great activity. He

was opposed in this campaign, by the Austrian army of Marshal Daun, of ninety battalions and 120 squadrons; the army of the Circles, which, combined with two Austrian divisions, formed the army of Bohemia, forty-five battalions and fifty squadrons strong, and the Russian and Swedish armies, amounting, together, to 80,000 men. With from 135 to 140,000 men he had to face 230, or 240,000; but the troops of his enemies were of different nations, acting separately, and without concert, on frontiers at a great distance from each other. In this calculation the French forces and Duke Ferdinand's army, which were acting on the Weser and the Rhine, are not included. Duke Ferdinand not only kept the French in check, but also the contingents of Wurtemberg and of the other petty states bordering on the Rhine, which would have increased the army of the Circles in Bohemia.

In the beginning of the spring, the King of Prussia was still in Silesia, Prince Henry commanded in Saxony, and General Dohna in Old Prussia. The King resolved to enter Moravia and besiege Olmutz. Marshal Daun was in Bohemia, engaged in fortifying all the debouchés; 8000 Austrians were in garrison in Schweidnitz. On the 1st of April the King surrounded that fortress, opened the trenches, and carried one of the works by assault, which

produced the surrender of the place on the 15th of April. On the 1st of May he set out from Troppau; on the 6th, he had Olmutz surrounded by sixteen battalions under Marshal Keith; the train of artillery was collected at Neiss to protect the siege. He formed three camps; one at Neustadt, of seven battalions and three squadrons, under the command of the Margrave Charles; one at Achemeritz, of fifteen battalions and seventeen squadrons, commanded by Prince Maurice; one at Prosnitz on the way to Vienna, of twenty-one battalions and twenty-eight squadrons; he stationed himself at this camp. General Fouguet, who was ordered to escort the besieging train with his division, arrived at Krenau, two leagues from Olmutz, on the 20th of May. The trenches were then open.

Daun had at length arrived in Moravia, and encamped at Leutomischel, twenty leagues West of Olmutz; he sent forward Count Laudon on Konitz, and General Deville in advance of Wischau, barring the Brunn and Vienna road. On the 9th of May, having received some reinforcements, for which he had been waiting, and being pressed by the orders of his court to succour Olmutz, he raised his camp, marched to Zwittau, encamped on the heights of Gerveiez, whilst General Janus drew near Prince Maurice. On the 16th of June he took up a position before

Wischau on the high-road to Vienna, three leagues from Prosnitz and seven from Olmutz. On the 22d, he forced a passage into the place for 1200 men, who entered by the road to Troppau; in the mean time the siege continued, and notwithstanding the activity of General Marshal, who commanded the place, it was reduced to the last extremity.

But the Prussian army now began to be in want of ammunition and provisions. A convoy of 4000 waggons, escorted by eight battalions, 3000 recruits, and 1000 horse, was prepared at Neiss. Marshal Daun conceived the scheme of intercepting it, and thus putting an end to the siege of Olmutz, without risking a battle. He detached several divisions under the command of Laudon, to occupy all the defiles of the mountains between Silesia and Moravia. The convoy left Troppau on the 27th, marched in a single line, and occupied a space of eight or ten leagues. On the following day, the 28th, Laudon made an ineffectual attack with his vanguard, was repulsed, and lost 500 prisoners. The King, however, was alarmed, and detached Ziethen, the same day (the 28th), to march to meet the convoy, who joined it on that day: from that time it appeared to be saved. But on the 30th, Laudon was in position on the heights of Domstaedtel with all his forces; he attacked Ziethen, separated

him from Olmutz, drove him back on Troppau, and took and burned the whole convoy except 200 waggons, amongst which were those of the treasure, which succeeded in reaching the Prussian camp. On the 1st of July the King raised the siege; 500 waggons followed his troops. All the debouchés of Silesia were occupied by Laudon with considerable forces; the King therefore adopted the alternative of retreating on Bohemia. On the 6th of July he reached Leutomischel; on the 9th the army was assembled there; on the 14th he encamped at Konigsgratz, covered by the Elbe, and in communication with Silesia. On the 25th he commenced his march to evacuate Bohemia, and on the 10th of August, he reached Landshut in Silesia. He left his army to the Margrave Charles, and marched with eighteen battalions and thirty-five squadrons against the Russians, who were besieging Custrin.

III.

The Czarina had been dissatisfied with Marshal Apraxin's retreat, after the battle of Jœgendorf; she disgraced the minister who had ordered it, and commanded her army to repass the Niemen, and to take up its winter-quarters in Old Prussia, on the right of the Vistula. In the course of March, General Fermor, the new com-

mander-in-chief of the Russian army, which consisted of 70,000 men, occupied Elbing and Thorn; on the 27th of June, he passed the Vistula, directing his march on Posen. The Prussian general Dohna marched on the 18th of June from Stralsund, which place he kept blockaded, and encamped on the 6th of July at Schwedt, with twenty battalions and thirty-five squadrons. On the 1st of July, the Russians arrived at Posen; on the 26th at Meseritz: on the 10th of August they passed the Wartha at Landsberg; on the 13th they surrounded the town of Custrin, on the right bank of the Oder, and bombarded it; their line was formed by forty battalions and thirty-five squadrons. Romanzow occupied Schneidemul with 8000 men. Braun arrived at Landsberg with a division of reserve. Dohna encamped, on the 6th of August, near Frankfort on the Oder; on the 16th at Reitwen; on the 17th between Manchenow and Gurgast. On the 21st the King reached Custrin. On the 22d the division he brought with him, under the command of Prince Maurice, encamped opposite Custrin, on the left bank of the Oder; on the 23d it passed to the right bank, several leagues below the place. The Russian general immediately raised the siege, collected all his baggage and waggons at Little Kamin, a village two leagues from Kustrin, on the road to Landsberg; he formed a retrenched

camp of the waggons, left 4000 grenadiers and twenty pieces of cannon to defend it, and encamped with the rest of the army before Zorndorf. On the 24th, Braun joined him with the division of reserve.

In the night of the 24th, the Russian army, 54,000 strong, and having 100 pieces of cannon, proceeded 3000 toises from the camp of Little Kamin, near the sheep-folds of the village of Quartschen, and drew up in a single square, of a rectangular form. The King, with 35,000 men, manœuvred all day on the 24th; in the evening he passed the little river of Mutzel, and arrived in presence of the Russian square. On the 25th in the morning he marched by his left, and placed himself between Zorndorf and Custrin to attack the right of the square, manœuvring in oblique order; but this operation was unsuccessful. The Russians, provoked by this flank march, advanced against the foremost columns of attack, which were broken and thrown into disorder. At last, after several fluctuations, and many false movements and rash attacks, of which the experienced eye of Seidlitz and the intrepidity of his cavalry prevented the ill consequences, the left of the Russian square was broken, and the Prussians remained victorious. The Russians lost 18,000 men, killed, wounded, or taken, and sixty pieces of cannon: the King lost 10,000 men.

On the 26th General Fermor, being driven to the wood of Drewitz, rallied his troops; but he was cut off from his baggage, and from the 4000 grenadiers of the camp of Kamin. In the night of the 27th, he passed between the King's camp and the fortress of Custrin, and joined the camp of Kamin, where he remained until the 31st. On the 1st of September, he marched on Landsberg. The King remained a spectator of all his movements; he had suffered too much to attempt to disturb the retreat of the Russians. On the 2d of September, he marched with fifteen battalions and thirty-five squadrons to manœuvre in Saxony, leaving the rest of the army under General Dohna, with orders to follow the Russians. General Fermor insensibly effected his retreat. In the beginning of September, General Palmbach surrounded and bombarded Colberg; on the 11th of October he was master of the covered way; but on the 22d, General Dohna having advanced to Storgard, the army retired, and the siege of Colberg was raised on the 1st of September.

The Swedes performed but little this campaign. On the 6th of September they had advanced on Prenzlow, where they were kept in check by General Wedel with eight battalions and five squadrons. At the end of October, this general having been called into Saxony, Dohna detached General Manteufel with eight battalions

to observe them; at a later period Dohna returned into Pomerania, surrounded Demmin and Aucklam, and took 2500 prisoners from the Swedes, whom he forced back into Stralsund. He took up his winter-quarters in Pomerania and Mecklenburg.

IV.

Prince Henry, with thirty-three battalions and forty-three squadrons, occupied Dresden with a garrison, and observed the frontiers of Bohemia. His camp and head-quarters were at Grossedlitz, whilst the army of the Circles, commanded by the Duke of Deux Ponts, fifty battalions and eighty squadrons strong, (including several Austrian divisions of bad troops) guarded Bohemia; its principal forces being at Saatz. During the months of February and March, he seconded the army of Duke Ferdinand by a division, which he recalled in April. On the 15th of April he marched to Plauen, with eighteen battalions and twenty-six squadrons, leaving General Hulsen on the position of Friebergsdorf, to observe the debouchés of Bohemia, and maintain his communications with Dresden; but the Duke of Deux Ponts was on the defensive, and was careful not to attempt any enterprise. Affairs remained in this posture during May, June, and July.

In the mean time Daun had followed the King's army in its retreat from Moravia. On the 17th

of August he encamped at Zittau, the first fortified place in Lusatia, and detached Laudon to Frankfort on the Oder, to cut off the King's communications with his other armies. He left General Harsch in Silesia with 12,000 men, and ordered General Deville, with 6 or 7000 men, to blockade Neiss. The Margrave Charles, whom the King had left in command of his army at the camp of Landshut in Silesia, detached Ziethen, with seven battalions and twenty-six squadrons, to observe Laudon; intrusted Fouquet, at the head of eleven squadrons and ten battalions, with the protection of Silesia; and quitted Landshut on the 20th, which place Fouquet kept till the 4th of November. On the 23d, he reached Lowenburg. Marshal Daun marched from Zittau to Gorlitz, on the 20th. Laudon entered Peitz on the 25th, his scouts advanced as far as Frankfort; but the approach of Ziethen frustrated all his plans. On the 26th Daun quitted Gorlitz, and marched on the Elbe, where he encamped on the 1st of September at Nieder Rodern. The Duke of Deux Ponts had had Fort Sonnestein invested; Colonel Grappe, its commander, delivered it up at the end of August; the garrison, consisting of 1400 Prussians, surrendered as prisoners of war. The army of the Circles occupied the camp of Pirna.

The King set out from Custrin on the 3d of September, after the retreat of the Russians, and

arrived on the 9th under Dresden, at the camp of Gros-Debritz. Daun, finding his plans disconcerted, marched to Stolpen, with his left on Pirna, his right on Loebau, and Bohemia in his rear. Laudon took up a position at Radeburg, to cut off the road from Bautzen to Dresden. In the mean time Neiss was besieged, and the King felt it highly necessary to march to the succour of that key of Silesia. Daun was unassailable in his camp at Stolpen. On the 14th of September, the Prussian general Retzow lay at Rodeberg, which place Laudon had evacuated. On the 26th the King entered Bischofwerda and Bautzen; and on the 1st of October Retzow encamped at Weissemburg. Daun then left Stolpen, and on the 6th of October encamped at Kittlitz near Hohenkirch, across the two roads leading from Bautzen to Loebau and Gorlitz. The King had fixed his bakehouses at Bautzen; on the 10th he marched in four columns on Hohenkirch, where he encamped in sight of the Austrian army, although the artillery played directly on the whole of the ground he occupied. He placed his right in advance of Hohenkirch, and his left on the side of the road from Bautzen to Gorlitz, on a rideau which extends along the rivulet which runs to Wurschen. This first line formed a Z reversed, the first arm of which, from 6 to 700 toises long, covered the village of Hohenkirch

and faced the mountains; the second arm was from 13 to 1400 toises long; and the third, facing towards Weissemburg, was 400 toises. This first line of 2200 toises, was occupied by twenty-six battalions and fifty squadrons; 200 toises farther in the rear was the second line, four battalions and thirty-five squadrons strong; three battalions were stationed in the village of Hohenkirch, two battalions of the guards were cantoned in the village of Wawitz, where the head-quarters were, nearly in the midst of the line. The general park was placed even with that point; two great batteries of twelve-pounders were placed one on the right and the other on the left of the first line. General Retzow, with sixteen battalions and thirty squadrons, was before Weissemburg, 2500 toises from the left of the King's army, and separated therefrom by the high road from Bautzen to Gorlitz, and by the Loebau, a small river. A dozen squadrons and three or four battalions occupying intermediate positions on the heights, maintained the communication between the two Prussian camps; six battalions and five squadrons were stationed at Bautzen to defend the bakehouses.

Marshal Daun's army was encamped 1000 toises in advance of the village of Kittlitz, his left supported on Mount Hohenkirch, his right on the little river of the Loebau, at the village of

Nostlitz, occupying 800 toises in advance of the Stromberg, where he had placed batteries; this mountain commands the adjacent country to a great distance. The Marshal's line of battle was 3600 toises in extent. He had Laudon's corps on his left, which was guarding the mountain of Hohenkirch and all the woods as far as the village of Meschwitz, making an angle in the rear of the Prussian right. The heights of Hohenkirch were at the distance of 500 toises. The Stromberg, behind which the right of the Austrian army was supported, was 1200 toises from the left of the Prussian army. The Prince of Lowenstein was on the right bank of the Loebau, opposite the camp of Weissemburg.

The numerous light troops of the Austrian army maintained the possession of all the coppices about Hohenkirchberg to within 300 toises of the Prussian camp. On the 13th the King detached two corps of seven battalions each, to seek provisions at Bautzen and Dresden. In the course of the 14th he evinced some anxiety on account of the bad situation of his camp, and only waited for the arrival of his provisions to effect the movement he had planned on Gorlitz and Silesia.

But on the 14th at sunset, Daun ordered his troops under arms, and manœuvred with his right, marching by his left through roads which he had

caused to be made in the woods of the mountain of Hohenkirch, in order to join Laudon and surround the whole of the King's right. This movement was made with so much order and silence, that the King knew nothing of it, although it was executed within 300 toises of his vedettes. A division of eight battalions and five squadrons, commanded by General Coloredo, advanced in observation opposite the front of the Prussian army, on the Kolwesa side. The right of the Austrians, under the Duke of Aremberg, marching by a contrary movement to that of the left, rested on the right, nearly as far as the river of Loebau, on the village of Weiche, beyond the Gorlitz road ; the right and left were thus 5000 toises asunder. The troops spent the night in executing these movements, and at five o'clock in the morning of the 15th, the left began the attack. Laudon marched on Steindorfel, having turned the whole of the King's right, and sent skirmishers in the rear to the village of Hohenkirch. Daun advanced in three columns on the front of the first arm of the Z. ; the Prussian troops were surprised in their camp ; they ran out half dressed ; three battalions of grenadiers hastened to attack Laudon, thinking they had only to repulse some light troops; but being soon surrounded on all sides, they were almost entirely destroyed. The regiment at the head of

the second line made a change of front, and advanced to attack Laudon, but was also surrounded and taken. The Austrians took the village of Hohenkirch, and the grand battery of the right. The King sent forward his reserves, and marched in person to retake the village, but after several attempts was obliged to relinquish the enterprise. A very thick fog succeeded the night, which, on clearing off, discovered the Austrian army already formed before Hohenkirch. The Prussian army was surrounded on every side. Laudon marched on the defiles of Dresa, but Moellendorf reached them time enough to preserve that important position and save the army. The Duke of Aremberg did not attack until eight in the morning; he surrounded several insulated battalions which were posted to keep up the communications with the camp of Weissemberg; he also took the grand battery on the left; but did not follow up his attack. General Retzow from Weissemberg, joined the left of the King, who then operated his retreat quietly, and halted on the hills of Spitzbergen. Daun returned to his camp, and the two armies thus remained several days in presence, at the distance of 6000 toises from each other. The King lost 10,000 men; a great number of his generals, amongst whom was Marshal Keith, and almost all his artillery. The Austrians lost 5000 men.

V.

The trenches were opened before Neiss: the road from Bautzen to Gorlitz was cut off by Marshal Daun. The King, ten days after his defeat, stole a march on the enemy, on the 24th of October, proceeded up the Spree, and reached Gorlitz before Daun. On the 3d of November he entered Schweidnitz; on the 5th the siege of Neiss was raised. As soon as Daun saw that it was impossible for him to prevent the King's return into Silesia without hazarding a battle, he contented himself with sending Laudon to pursue him, and with sending a division over the mountains to reinforce the army besieging Neiss; after which he marched on the Elbe, with the main body, passed it on the 6th of November at Pirna, and encamped on the heights of Lokwitz, whilst the army of the Circles was advancing on Freyberg; he summoned and surrounded Dresden. Prince Henry had accompanied the King into Silesia. The Prussians at the camp of Gamich, menaced on one side by the army of the Circles, and on the other by the approach of Daun, evacuated that camp, and covered themselves by the valley of Plauen: on the 2d of November they passed the Elbe, and placed themselves behind Dresden. On the 10th of November Schmettau set fire to the suburbs; Daun summoned the town. In the mean time the King,

after having delivered Neiss, marched on the 8th of November on his return to the Elbe; on the 15th he reached Lauban, whence he marched on Dresden. On his approach, Laudon retreated to Zittau. Daun blew up the castle of Sonerstein, and returned into Bohemia. The army of the Circles, which had marched on Leipsic, had several engagements with the Prussian divisions which the King had sent towards Torgau. Both armies went into winter-quarters. On the 10th of December the King left Dresden, and reached Berlin on the 14th. During the winter, the Prussian army was cantoned as follows: that is to say, Fouquet, with twenty-five battalions and thirty squadrons, in Silesia, in the neighbourhood of Ratibor; Ziethen, with thirty-six battalions and thirty-five squadrons, at Lowenberg; sixteen battalions and thirty squadrons in the vicinity of Breslaw; forty-one battalions near Dresden; thirty squadrons near Leipsic; three battalions and thirty squadrons in observation at different posts; and lastly, General Dohna, with twenty-one battalions and thirty-five squadrons, in Pomerania; making a total of 142 battalions and 190 squadrons. The Austrian army was cantoned in the circles of Sautz, Leutmeritz, Buntzlau, and Konigsgratz, and in Moravia. The head-quarters were fixed at Prague. The army of the Circles wintered in Franconia.

VI.

Observation XI.—1. The Count de Clermont evacuates one hundred leagues of ground, in a season so unfavourable to military operations, with an army superior in numbers, without striking a blow; he suffers a place like Minden to be taken in his sight, without attempting to succour it. All this is far from honourable, not only to the General, but even to the general-officers of the army; for if Broglie, Saint-Germain, Chevert, and d'Armentieres had demanded to fight, if the opinion of the generals and leaders of corps had been loudly declared in favour of making some resistance, and at least saving the honour of the army, the General certainly could not have refused.

2. Duke Ferdinand made a brilliant campaign, indeed, but he met with so little opposition, that his glory would be very inconsiderable if it did not rest on more solid claims, which prove his talents and skill: 1st, His passage of the Rhine was contrary to rule; he remained several days on the left bank of that river, separated from two-thirds of his army: 2dly, He would have done better in besieging and taking Wesel, or attacking and beating Soubise, to oblige him to repass to the left bank of the Rhine. He neglected him, so that Soubise

marched forward; and all Hesse was reduced without an action. The Duke's plan was faulty; if Chevert had succeeded in getting possession of the bridge of Rees, his army would have been lost; and Chevert would have succeeded if Marshal Contades had detached him, not with 7 or 8000 men, but with 18 or 20,000. In saying this we are speaking according to the principles of those times; for if this Marshal had been a great general, he would have debouched, with his whole army, by forced marches, on his enemy's bridges, and would thus have cut off his retreat. 3dly, Duke Ferdinand's plan at the battle of Creveldt was contrary to the rule which directs us *never to separate the wings of an army from each other, so that the enemy may place himself in the intervals.* He divided his line of battle into three parts, separated from each other by void spaces and defiles; he turned a whole army with a corps resting on nothing, which was in imminent danger of being surrounded and taken.

Observation XII.—1. Ought the King of Prussia, at the beginning of the campaign, to have besieged Olmutz? No: had he taken that place he must have evacuated it two months afterwards, or been obliged to leave a strong garrison in it, which would so far have weakened

his army. It was not in taking Olmutz that he should have spent the months of April, May, and June, when the Russians were far from the theatre of the war, and allowed him a respite, but in beating Daun, and destroying his army. He could have done it; that army was weak at the beginning of the campaign; and having routed it, he should, in concert with Prince Henry, have destroyed the army of the Duke of Deux Ponts, and established himself firmly in Bohemia.

2. But on the supposition that the King of Prussia was right in besieging Olmutz, he ought nevertheless, in order to succeed in that enterprise, to have beaten Daun's army. He had the experience of the catastrophe which had befallen him at Prague; but then he had been induced to lay siege to Prague by the natural influence of great success, and by the hope of taking 40,000 men, which would have put an end to the contest. The possession of Prague was important in itself, as ensuring the possession of Bohemia; but what was the use of Olmutz?

3. The King wishes to take Olmutz: he surprises the enemy's general by fine manœuvres, and invests the place on the 6th of May; yet his battering train does not arrive until the 20th; here, then, are fourteen days lost, which give Daun time to recover himself. The battering

train ought to have arrived two days after the investment, and the trenches should have been opened on the 8th.

4. It appears that the King undertook to besiege Olmutz, and to keep up his communications with Neiss, his place of depôt, six days' march from Neiss, before an army of succour superior in number to his own, and against a power which had an immense quantity of light troops. In this case he should have formed lines of circumvallation and countervallation; the former would have enabled him to keep the garrison in check with a few troops; the latter would have presented a considerable obstacle to all the partial succours which might have attempted to enter the place. He might have fortified his lines with fossés full of water, which was plentiful before this place.

5. The King did not bring his train of artillery with him. He calculated his operation on the necessity of receiving two or three convoys from Neiss, his place of depôt, and yet he did nothing, because he could do nothing, to maintain his communications with that town: the road is a continued defile amongst mountains. He placed three corps of observation on the semicircumference on the side of Bohemia, Vienna, and the Danube; whilst he placed nothing, and had nothing to place, on the other semicircum-

ference. It was upwards of two leagues from Neustadt to his camp near Littau; it was six from his camp at Littau to that of Posnitz; therefore there was a semicircumference of eight leagues guarded by three camps—of seven battalions, fifteen battalions, and twenty-one battalions, against an army of ninety battalions, fresh and well disciplined, which had sustained no check in this campaign, and was manœuvring about the place. Accordingly, Daun did just as he pleased. He threw reinforcements into the town; he placed 20,000 men on the King's line of communication, and kept them there from fifteen to twenty days; he intercepted convoys, and if he had chosen to attack the camps of Neustadt Littau, and Posnitz, the result could not have been doubtful; he might have taken the whole of the Prussian army.

6. There are but two ways of securing the siege of a place. One is, to begin by defeating the enemy's army, driving it far from the field of operations, forcing the remnant of it beyond some natural obstacle, such as mountains, or a great river, placing the army of observation behind this natural obstacle, and in the mean time opening the trenches and taking the place. But if it be intended to take the place before the army of succour, without risking a battle, it is necessary to be provided with a besieging train,

to have ammunition and provisions for the time of the presumed duration of the siege, and to form lines of circumvallation and countervallation, taking advantage of the localities, whether heights, woods, marshes, or waters. It being then unnecessary to keep up any communication with the places of depôt, there is nothing to attend to but the keeping of the army of succour in check, for which purpose an army of observation is formed, which never loses sight of it, and which, closing the road to the place against it, is always in time to reach its flanks or rear, should it steal a march; or finally, taking advantage of the lines of countervallation, to employ a part of the besieging forces to give battle to the army of succour.

7. But to attempt all these three things at once, that is to say, 1st, to besiege a fortress and keep its garrison in check without countervallation; 2dly, to maintain communications with places of depôt situated at a distance of six days' march; and 3dly, to keep the army of observation in check, without the aid of any natural obstacle, or of lines of circumvallation, shows an erroneous calculation which can only lead to disasters, unless supported by forces double the number of the enemy.

8. The King's retreat into Bohemia was rendered indispensable by the positions which Daun

had taken and which Laudon occupied. The precision and *sang-froid* with which this movement was operated, are truly admirable; but if, as the Prussian writers pretend, Frederic had only adopted it in order to carry the war into Bohemia, it would have been a false operation.

When an army drags a besieging train and numerous convoys of sick and wounded after it, it cannot take too short a road, to reach its depôts as quickly as possible; but in this case events speak for themselves. The King raised the siege on the 1st of July; he spent fourteen days in reaching Konigsgratz, and six days afterwards he began his retreat on Silesia; it is, therefore, not true that he wished to carry the war into Bohemia. He retreated on Konigsgratz, because he could do no other, and in this point of view his conduct was very laudable; but to recommend this compulsory conduct as if it had been voluntary, would be propagating false notions.

Observation XIII.—1. By the manœuvres of the Russians it may be seen how much behindhand they were in all military operations. The extreme slowness which characterised their movements is remarkable. Their order of battle, on the day of Zorndorf, was a rectangle, the greater side of which was one thousand toises in length: a barbarous order, which paralyzed half their forces.

2. During the whole of the battle, they were

separated from their baggage, which was placed at Kamin, and guarded by 4000 grenadiers. The King of Prussia manœuvred between that camp and their army; it has been said that he was ignorant of its existence. In fact, if he had known of it, he would only have had to take it, in order to paralyze the whole Russian army. It is, however, impossible that he could have been ignorant of it the day after the battle, because he had taken a great number of prisoners; but then, it will be said, he had suffered too much to engage in an attack on this camp before the Russian army which was rallying; nevertheless, that alone would have completed his victory, and been its most noble trophy.

3. None of the King's designs were executed on this day. All his dispositions were overruled by circumstances. This battle was only a series of skirmishes; the boldness and intrepidity of Seidlitz, who performed prodigies, made up for every thing. The Prussian army amounted to 35 or 36,000 men; that of the Russians, exclusive of the 4000 grenadiers detached at Kamin, consisted of 40,000 men.

4. The offensive movement of the Russians on the left flank of the Prussian army, when it manœuvred to turn their right, was well conceived; its success was complete, as it always will be against an army making a flank-march;

but this movement should have been made regularly by echelons, and in line, supported by the cavalry. The Russian army was at that time far from being sufficiently well trained to execute such a manœuvre; accordingly, it was taken in flank by the Prussian cavalry.

Observation XIV. — 1. Marshal Daun lost the opportunity of destroying the Prussian army, when it was incumbered with a siege and dispersed to cover it.

2. He allowed the King of Prussia, although incumbered with five hundred waggons, to make his retreat undisturbed and as deliberately as he pleased. Did he then think it difficult to get beyond the King by parallel marches, and to anticipate him by forming his army on some of those fine hills with which that country abounds, and occupying both sides of the road? This would have compelled him to abandon his convoy to accelerate his march, or to give battle in such a position that if he had lost it, or succeeded but partially, his army must have been destroyed.

3. The King of Prussia quitted Bohemia on the 26th of July, and arrived before Dresden on the 25th of September; Daun, therefore, had it completely in his power to do whatever he thought proper during forty-five days. From Konigsgratz he might have reached Pirna, through

the interior of Bohemia, in five or six marches, and after joining the Duke of Deux Ponts, he might have beaten Prince Henry, and taken Dresden, or marched against the Margrave Charles, and destroyed his army. He did nothing.

4. After the great victory of Hohenkirch, when the King had lost all his artillery, Daun allowed his enemy to rally, and remained ten days within two leagues of him.

5. When the King went into Silesia, Daun did not follow him; he marched to Dresden at an ill-chosen time; he could do nothing there, having no besieging artillery; and he was not wanted there, because Prince Henry's army was more than sufficient to blockade and besiege that place. Had Daun marched into Silesia, in the rear of the King, he would have intercepted all his communications with Saxony, and contributed more effectually to the reduction, than he could do by the presence of his army under the ramparts of that city. In his march on Silesia, he would always have had Bohemia on his right flank, and thus would constantly have been in communication with his country. The Russians were not far distant; this movement, carrying the war to the Oder, might have induced them to approach and place themselves on his left. Ten or twelve days had not been sufficient to

restore the confidence of the Prussian army, after the great check it had sustained at Hohenkirch; and if Daun had pursued it closely into Silesia, it would have been the victor driving the vanquished: the moral effect of Hohenkirch would have fought for him.

Observation XV.—1. The King could not encamp at Hohenkirch without possessing himself of Hohenkirchberg. No adjutant of a regiment would have neglected this precaution, or encamped his battalion on ground commanded by the enemy's batteries. It is impossible to conceive how he could persist in remaining six days in this camp; all the heights belonging to the enemy, Laudon being in his rear, and all the coppices to within three hundred toises of his right being occupied by Daun's fusileers, whose batteries could even throw grape-shot into his tents. The King durst not attack the heights of Hohenkirch, because they were supported by the whole of the Austrian army: he ought therefore to have taken up another camp.

2. If the Duke of Aremberg had attacked at six o'clock in the morning and with more spirit, the King would have suffered still greater disasters.

3. If Daun had followed up his first success more boldly, the King would not have rallied; he deserved to lose his whole army. The loss of

his baggage, his tents, 200 pieces of cannon, and the best of his troops, was not so great as the military fault he committed in encamping at Hohenkirch: he was indebted, for all that he saved, merely to his good fortune.

4. It is impossible to discover any justification of his conduct, because he pitched his camp in sight of Daun's forces, drawn up in line; he could not be ignorant of any thing relating to the position he occupied.

5. It is surprising that Daun did not attack him in the night of the 10th; but waited four days before he gave battle. Ought he not to have been apprehensive that the King might recollect himself? How could he possibly hope that he would remain several days in so strange a position?

CHAPTER V.

CAMPAIGN OF 1756.

I. Operations of the French and Hanoverian armies; battle of Bergen (April 13); battle of Minden (August 1).—II. Operations in Silesia and Saxony, during April, May, June, and July.—III. Operations of the Russians; action of Kay (July 23); battle of Kunersdorf (August 12).—IV. Operations in Saxony and Silesia during the battle of Kunersdorf and afterwards; capitulation of Maxen (November 21); winter-quarters.—V. Observations.

I.

THE two French armies of the Lower Rhine and the Mein remained in their cantonments during the winter; the former on the left bank, in the territories of Cleves and Cologne; the latter on the right bank, in the valley of the Mein. Marshal Contades, commanding the army of the Rhine, had the chief direction of the two armies; his head-quarters were at Wesel. The Duke of Broglie succeeded the Prince of Soubise in the command of the Mein. The enemy occupied a

central position on the right bank of the Rhine. The armistice concluded by the two belligerent parties, for the sake of tranquillity in their winter-quarters, expired on the 16th of March.

On the 24th, Duke Ferdinand collected his army and marched on Cassel, to manœuvre against the army of the Mein. He left General Sporken, with a corps of observation, on the right of the Lower Rhine; and on the 30th encamped at Fulde, where he remained until the 10th of April, which gave the Duke of Broglie time to concentrate himself on the position of Bergen, which the French engineers had strongly intrenched, and which is situate on the high road to Hesse, three leagues before you reach Frankfort. Duke Ferdinand encamped on the 12th of April at Windeken, near the French army, which was drawn up with the right towards a rivulet, the centre at Bergen, and the left at the village of Wilbel, on the road to Frankfort. On the 30th of April, Duke Ferdinand commenced his march before daylight, in five columns. He attacked the centre at the town of Bergen with the greatest intrepidity, whilst the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick marched along the rivulet, with the left, to turn the right of the French. His forces were very superior, but the position of Bergen was impregnable: he was repulsed, lost from 5 to 6000 men, and in the evening regained

his camp at Windelken. This was the first time during this war that the French armies had gained any success of importance. It excited a lively sensation throughout France; a rising Turenne was seen in Broglie, and he was made a marshal of France. This battle was his principal military achievement.

In the mean time Marshal Contades had arrived from Paris at his head-quarters, had raised his cantonments, and being convinced by the experience of the preceding campaign of the disadvantages incident to a double line of operations, he passed the Rhine, and joined the army of the Mein at Geissen on the 3d of June, by rearward movements on the ground occupied by his troops. He had 126 battalions and 125 squadrons. On the 8th he encamped at Sachsenburg, on the 10th at Corbach, on the 13th on the Dimel; which river he passed on the 14th. The reserve, under the command of the Duke of Broglie, encamped on the 11th at Cassel, and on the 14th at Dieburg. He himself encamped in person at Bielefeld on the 4th of July; on the 6th Lieutenant-general d'Armentieres invested Munster by his orders; on the 8th he encamped at Herwarden; on the 10th the Duke of Broglie took the fortress of Minden by a vigorous *coup-de-main* with 1200 men. On the 14th the whole army encamped on the left

bank of the Weser, with the right at Minden and the left at Hartenhausen. Lieutenant-general Saint-Germain surrounded Hameln. Duke Ferdinand, who had commenced his retreat as soon as he was informed of the movement of Marshal Contades, encamped on the 12th of June at Soest, on the 14th at Buren, on the 30th at Marienfeld, and on the 7th of July at Osnabruck. Although he was convinced of the great superiority of the strength of the French army, he resolved to fight a battle. He marched to Stolzenau on the Weser, constructed a bridge, and made a show of intending to pass that river. He took the fortified place of Nienburg as the centre of his operations, and caused Bremen in the rear to be occupied. On the 17th he marched forward, up to the left bank of the Weser. Contades immediately called in his detachments, especially the reserve under the Duke of Broglie which he had sent into Hanover. On the 23d, the gates of Munster were opened. On the 28th, 29th, and 30th, the two armies remained in presence of each other. Duke Ferdinand, finding the position of the French too strong, detached the hereditary Prince with two divisions, to annoy them in the rear. Marshal Contades resolved to profit by this circumstance to give battle, and made his dispositions in the night of the 31st of July. He ordered the Duke

of Broglie, with the right, to attack the left of the enemy supported on the Weser, and to pursue them closely: it was from this attack that he expected the victory. He placed his cavalry between his right and left. His troops were full of ardour and confidence. At day-break the Hanoverian army debouched in eight columns. At six in the morning it was in line, and perfectly formed. The Duke of Broglie had begun the attack, as early as five o'clock, but feebly; and he continued it in the same manner. The cavalry of the centre advanced at an unfavourable moment; it was attacked by a numerous artillery and a strong reserve of infantry, and gave ground. The two wings were now insulated, the enemy passed between them, the French thought themselves beaten; they retreated, and resumed their camp at Minden. Marshal Contades having returned to this camp, had nothing to fear; but he evacuated it nevertheless on learning that on the very day of the battle, the hereditary Prince had beaten the detachment commanded by the Duke of Brissac, at Kosen, four leagues behind him. The following day he passed the Weser over the bridges of Minden, and retired on Cassel by the right bank. A few days afterwards the Court recalled him, and confided the command of the army to Marshal Broglie.

Duke Ferdinand occupied the whole country

as far as the Lahn, and caused Munster to be besieged, which place surrendered on the 21st of November. At that period he was disabled from continuing an active campaign or attempting any thing of importance, being obliged to send a detachment of thirteen battalions to the King of Prussia. Both armies went into winter-quarters. The Court of Versailles divided into two parties, that of Contades and that of Broglie: the ministry and the public declared for one party or the other. The whole particulars of the faults of the generals and officers of the army were completely exposed to the astonishment of Europe, and increased the humiliation and resentment of the French.

II.

Frederic operated in this campaign with 141 battalions and 200 squadrons, amounting to 130,000 men. He had opposed to him the Austrian army, of 118 battalions and 190 squadrons; the army of the Circles, of 15,000 men, and the Russian army of 70,000 men. Thus he opposed 180,000 men with only 130,000: but, as in the preceding years, these 180,000 men were of different nations, under independent commanders, acting separately on very remote points of the frontiers, and without any combination amongst themselves. At the commencement of hostilities, the King's armies were dis-

posed as follows: in Silesia, under his immediate command, seventy-two battalions and one hundred and eight squadrons, of which eighteen battalions and twenty squadrons were under General Fouquet in Upper Silesia; in Saxony, Prince Henry with forty-three battalions and sixty squadrons; in Pomerania, General Dohna, in observation before the Swedes and Russians, with twenty-six battalions and thirty-five squadrons.

Marshal Daun, commanding the Austrian army, encamped on the frontier of Silesia with his principal forces. The Duke of Deux-Ponts, with the army of the Circles and two Austrian divisions, were in Bohemia and Saxony. The Russians were preparing to make an active campaign, and seemed more animated than on former occasions. According to the plan concerted between the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, their armies were to unite on the Oder, and to operate in a mass; but the Russian army could not arrive before July.

During April, May, June, and July, the King's armies occupied several camps, and executed secondary manœuvres, without attempting any thing serious. He detached some troops into Moravia, towards Olmutz, to carry off a magazine, which was saved by a timely removal. He sent another detachment to Posen, to destroy the stores which had been collected there for the

Russians, in which he succeeded. In the mean time Prince Henry made an incursion into Bohemia, attacked several columns of the enemy, made 1800 prisoners and burned 30,000 barrels of flour; but he failed in every attempt to draw the army of the Circles into a general engagement. In vain he presented himself before several of their camps (that of Munchberg, among others); they constantly evacuated them on his approach. At length, on the 3d of June, he detached General Hulsen with ten battalions and twenty squadrons to reinforce Dohna's army on the right bank of the Oder.

On the 28th of June, Marshal Daun, having received intelligence of the approach of the Russians, raised his camp at Schurtz, and advanced to the Oder, following the course of the Queiss, for the purpose of favouring Soltikoff's movement and reinforcing him with Laudon's corps of 15,000 men, mostly cavalry, and Haddick's corps of 19,000 men. On the 13th of July, he encamped at Pribus, halfway between Bohemia and the Oder. Prince Henry encamped at Bautzen, and the King at Schmotheiffen, near Greifenburg. On the 24th of July the corps of observation of Pomerania was defeated at Kay by the Russians. The King then took the command of the army of Saxony, and Prince Henry that of the army of Silesia.

III.

On the 10th of April, General Dohna had quitted the blockade of Stralsund, leaving General Kleist there with six battalions and seven squadrons. He had encamped on the 26th of May, at Stargard, and on the 12th of June at Landsberg, on the Wartha. In the mean time General Soltikoff, who commanded the Russian army, passed the Vistula at Thorn, on the 12th of May, reached Posen early in June, and manœuvred to cut off Dohna from the road to Silesia, and to approach the Oder. During his march he several times exposed his flank to Dohna, who declined attacking him. The King being dissatisfied with him, removed him from his command, and appointed General Wedel to succeed him. On the 23d of July, Wedel attacked Soltikoff, near Kay, to oppose his junction with Laudon; he was repulsed, lost 6000 men, repassed the Oder, and encamped at Savada. The loss of the Russians was equally great; the only advantage they derived from their victory was the occupation of Crossen on the 25th, where they were joined by Laudon on the 3d of August. The King, having collected the remains of Wedel's forces at Sorau, marched against the Russian army. He repassed the Oder in the night of the 10th of August near Riessen, left nine battalions and seven squadrons there to defend

his bridges and baggage, and with fifty-three battalions and ninety-five squadrons, amounting to between 40 and 45,000 men, took up a position, with his right at Lessow, and his left at Bischofsee. The Russian army, thus reinforced by Laudon's corps, was in position on the right bank of the Oder, near Franckfort; its line being parallel to the river.

As soon as Soltikoff received intelligence of the approach of the Prussian army and the position it occupied, he changed his order of battle; placed his right on the Oder, 100 toises from Franckfort, and his left at Muhlberg, which he covered with intrenchments. On the 13th, at daybreak, the King commenced his movement, marching by lines and by the left flank; he was stopped by morasses and impracticable roads. Having reconnoitred the new position of the enemy, he made his left and centre attack the heights of Kleitsberg, took them, made a great number of prisoners, and took seventy pieces of cannon. The Russians retired behind the Kuhgrund, and intrenched themselves. Laudon proceeded thither; all the artillery of their right was collected on that point, their last rampart. The King made several unavailing efforts to force the passage of the ravine, but lost the flower of his troops in the attempt. The famous Seidlitz made an ill-timed charge, by turning the ponds; he

was wounded, his cavalry repulsed in disorder, and the battle lost. The King lost half his troops in killed, wounded, and prisoners; the loss of the Russians was equally great, it is true, but, as they were much more numerous, they did not feel it so severely. The nine battalions left at Riessen, which had taken possession of Franckfort, evacuated that place the same evening, when the army repassed the Oder, and broke down its bridges. On the 16th, it encamped at Madlitz: on the 18th, took up a position at Fustenwald to cover the capital, and the King recalled Kleist's corps, which was in Pomerania. The arsenal of Berlin repaired his losses in cannon and artillery stores; and his army in a few days amounted to 30,000 men. The Russian army passed the Oder on the 16th, and was joined by Haddick's corps.

IV.

Whilst the principal Prussian army was marching against the Russians, Saxony was entirely abandoned to the garrisons of Dresden, Leipsic, Wirtemberg, and Torgau. The army of the Circles invaded this country, under the command of the Duke of Deux-Ponts, who took possession of Leipsic, on the 6th of August, and of Torgau on the 8th. The Prussian colonel Wolfersdorf, commanding the latter place, evacuated it after

a vigorous resistance, and retreated on Potsdam. On the 20th, Wittemberg opened its gates; the garrison also retreating on Potsdam. On the 28th, General Maquire, being detached with 15,000 men from Daun's grand army, to reinforce the Duke of Deux-Ponts, attacked the suburbs of Dresden, at the very moment when that prince was entering Meissen. He was repulsed. Count Schmettau, governor of that place, had means of defending it, and it is probable that he would have preserved it to Prussia, but in the first consternation occasioned by the disasters of Kunersdorf, the King had written to him not to reckon on any succour, but to think only of sparing his troops, and of bringing off to the King, by means of a good capitulation, the twenty millions of treasure which he had under his care, and which was so important to him at this critical moment. On the 3d of September, he capitulated, and marched out of the place. But General Wunsch had left Potsdam on the 21st of August, with a small corps consisting of nine battalions and eight squadrons, which he was ordered to conduct to Count Schmettau. On the 27th he took Wittemburg, and on the 31st, Torgau, where he was obliged to remain three days to wait for the artillery which was coming from Magdeburg, and reached him on the 2d of September. On the 3d he resumed

his march, and encamped on the 4th at Grosen-Hayn; but he there found that the capitulation of Dresden had been signed, and the place surrendered. Wunsch was extremely enraged, and took his revenge on Maquire's corps, which he entirely defeated, and then returned to Torgau. Frederic lost Dresden for ever.

As soon as Daun received intelligence of the victory of Kunersdorf, he marched on Triebel, in order to be nearer to the Russians. The King's position was critical; but the Russians complained bitterly of having gained two sanguinary battles, and lost half their army, whilst the Austrians, for whom they were fighting, had not yet drawn a sword.

On the other hand, Prince Henry began his march on the 18th of August, as soon as he was informed of the loss of the battle, to bring the 50,000 men under his command in Silesia to join the King. He encamped, on the 29th, at Sagan, on Daun's line of communications, who immediately retired behind the Neiss, whence, after the taking of Dresden, he marched into Saxony, and on the 13th of September reached Bautzen. Soltikóff, suspicious of this diverging march, directed his own course to the Oder. On the 17th the King followed Daun, and marched to Cotbus, while Prince Henry went to Gorlitz: the King's two armies thus separated the Austrian armies

from that of Russia. The King having learnt at Cotbus that Soltikoff intended to lay siege to Glogau, marched to attack him, executed several manœuvres which lasted the whole of September and part of October, and prevented the Russians from carrying their scheme into effect. On the 24th of October, they retreated on the Vistula; but the King fell ill, was carried to Glogau by his own orders, and disjoined his army. He sent General Hulsen with nineteen battalions and thirty squadrons to Prince Henry, ordered Count Schmettau, with nine battalions and twenty squadrons, to observe Laudon, and sent reinforcements to Fouquet in Silesia.

Prince Henry had marched on the 4th of October, to Strehlen, and had effected his junction with General Finck's corps, which had increased his force to sixty-nine battalions and 103 squadrons, with which he kept the Austrian army in check, amounting to seventy-four battalions and seventy-six squadrons, and lying in Saxony supported on Dresden. The Aulic Council ordered Daun to attack it; but this general, according to his usual custom, lost his time in marches, manœuvres, and counter-manœuvres: he wished, by a movement concerted with the army of the Circles, to invest Torgau, where Prince Henry had taken position. He failed, and retreated on Dresden, when he was informed of the departure of

the Russian army, and of the march of the considerable detachment which General Hulsen was bringing to Torgau. The Prussian army followed his movement. In the mean time the King took the command of his army under Dresden. On the 14th in the morning, Daun having raised his camp at Wilsdruff, the King conjectured that he was going to take up his winter-quarters in Bohemia, and ordered general Finck to march to Maxen with eighteen battalions and thirty-five squadrons, (18,000 men) and to cut him off from the defiles of Bohemia. Finck lay on the 16th at Dippodiswald, and on the 17th at Maxen. The movement of so large a body of troops alarmed the Austrian general: he took up a position at Plauen, near Dresden, placed General Sincere's corps on the heights of Rainchen, and made the army of the Circles take up a position at the village of Giesbuhel. The King encamped, on the 18th, near Wilsdruff; on the same day Daun increased General Sincere's corps to 30,000 men. On the 19th this general marched on Dippodiswald; on the 20th he completely surrounded General Finck, and after a very severe action forced him to capitulate. General Wunsch, with his cavalry, succeeded in forcing his passage in the night of the 21st, but being included in the capitulation, he was obliged to return. The Prussians had 3000 men killed

or wounded; 14,000 laid down their arms; colours, cannon, and every thing, were taken. Finck was afterwards delivered over to a council of war, deprived of all his military dignities, and condemned to two years' imprisonment. A few days afterwards the Austrian army surprised three battalions near Meissen. After these glorious exploits this army took up its winter-quarters about Dresden. Those of the army of the Circles were in Franconia. The King cantoned his troops on both sides of the Elbe, opposite the Austrian army; he had barracks of plank constructed.

V.

Observation XVI. — 1. The plan formed by Marshal Contades, in this campaign, was good, and agreeable to all the principles of war with which this general-officer seems to have been acquainted. Yet with 100,000 men, all excellent troops, he failed against 70,000, composed of contingents; because he possessed no energy, because there was no unanimity amongst the generals, and because his head-quarters were, like the Court of Versailles, a scene of the lowest intrigues.

2. He offered battle after having refused it; he himself fixed the moment, yet he engaged without having been joined by all his detach-

ments. He ought to have raised all the sieges, and attacked Duke Ferdinand with all his forces, that prince having committed the error of weakening himself by the detachment of two divisions. This simple plan would probably have procured him the victory.

3. He fatigued his troops the whole night of the 31st of July, and part of the morning of the 1st of August, in order to take up his line of battle, an operation which in our times armies of twice or thrice the number perform in two hours with such rapidity.

4. As he made his principal attack by his right, he ought to have directed it in person, employed double the number of troops in it, and not confided it to the Duke of Broglie, whose character he knew.

5. He adhered closely on the day of the battle to the dispositions which he had made the day before, in an order of the day of five or six pages, which is a decisive proof of mediocrity. When once an army is drawn up in order of battle, the General-in-chief ought, at day-break, to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and ascertain what movements he has made in the night, and upon those data to form his plan, despatch his orders, and direct his columns.

6. The Duke of Broglie, at break of day, pretended that it was impossible to execute the

order which had been despatched to him the preceding day; the enemy having been reinforced: he began a trifling cannonade, and went to Marshal Contades: the hours elapsed in vain discussions, and gave Duke Ferdinand time to reinforce his left in reality, which would have been destroyed if the Duke of Broglie had fairly executed his orders. This general's guilt was great; he was ill-disposed, and jealous of his chief.

7. The position of the French cavalry in the centre of the line, without artillery, was bad; because the cavalry affords no fire, but fights only sword in hand; thus the enemy's infantry and artillery were able to cannonade it and fire musquetry upon it at their ease and without retaliation. Since the creation of horse artillery, the cavalry has also its batteries; artillery is even more necessary to the cavalry than to the infantry, whether it be engaged in an attack, remaining in position, or rallying.

8. Neither the success of the enemy, nor the losses sustained by the French army, were of such a nature as to oblige Marshal Contades to evacuate his camp at Minden. If Duke Ferdinand had attacked that camp, he would have been repulsed.

9. Neither was the check sustained by the Duke of Brissac of such a nature as to influence the position of the army. Marshal Contades

might have reinforced this detachment with the corps employed in the different sieges. His senses forsook him, he abandoned his camp, repassed the Weser, and retreated with the utmost precipitation. In consequence of debating and holding councils, and of the ambition of some individuals to shine, the French armies of those times shared the fate which has in all ages attended those who have followed a similar course; that of ultimately adopting the worst measures, which in war are almost always the most pusillanimous, or, as they are sometimes called, the most prudent. The true prudence of a general lies in energy of determination.

10. At the commencement of a campaign, it is necessary to consider well whether it be proper to advance; but when once offensive operations have been commenced, they ought to be followed up to the last extremity. For independently of the national honour and the spirit of the army, which are lost in a retreat, and of the courage with which it inspires the enemy, retreats are more disastrous, and cost more men and materials, than the most sanguinary battles; with this difference, that in a battle the loss of the enemy is nearly equal to your own, but in a retreat you are the only loser. With the number of men of which France was deprived by the retreat on the Lahn, Marshal Contades might have afforded a

second battle at the camp of Minden, and another on the right bank of the Weser, previously to commencing his retreat; he would thus have had new chances of success, and would have obliged the enemy's army to participate in loss.

Observation XVII.—Duke Ferdinand detached a considerable body of troops previously to the battle of Minden: this was an error by which he might have lost the battle; but as he was victorious, notwithstanding this mistake, he has never been censured for it. On the contrary, it has been pretended that he weakened himself in order to increase his strength. This flattery is ingenious, but false; and the same flatterers would have reproached him bitterly with this very step, if he had lost the battle. A general rule: *When you intend to fight a battle, collect all your forces; do not omit any of them; a battalion sometimes decides a victory.*

Observation XVIII.—During the months of April, May, June, and July, the Russians were 100 leagues from the scene of action. The King's armies might have attacked Marshal Daun, forced him to fight a battle, and disabled him from attempting any thing during the remainder of the campaign. But the King did nothing.

2. During the month of July, and part of August, Daun manœuvred in Silesia, whilst the Russians were still far on the right of the Oder.

The Prussian armies were between them. Frederic did not profit by this advantage, and engage Daun, attacking him with his two armies by a combined movement.

3. At the battle of Kunersdorf he had not sufficient troops: What prevented him from summoning to his aid 20,000 of Prince Henry's 50,000 men? They would have joined him on the eve of the battle, and set out again the day after the victory.

4. Although he was very inferior to the Russian army reinforced with Laudon's corps, he left nine battalions to guard his bridge, and ordered them to march on Franckfort during the battle; they were of no use. Such detachments are prohibited by the rules of war.

Observation XIX.—1. The movement of Finck's corps on Maxen, which proved so disastrous to the King, was without object. What could he mean to do? To oblige Daun to expedite his retreat into Bohemia, by menacing his communications by Peterswald. But there was nothing to induce him to think that Daun intended to go into Bohemia. He was master of Dresden, and by evacuating Saxony he would have exposed that important place. He had sustained no check in the campaign; his army was numerous, whilst the King, on the contrary, had been beaten by the Russians, and had lost Dresden. What then,

could lead him to imagine that Daun wished to evacuate Saxony? And even in that case, was not the latter master of the right bank of the Elbe, and able to retreat into Bohemia if he thought proper? The defeat of Maxen was the most considerable one ever sustained by this great captain, and his error in this instance was the least excusable of all he ever committed: the more the localities are understood, and the situation of the two armies considered, the more clearly it is perceived that this movement could only lead to a fatal catastrophe. General Finck was thrown, with 18,000 men, into the midst of the whole Austrian army, at the distance of several marches from his own army, in a country full of mountains and defiles. The memoirs of the time state that he represented the danger of this movement, previously to its execution, to the King, who refused to listen to him.

2. A question of the utmost importance arises here. Do the laws and principles of war authorize a general to order his soldiers to lay down their arms and yield to their enemies, and to constitute a whole corps prisoners of war? There can be no such doubt with respect to the garrison of a fortified place: but the governor of a place is in a peculiar situation. The laws of all nations authorize him to lay down arms when his provisions fail, when the defences of the place

are demolished, and when he has sustained several assaults. In fact, a fortified place is a military machine which forms a whole, has peculiar functions, and a prescribed, definite, and known destination. A small number of men, protected by this fortification, defend themselves, stop the enemy, and preserve the deposit intrusted to them against the attacks of a great number of men: but when these fortifications are destroyed, and no longer afford protection to the garrison, it is just and reasonable to authorize the commandant to do what he judges most for the interest of his troops. A contrary line of conduct would be of no use, and would, moreover, be attended with the disadvantage of exposing to destruction the whole population of a city, the old men, women, and children. The moment a place is invested, the prince and the commander-in-chief intrusted with the defence of the frontier on which it is situated, know that such place can only protect the garrison and stop the enemy for a certain period, which being elapsed and the works demolished, the garrison will lay down arms. All civilized nations have agreed on this subject, and the only point of dispute has always been the greater or less resistance made by a general previously to his capitulating. There have, indeed, been generals, and Villars was amongst the number, who thought that a gover-

nor ought never to surrender, but, at the last extremity, to blow up his fortifications and cut his way by night through the besieging army; or in case the former step be impracticable, at least to sally forth with his garrison and save his men. Governors who have adopted this plan, have rejoined their army with three-fourths of their garrison.

3. In proof that the laws and practice of all nations have specially authorized commandants of fortified places to surrender their arms on conditions stipulated for their benefit, and that they have never authorized any general to order his men to lay down their arms in any other case, it may be advanced that no prince, no republic, no military law, has ever authorized them to do so. The sovereign or the nation prescribes to the soldier and to the inferior officer, obedience towards their general and their superiors for all purposes conducive to the interest or the honour of the service. When the soldier receives his arms, he takes the military oath to defend them till death. A general has received orders and instructions to employ his troops in the defence of his country: how, then, can he be empowered to order his soldiers to give up their arms, and to submit to chains?

4. There is seldom a battle in which some companies of light infantry or grenadiers, and frequently whole battalions, are not for a short

time surrounded in houses, cemeteries, or woods. Any captain or lieutenant-colonel who should enter into a capitulation as soon as it became evident that he was surrounded, would betray his prince, and forfeit his honour. There have been few battles in which the conduct of men in analogous situations has not decided the victory. Now a lieutenant-general is to an army what a lieutenant-colonel is to a division. Capitulations made by corps which are surrounded, either during a battle or an active campaign, are contracts of which all the advantageous clauses are in favour of the parties making them, and all the burthensome clauses attach to the prince, and to the other soldiers of the army. To fly from danger in order to render the situation of one's comrades more perilous, is evidently a piece of cowardice. Should a soldier say to a commander of cavalry: "There is my musquet, let me go home to my village," he would be deserting in the presence of the enemy, and the laws would condemn him to death. But what difference is there between his conduct and that of the general commanding a division, the lieutenant-colonel of a battalion, or the captain who says: "Let me go home, or receive me in your country, and I will surrender my arms?" There is but one honourable way of being made prisoner, which is, to be taken alone, with arms in one's hands,

when one can no longer use them. It was thus that King John, Francis I., and many other brave men of all nations were taken. In this manner of surrendering there is no bargain, nor can there be any, consistently with honour; life only is accepted, because the party has no power to take that of his enemy, who spares him on condition of similar lenity, because such is the tenor of the law of nations.

5. The danger of allowing officers and generals to lay down their arms on a private capitulation, in any other case than that of the garrison of a fortress, is incontestable. It destroys the military spirit of a nation, and weakens its sense of honour, to open this door to cowardice and timidity, or even to the errors of the brave. If military laws decreed corporal and infamous punishment against all generals, officers, and soldiers laying down their arms by virtue of a capitulation, this expedient for extricating themselves from a perilous situation would never occur to the soldiers' minds; they would have no resource but their valour and perseverance; and what prodigies have they not performed?

6. If the twenty-eight battalions of choice troops who laid down their arms at Hochstett, had been convinced that they were staining their names, disgracing their families, and incurring

the punishment of decimation, they would have fought; and if their perseverance had not changed the fortune of the day, they would certainly have regained the left wing and made good their retreat. If the Bavarian infantry, which had gloriously defended the village of Allerheim at the battle of Nordlingen, and had repulsed the attacks of the great Condé, could not have capitulated with Turenne without drawing upon themselves the dishonour and punishment of being decimated, they would not even have thought of quitting their position; had they maintained it an hour longer, they would have discovered that they were not cut off from John de Wert; and the Bavarians would have gained the victory and remained masters of the field; Condé would have brought back but few of his troops beyond the Rhine.

7. But what should a general do, when surrounded by superior numbers? We can give no other answer than that of old Horace. In extraordinary situations, extraordinary resolutions are necessary; the more obstinate the resistance made, the greater will be the chance of being relieved or of forcing a passage. How many things, which at first appeared impossible, have been performed by resolute men with no other resource than death! The more resistance you make, the more of the enemy you will

kill, and the fewer men he will have to attack the other corps of the army. This question does not appear to us capable of any other solution, without destroying the military spirit of a nation, and exposing it to the greatest calamities.

8. Ought the laws to authorize a general, who is surrounded by very superior forces at a great distance from the army to which he belongs, and who has sustained an obstinate conflict, to disperse his army by night, intrusting every individual with the care of his own safety and fixing a rallying point more or less distant? This question may be doubtful, but there is certainly no doubt that a general who should take such a measure, in a desperate situation, would save three-fourths of his men, and, what is still more valuable than men, he would save himself from the dishonour of surrendering his arms and colours in pursuance of a contract stipulating advantages for individuals, to the detriment of the army and the country.

9. In the capitulation of Maxen there was a very singular circumstance. General Wunsch, with the cavalry, had opened himself a passage at day-break. One of the conditions of the capitulation was, that he should return to the camp and lay down his arms. This general had the simplicity to obey the order given him by General Finck; this was a misconception of military

obedience. A general in the power of the enemy has no right to give orders, and those who obey him are criminal. And here one cannot but observe, that since Wunsch had made his way with a large body of cavalry, the infantry might also have penetrated; for, in a mountainous country like Maxen, it was more easy for the infantry to escape by night than the cavalry.

The Romans disavowed the capitulation made with the Samnites, and refused to exchange or ransom the prisoners. All that is great was instinctive with them; nor was it without reason that they conquered the world.

CHAPTER VI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1760.

I. Operations of the French and Hanoverian armies; action of Corbach (July 8); action of Ameneburg (July 16); action of Oldendorf (July 31); action of Clostercamp (Oct. 15).—II. Operations in Saxony and Silesia in April, May, June, and July; capitulation of the camp of Landshut (June 23); taking of Glatz (July 25).—III. Operations in Saxony and Silesia during August, Sept. and Oct.; battle of Liegnitz (August 15).—IV. Operations of the Russians; occupation of Berlin (Oct. 3).—V. Operations in Saxony during the latter part of the autumn; battle of Torgau (Nov. 4).—VI. Observations.

I.

The Grand French army, consisting of 90,000 men, wintered on the Mein, under the command of Marshal the Duke of Broglie; and that of Count Saint-Germain, 30,000 strong, upon the Lower Rhine. Duke Ferdinand's army, which was opposed to them, consisted of 70,000 men. On the 16th of June, Count Saint-Germain passed to the right bank of the Rhine, and marched to Dortmund; the Duke of Broglie marched to

Homberg and Neustadt. The two French armies effected their junction on the 8th of July, in the vicinity of Fritzlar. The hereditary Prince of Brunswick attacked Count Saint-Germain, whom he thought to be alone, near Corbach; but his corps was supported by six brigades of Marshal Broglie's army; the hereditary Prince was beaten, and lost fifteen pieces of cannon. On the 16th of July, he took his revenge at the action of Ameneburg: he surprised Glaubitz's French brigade, from which he took 2800 prisoners. On the 30th of July, the Duke of Broglie removed his head-quarters to Cassel. Saint-Germain was succeeded by General Dumuy. Duke Ferdinand took advantage of the situation of this general's troops, two days' march from Cassel, on the left of the Weser, and beyond the reach of succour from the grand army, and defeated them. At the action of Oldendorf, Dumuy lost twelve pieces of cannon and 4000 men. The month of August was spent in observation. In September, Broglie occupied Gœttingen, and had that place fortified. Duke Ferdinand encamped behind the Dimel, whence he detached 15,000 men under the hereditary Prince on the left bank of the Rhine. This detachment reached Wesel on the 3d of October, passed the Rhine, and marched on Cleves; Lieutenant-general de Castries, to whom the command of the country was intrusted, collected

20,000 men, and marched to meet him. On the 15th of October, he encamped behind Eugene's canal at Clostercamp, where he was attacked by the hereditary Prince, and defeated him. The loss on each side was 2000 men. It was at this battle that the Chevalier d'Assas signalized himself by his devotion to his country: "*This way, Auvergne, here is the enemy!*" The bridges at Rees, on the Rhine, were carried away by the rising of the waters. If M. de Castries had pushed his victory, the hereditary Prince would have been lost; but he suffered himself to be intimidated, and, on the 18th, the Prince passed the bridge. The armies went into winter-quarters. The French army had its cantonments in Hesse, Gœttingen, and part of Westphalia.

II.

The King's losses in the preceding campaigns had destroyed the *élite* of his troops. The population of his states was exhausting, his army was weakened. It scarcely amounted, this campaign, to 100,000 men; yet he divided it into three armies; one, under his own immediate command, wintered in Saxony, with its right at Freyberg, its centre at Wilsdruff, its left at Meissen, and a detached corps at Gorlitz; another, commanded by Prince Henry, was cantoned in Silesia, on the Bober, and in the marches on the Oder; and the

third and least numerous, under the command of Fouquet, occupied the camp of Landshut. He likewise placed good garrisons in the ten fortresses of Silesia, as well as in Colberg, Custrin, Stettin, Spandau, and Magdeburg. The Courts of Vienna and Russia made extraordinary exertions, and their armies were more considerable than ever. Laudon, with 50,000 men, commanded in Silesia. Daun, with 80,000, including the army of the Circles, encamped under the walls of Dresden; and 60,000 Russians, commanded by Soltikoff, marched on the Oder.

On the 31st of May, Laudon, at Frankenstein, menaced the camp of Landshut, which Fouquet evacuated, and marched on Schweidnitz and Breslaw. On the 7th of June he blockaded Glatz: but Fouquet having received the King's orders to return to Landshut, and having proceeded thither on the 17th of June, with sixteen battalions and fourteen squadrons, Laudon surrounded him, on the 21st, with fifty-two battalions and seventy-five squadrons. On the 23d, after a very brisk action, he drove him to the Galgenberg, and compelled him to lay down his arms. The King thus lost 10,000 officers and soldiers. Laudon's loss was 3000 men killed and wounded.

In Saxony, the King was occupied in marches and countermarches during part of May and the

whole of June. On the 12th of July, having succeeded in removing Daun from Dresden, he surrounded that city, which was defended by a garrison of 15,000 men; on the 18th he bombarded it, but Daun hastened from Gorlitz to Bautzen and Bischofswerd, and compelled him to raise the siege on the right bank. On the 29th, the King raised it on the left bank likewise, and on the 31st, he encamped at Meissen.

In Silesia, Laudon, after his brilliant action at Landshut, besieged Glatz; he brought his battering train from Olmutz; and, on the 25th of July, the place capitulated. This premature conquest was attributed to the correspondence he kept up with the Catholics within the town. After this important success, he surrounded Breslaw, on the 31st of July.

III.

The King being informed of the taking of Glatz, hastened into Silesia with seventy-four battalions and 109 squadrons, leaving General Hulsen in Saxony with nineteen battalions and twenty squadrons; he marched by Konigsbruk, Sagan, and Buntzlau, where he arrived on the 7th of August. Daun followed his movement in a parallel direction, by Bautzen, Reichembach, and Schmotheiffen, and joined Laudon, who encamped at Striegau. The King had marched

forty leagues in five days; he wished to join Prince Henry below Breslaw; he reached Liegnitz on the 9th. Daun, Laudon, and Lascy lined the right bank of the Katzbach, and intercepted his communications with Breslaw and Schweidnitz. He at first manœuvred to re-open them with Schweidnitz; but failing in that, he attempted to re-establish them with Landshut, in which he was also unsuccessful. His position became critical; he was without bread, and surrounded by forces triple in number to his own; he relinquished his plan of marching on Breslaw, and on the 14th of August, in the evening, set out from Liegnitz, marching on Glogau to collect provisions, and support himself on that fortress.

In the mean time Daun, having determined, the same day, to give him battle, ordered Laudon to pass the Katzbach in the night of the 14th, to gain possession of the heights of Liegnitz on the left of that river, whilst he himself was to march on Liegnitz, thus placing the Prussian army between two fires. At three in the morning, the King, having arrived on the heights of Pfaffendorf, was about to take up a position, when the grand guards were attacked by Laudon, who, conceiving that he had to do only with parks and luggage, charged them briskly. Frederic engaged only with his right, forming his first line; nevertheless by five o'clock the victory

was decided, and Laudon driven into the Katzbach, with the loss of 10,000 men, 6000 of whom were made prisoners, and eighty-six pieces of cannon. Daun arrived at Liegnitz two leagues from the field of battle, at five o'clock in the morning; he heard no cannonade. When he was informed of the defeat of Laudon, he fell back half a day's march. This event, equally fortunate and unexpected, opened to the King the road to Breslaw; he passed the Katzbach at Parchwitz, proceeded to Neumark, and effected his junction with Prince Henry. Daun occupied the camp of Hohenposeritz. The armies on both sides manœuvred during the autumn, without any occurrence of importance, until they returned into Saxony.

IV.

The Russian army, commanded by Soltikoff, arrived on the Vistula in the beginning of June, and reached Posen on the 17th of July. Prince Henry passed the Oder and the Wartha to watch its motions, with sixty-six battalions and eighty-seven squadrons. Soltikoff, after several manœuvres, resolved to march on the Upper Oder to effect his junction with Laudon before Breslaw. On his approach, Laudon raised the siege of that place, and quitted the banks of the Oder. Prince Henry then repassed that river over the bridges of Breslaw, and took up a position on the right

bank, making a show of intending to attack Soltikoff, who, having missed his aim, retrograded, and after much hesitation and several marches and countermarches, at length resolved to advance on Berlin, where his van entered on the 3d of October, and his principal corps on the 9th. He was joined by General Lascy's Austrian light troops; but he evacuated that capital from an apprehension of being turned by the King's army, which was approaching.

V.

The Duke of Deux-Ponts profited by the King's movement on Liegnitz to get possession of Torgau, and drive General Hulsen entirely out of Saxony, in which country the Prussians retained only Wittemberg. After this he took up his winter-quarters in the Empire. As soon as the King found that the Marches were invaded, and that Hulsen was driven out of Saxony, he left Silesia, after having thrown six battalions into Breslaw. He encamped on the 7th of October, under Schweidnitz, on the 11th at Sagan, on the 14th at Guben, on the 16th at Liberose, and on the 23d at Wittemberg. Daun followed him, and arrived on the 10th at Lowenberg, on the 16th at Mikel on the Spree, and on the 27th opposite Torgau. On the 29th he resumed his camp at Torgau. All his endeavours to draw the army of the Cir-

cles upon himself were fruitless. The Russians were still on the Oder, they were inclined to go beyond the Vistula to winter, but they promised to take up their winter-quarters on the Oder, if the Austrians would take up theirs at Torgau. It is supposed that this was what determined the King to attack Daun, on the 3d of November, in the strong positions he occupied.

The Austrian army consisted of 64 battalions and 141 squadrons, and was encamped to the left of Torgau; with the right on Siptitz, having in front a large pool and the Rhorgraben, a marshy rivulet. The King approached Torgau by the Leipsic road, with 68 battalions and 120 squadrons. He found the enemy's position formidable; and he formed the plan of turning its right in order to attack it in the rear. He therefore divided his army into two corps, ordering Ziethen, with twenty-two battalions and fifty-two squadrons, to present himself before Daun's line on the banks of the great pool, threatening to pass the Rhorgraben; and with the remaining two-thirds of his army, he crossed the forest of Dommitsch, where he overthrew the Austrian grand guards, who carried the intelligence of his march. Daun perceived that he was about to be attacked in the rear; he changed front by a countermarch, carried his right towards Zima near Torgau, and his left towards Siptitz.

At one o'clock in the afternoon, the King debouched from the forest, but only with ten battalions of grenadiers, a few squadrons, and a battery of twenty pieces of cannon. At the same instant Ziethen deployed, his right being supported on the pool. He was received with a brisk cannonade by the second Austrian line, which faced about to the rear. The noise of this cannonade alarmed the King; he was apprehensive that Ziethen would be overpowered; he determined to draw up his ten battalions of grenadiers in two lines, and to attack the enemy's line under the protection of his twenty pieces of cannon. The ten battalions and the twenty guns disappeared in an instant under the fire of Daun's whole line, and the grape-shot of two hundred pieces of artillery. The brigades of the second and third lines engaged as fast as they debouched from the forest, and met with the same fate. The Duke of Holstein with his cavalry renewed the action by a brilliant charge; but the King was nevertheless obliged to command a retreat, and to abandon the field of battle. Ziethen, observing that the firing seemed to grow more distant, concluded that the King had been defeated; he marched by his left to endeavour to rejoin him, and succeeded in reaching the village of Siptitz, passing the pond, and placing himself in commu-

nication with five battalions of the Duke of Holstein's reserve, which gave him twenty-eight fresh battalions that had not engaged. The sun had set; Ziethen took possession of the whole level of Siptitz, and occupied the field of battle. The King, being informed of this fortunate circumstance, returned with all possible expedition, and formed, during the night, ten weak battalions out of the forty which had engaged in the battle.

In the mean time Daun, who had been wounded, was at Torgau, receiving compliments on his victory, when at nine o'clock in the evening he received information of the latest posture of affairs. He immediately ordered a retreat, which began at midnight; at break of day he repassed the Elbe; the Prussians thus remained victorious. On the 4th General Hulsen occupied Torgau with ten battalions and twenty-five squadrons. At this battle the Austrians lost 20,000 men, (8000 of whom were made prisoners,) and forty-five pieces of cannon. The loss of the Prussian army was 16,000 men, including 5000 prisoners. On the 11th of December, both armies went into their winter-quarters, by virtue of a convention which put the King in possession of all Saxony, except a small part of the environs of Dresden.

VI.

Observation XX.—The distribution of the French armies during the winter, with the principal corps on the right bank of the Rhine, and the least on the left bank of the Lower Rhine, is agreeable to military principles.

The first march ordered by the Duke of Broglie was contrary to rule. Duke Ferdinand might easily beat Count Saint-Germain and drive him into the Rhine, because he was encamped alone, and five or six marches from the grand army.

The detachment of the hereditary Prince on Wesel was a false operation; his forces were too inconsiderable to master the operations of the French army, and yet it was an important diminution of the principal army, which was already far inferior to that of Marshal Broglie. If the latter had marched briskly, Duke Ferdinand would have experienced the consequences of such a fault, which was calculated to secure the possession of Westphalia to the French, and enable them to drive the enemy's army to the Elbe.

Observation XXI.—The King's plan of besieging a great city like Dresden, with a garrison of 15,000 men, in sight of an army which had not been defeated, and without availing himself of the first few days succeeding the investment, in order to cover himself by good strong lines of

circumvallation, was attended with the result which might have been expected, but which Daun might have rendered more fatal.

The important check sustained by the King at Landshut was like that of Maxen. However strong the camp at Landshut may be, it is not sufficiently so to protect a body of troops against thrice their force, as Fouquet judged; he would have been as well posted under the cannon of one of the fortresses of Silesia as at Landshut. Whilst Laudon was thus overpowering 12,000 men with an army of 36,000, Prince Henry was within three days' march, with an army of 40,000 men, which was doing nothing. Had Fouquet been under his command and made part of his army, the Prince would have been so much the stronger, and Fouquet would have sustained no check; the King deserved this reverse. But does this justify Fouquet's capitulation? No, no, no! No capitulation in the field, if you would have soldiers and an army. A capitulation that should save you 60,000 men would not compensate for the injury done to the state by the violation of this principle.

Observation XXII.—All the King's manœuvres about Liegnitz, in August, were attended with great danger to himself. He had no basis, no point of *appui;* he was surrounded by forces of thrice his numbers; chance alone saved him; he

was indebted to fortune only for his victory over Laudon, which extricated him from the perilous situation in which he had placed himself; he was much more fortunate than prudent in this instance.

After the battle of Liegnitz, and his junction with Prince Henry, he should have openly attacked Daun, defeated him, and driven him into Bohemia, which would have spared him the battle of Torgau, and put an end to this campaign.

Observation XXIII.—1. Daun's conduct still bears the same character. He obliges the Prussians to raise the siege of Dresden on the right bank, yet he does not march, the same day, to attack the King impetuously, and try to possess himself of his besieging batteries on the left bank.

2. At Liegnitz, where he is at the head of such considerable forces, he insulates Laudon without establishing communications with him by an intermediate corps, so as to attack in concert, and to be always informed of what is passing on his right. The art of war teaches that a wing should be turned and outflanked without separating the army.

Observation XXIV.—In this campaign the Russians never fought a battle: they did nothing but march and countermarch to no purpose. If

their movement on Berlin had been combined with the Swedish army, that of the Circles, and the Austrian army, it would have decided the war: but, as it was effected, it was only dangerous. The greatest animosity existed between the Russians and Austrians.

Observation XXV.—1. The resolution taken by the King, to attack Daun's army in the rear, at the battle of Torgau, appears the more appropriate, because by this movement his left was supported on the Elbe and his rear on Wittemberg and Magdeburg; but the detachment of a third of his forces under Ziethen, was contrary to all that this prince ever did in other battles, and to the principles of war. Ziethen was in danger of being separately defeated; and it appears that Frederic was so sensible of this danger, that the apprehension of it induced him to make the insulated and precipitate attacks which ruined his army.

2. But even this reason seems insufficient to justify him with respect to this second fault; he was well acquainted with Daun's character, and Ziethen had such a quantity of cavalry, that he might at any time have made good his retreat, if vigorously attacked; and if the King was apprehensive that Ziethen would engage too far, it was evident that that general would not do so until he should hear the King's cannonade. He

should therefore have waited patiently an hour or two for the arrival of all his troops before he attacked.

3. A third error committed by the King at this battle, was that of persisting, after the loss of his division of grenadiers, in partial and successive attacks on the enemy's line. He thus sent his battalions to the slaughter as fast as they came up, without a hope of success; instead of which, had he collected them together, he might have employed them in a second attack, from which he might have promised himself success, if he had supported it with all the Duke of Holstein's cavalry.

In this battle Frederic violated the principles of war, both in the conception and execution of his plan; of all his battles it was that in which he made the greatest number of mistakes, and the only one in which he displayed no talent.

CHAPTER VII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1761.

I. Operations of the French and Hanoverian armies. Action of Grunberg (March 20). Battle of Willinghausen (July 16).—II. Operations in Saxony.—III. Operations in Silesia; taking of Schweidnitz by the Austrians (Sept. 30).—IV. Capitulation of Colberg (Dec. 15).—V. Observations.

I.

France was humbled by the disgraceful career which had rendered her armies so ridiculous throughout Europe. The Court of Versailles made greater exertions than in the preceding campaigns, and brought two armies into the field, one of 100,000, and the other of 60,000 men; a prodigious force, and sufficient, had it been well conducted, for the conquest of Germany. At no period of her history had France had such numerous forces on one of her frontiers only. But the Prince of Soubise commanded them, under whom the Duke of Broglie commanded the army of the Mein, which had passed the

winter between the Fulde and the Weyra, occupying Gœttingen, after having fortified that place.

Duke Ferdinand still commanded the army of the Allies, consisting of between 70 and 80,000 men. He suddenly raised his cantonments, and directed the hereditary Prince, with his right, on Fritzlar and Marburg. These two attacks failed. Lieutenant-general Narbonne, who repulsed the attack on Fritzlar, in a brilliant action, preserved its name; but on the 15th of February he surrendered the place by an honourable capitulation. The centre, commanded by Duke Ferdinand in person, and forming the main body of the army, passed the Dimel on the 11th, and took up cantonments before that river. Sporken, who commanded the left, arrived on the 15th at the cantonments of Stainville and Prince Xavier of Saxony, who was at Langensalza. Stainville was surprised, lost 2000 men, and with difficulty regained the defiles of Eisenach. Marshal Broglie, thus turned on his right and left, made a retrograde movement, and encamped on the 17th at Hirschfeld, whence he proceeded to Fritzlar and Schmalenberg. Duke Ferdinand soon encamped at Fritzlar, and Sporken at Eisenach. On the 20th of February, Marshal Broglie, without having fought a battle, burned his immense stores, and made a precipitate retreat;

on the 20th he reached Fulde, and on the 26th, Bergen, leaving garrisons at Gœttingen and other places of Hesse. The stores he lost were very considerable, having been collected with great labour, and cost several millions. Duke Ferdinand surrounded all the Hessian fortresses ; the trenches were opened before Cassel on the 1st of March.

But on the 9th of March the Duke of Broglie having received a reinforcement of 15,000 men, from the army of the Lower Rhine, again marched forward, compelled the enemy to raise the siege of Marburg, and encamped, on the 14th, with his right on Hungen, and his left at Giessen, and with Lieutenant-general Stainville detached at Grunberg. On the 19th the hereditary Prince attacked Stainville ; he was repulsed, and lost 2000 men, nineteen standards, and ten pieces of cannon. This action of Grunberg did honour to Marshal Stainville. Duke Ferdinand was obliged to raise the siege of Cassel on the 28th, and repassed the Dimel on the 31st of March. The Duke of Broglie resumed his positions ; but he had lost all his magazines. Both armies remained two months in their respective camps.

In June, the army of the Lower Rhine at length debouched by Wesel, and encamped on the 18th at Dortmund. The Duke of Broglie assembled

his army at Cassel. Duke Ferdinand placed himself between them; he encamped on the 23d at Soest, and on the 29th, a league and a half from Soubise's camp: but finding him strongly posted, he turned him, and marched on his line of operations. Nothing more was requisite to induce Soubise to abandon his position, and beat a retreat. Broglie put himself in motion on the 26th of June, and on the 17th of July effected his junction with the Prince of Soubise. Duke Ferdinand awaited them at the camp of Willinghausen, which was covered by the Soetzbach, his left being supported on la Lippe. The two armies were thus in presence, the French having 150,000 men, and the Hanoverians 60,000. The French generals passed eight days in holding councils, and at length, on the 26th June, came to an unanimous resolution of attacking the enemy; but they manœuvred without concert or decision, and like men certain of being defeated. They performed nothing of any utility; but lost 6000 men and the honour of their troops. After this action Soubise, embarrassed with the direction of such numerous forces, acquiesced in the wishes of the Duke of Broglie to have the two armies separated. This marshal's conduct was dictated by the desire of independence. On the 27th of July he marched on Paderborn and Hameln on the Weser, whilst Soubise advanced

on Munster, thus manœuvring just as the enemy's general could have wished, who instantly placed himself between them, and easily forced them to raise both sieges. Broglie passed the Weser and marched on Brunswick, but was speedily recalled to the Weser, by Duke Ferdinand's menace of advancing on Cassel. After this glorious campaign, the French armies went into winter-quarters. On the 16th of November Soubise repassed the Rhine, and wintered on the left bank. The Duke of Broglie cantoned his troops between the Weser and the Fulde.

II.

The King of Prussia, in person, wintered in Saxony, where he was at the beginning of the campaign. He was in Silesia all the summer, and returned into Saxony towards the end of autumn. He had four armies: that of Saxony, under the command of Prince Henry, was 30,000 strong; that of Silesia, commanded by the King, 50,000; there was a corps of observation, of 15,000 men, commanded by Goltz, before Glogau, opposed to the Russians; and another corps of observation of the same strength, was encamped before Colberg, under the command of the Duke of Wirtemberg. Independently of the garrisons of the fortified places, the active army thus amounted to between 100 and 110,000 men;

but Frederic's veteran troops had perished; his soldiers were young; the loss of the entire corps of Fouquet and Finck now became sensible. The Allies opposed him with three armies. Daun still remained in Saxony, encamped before Dresden, with an Austrian army and the army of the Circles under his command. In the course of the campaign he sent and received reinforcements from Silesia: his forces may be estimated at 60,000 men. Laudon commanded 80,000 men in Silesia; and the Russian army, under the command of Butturlin, was 60,000 strong. In this campaign, therefore, the King had to contend with near 200,000 men, more inured to war, and better organized than those he had encountered in the preceding campaigns: yet he triumphed.

The Courts of Vienna and Russia had determined to operate in Silesia with their principal forces, to assemble their armies in that country, and thus to strike decisive blows. Daun consequently remained on the defensive in Saxony; he occupied the camp of Plauen, near Dresden, having troops encamped on the heights of Dippodiswald. The army of the Circles assembled on the Salle: Daun sent a considerable detachment to reinforce Laudon's army; but, after the marching of this detachment, he had still about 60,000 men. Prince Henry, with 36,000 men, encamp-

ed at Nossen, held him in check during the whole campaign, and often sent detachments to cover the province of Magdeburg against the French partisans of the Duke of Broglie. Nothing of importance, or demanding particular notice, occurred in Saxony in the course of this campaign.

III.

Laudon, reinforced by the detachment sent to him by Daun, had 80,000 men. He encamped in the mountains on the frontiers of Silesia, waiting for the arrival of the Russians on the Oder, to put himself in motion. The Russian army, commanded by Butturlin, reached Posen on the 13th of June. General Goltz, who was observing it from the camp of Glogau, demanded a reinforcement of the King to enable him to attack it in its march on Upper Silesia. The reinforcement marched; but Goltz died suddenly, and on the 31st of June, when Ziethen succeeded him, it was too late for this attack. The Russians had effected their movement, and appeared to intend to operate their junction with Laudon at Oppeln. As soon as Laudon was informed of their approach, he encamped, on the 13th, at Frankenstein. The King marched to Ziegenhals on the 22d, and Laudon to Gros-Neisse. He deemed it impossible for him to join the Russians in Upper Silesia, and proceeded to Panns-

dorf, on the 22d, inducing the Russians to adopt the plan of operating their junction in Lower Silesia, towards Liegnitz. On the 9th of August, Laudon invested Schweidnitz. On the 11th, the Russian army passed the Oder, at Leubus, marched on Parchwitz, and on the 18th, the two armies joined at Jauer. By their combined march, the King found himself surrounded by forces of four times the strength of his own. He remained three days in this critical position, but the enemy did not venture to make any attempt. On the 20th of August, he occupied the camp of Buntzelwitz, which he fortified and armed with 190 pieces of cannon. On the 24th, the Russian general encamped at Jauer; on the 25th, at Hohenfriedberg, and Laudon at Grogersdorf. On the 28th, the Russians marched to Striegau. On the 1st of September, Laudon submitted to the Russian general the plan of an attack upon the King's camp, but the latter absolutely refused to engage in it. Had the King been thus attacked by armies of four times his strength, he would probably have been forced. On the 9th of September, Butturlin began his retreat by Jauer, and repassed the Oder. On the 10th, Laudon resumed his camp at Grogersdorf. These unexpected occurrences saved the King. He detached General Platten with fourteen battalions and twenty-five squadrons to follow the Russians.

Platten passed the Oder at Breslaw, on the 11th of September, destroyed a great number of their stores on the right bank, reached the convent of Gostyn on the 15th, found a Russian park there barricadoed and defended by 5000 infantry, attacked and forced it, took, killed or wounded, 2000 men, and burned five thousand waggons. On the 22d he marched to Landsberg. The King left his camp at Buntzelwitz on the 25th of September, and advanced on the 29th to Gros-Neisse. Laudon took advantage of this false movement, surrounded Schweidnitz on the 30th of September, attacked the place in five columns, and carried it by a *coup-de-main*. The garrison consisted of only 3500 men, who were made prisoners. He lost in this attack 1500 men, threw ten battalions into the place, and returned to his camp at Grogersdorf. The King, much astonished, hastily retraced his steps, and on the 6th of October encamped at Strehlen to cover Breslaw. On the 25th of November both armies went into winter-quarters. It was at this period that a gentleman named Warkotsch, a friend of Frederic's, entered into a plot for delivering him up to the Austrians, which was not discovered until the very day on which it was to have been executed. After the taking of Schweidnitz, Laudon detached twenty-four battalions into Saxony, to reinforce Daun; but

that general knew not how to benefit by this great increase of strength, and the two armies in this country also went into winter-quarters.

IV.

The Cabinet of Saint-Petersburg had long felt the necessity of having a point of *appui* to shorten its line of operations, and to enable its armies to winter nearer the centre of the war. In the five preceding campaigns its armies had passed half their time in marching to the field of operations, and in returning to take up their winter-quarters in Poland. For this purpose, the Russian government had thought of Colberg, a fortified seaport on the Baltic, with which the communication by sea was easy, as the Swedish and Russian fleets commanded the Baltic. Several attempts against Colberg had failed in the former campaigns. The attack of the Russians was this year better planned. Romanzoff, with 18,000 men, encamped on the 5th of July at Coslin; and on the 30th a Russian fleet appeared in sight of Colberg, landed 6000 men and a besieging train, and bombarded the place from the sea. Romanzoff, on the 15th of September, arrived near the Prussian camp of the Prince of Wirtemberg; but thinking it too strong to be carried by a *coup-de-main*, he laid siege to it in form. On the 18th of October he was repulsed, and lost 3000 men in

one of his attacks. General Platten, who followed the Russian army, made several movements for the purpose of succouring the place, and the intrenched camp, but he failed, and lost one of his corps of 2000 men, who were surrounded by a detachment of the grand Russian army, and laid down their arms. On the 2d of September Butturlin continued his march to repass the Vistula, contenting himself with reinforcing Romanzoff's corps. On the 14th the Prince of Wirtemberg left his intrenched camp, and joined Platten's corps in the open plain. On the 19th of December the garrison of Colberg capitulated: Romanzoff wintered in the environs of the place. The Court of Russia had formed a plan to make Colberg its centre of operations in the ensuing campaign.

V.

Observation XXVI.—1. Duke Ferdinand's operation, in the month of February, was perfectly well conceived. He repulsed the French, and got possession of all Hesse, by paralysing the principal French army, which was cantoned on the left bank of the Rhine. For the last five years the French ministry had not understood the necessity of keeping their forces united on the right bank.

2. Ought Marshal Broglie, when attacked in

the depth of winter by an army equal in strength to his own, to have risked a battle to defend his magazines? The first principle of war is never to give battle except with all the troops that can be collected on the field of operations. But this marshal, convinced as he was of the erroneous conduct of the court, in dividing its army and keeping the greater part of the troops on the left bank of the Rhine, ought to have expected what took place, and collected his magazines in fortresses, for instance, in Cassel, Marburg, Bergen, Frankfort, and Hanau, so that he might have evacuated the whole country without sustaining any loss.

3. The reinforcement of 15,000 men, which he received from the army of the Rhine, does not seem to have been a sufficient increase of strength to justify Duke Ferdinand's retreat, who, in his turn, evacuated the country before the Duke of Broglie, raised the siege of Cassel, and retreated behind the Dimel. In fact, he was more likely to succeed in defeating this marshal, although reinforced with 15,000 men and superior in strength to himself, than in waiting until the grand French army had passed to the right bank of the Rhine. He was to blame for losing this opportunity of destroying the Duke of Broglie's army.

4. The plan of operations of the month of June, for taking the field, is formed on the falsest

military principles; and that the French did not suffer by it more severely and to the extent they deserved, must be attributed to their great numerical superiority.

5. The conduct of the Prince of Soubise, after the junction of the two armies, will for ever prove the absolute incapacity of that general, even much more decidedly than the action of Gotha and the battle of Rosbach. The resolution he adopts, in his embarrassment, to separate his forces and send the Duke of Broglie to the right, whilst he proceeds to the left, towards the Rhine, is the climax of imbecility and unskilfulness. Yet the French soldier of that period was at least equal to the soldier opposed to him, as appears by the success constantly obtained in all affairs of posts. The cavalry was fine, well mounted and disciplined; the artillery excellent; the corps of engineers the most expert in Europe; and the infantry was not bad. And the whole army was composed of Frenchmen, who were much mortified at the result of the preceding campaigns, and desirous to retrieve the glory of their colours: but the commanders-in-chief, and other generals, were totally incapable.

6. At the conclusion of the campaign, the Prince of Soubise reconducted his army to the left bank of the Rhine, leaving the Duke of

Broglie alone, exposed on the right bank to all Prince Ferdinand's attacks during the winter.

Observation XXVII.—1. The King of Prussia incurred the same reproach, this campaign, as in those which preceded it. He had every thing to gain by opening the campaign in the month of April, by operating against Daun with all his forces united, defeating, destroying, and driving him into Bohemia, and besieging and taking Dresden. He diminished the number of his troops at an improper time. The Prince of Wirtemberg's corps at Colberg, and that of Goltz at Glogau, were useless: had he added them to his army of Saxony, it would have been superior to Daun; he might have been master of Dresden by the end of April, and advanced with his principal forces into Silesia, on the Oder, to oppose the junction of the Russians with Laudon.

2. In Silesia, Frederic also lost the months of May and June; had he then marched against Laudon with his army, reinforced by those of the Prince of Wirtemberg and Goltz, he might have given Laudon a considerable check, which would have disheartened his army, rendered him more circumspect, and eventually augmented the difficulties of his junction with the Russians.

3. The placing of the Prince of Wirtemberg's corps at the camp of Colberg, was an error; it

was dispersing his troops, and paralysing them during three fourths of the campaign to no purpose. This corps weakened, instead of strengthening Colberg, because it required immense stores; and after all, as the enemy was master both by sea and land, it was necessarily doomed to be vanquished by famine. If the Prince of Wirtemberg had been at Glogau, he would have doubled Goltz's forces, and probably made a successful attack on the Russian forces in their march towards the Upper Oder.

4. The King manœuvred injudiciously throughout the month of August, for he at length suffered himself to be surrounded by the two armies of the enemy. For three days, the 15th, 16th, and 17th, his enemies had it in their power to complete his destruction; whereas, if this Prince had marched against the Russian army before it approached Laudon, or against the latter, he would have had two days to attack them separately in.

5. When he was in the camp of Buntzelwitz his situation was better, but still very bad. The enemy's forces were four times, or at least thrice, as numerous as his, and equal to them in quality. To maintain his communications with Schweidnitz, he would have been obliged to engage in partial affairs, which would have ruined his army. It is even probable that he would have been forced in his camp, if the Russian general had

adopted Laudon's scheme. He was saved by the policy of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg; but in a military sense, he had suffered himself to be surrounded.

6. These last campaigns of Frederic no longer bear the same character. He becomes fearful, and does not venture to fight battles. Turenne was the only general whose boldness increased with his years and experience. It must, nevertheless, be remembered, that the great advantage which the King had at the beginning of this war, the possession of an army of 120,000 men perfectly trained and inured to war, whilst the Austrians had no army at all, was daily diminishing; for on one side his old army was wearing out, whilst, on the other, that of the enemy was forming and acquiring experience. Even the French army, although so wretchedly commanded, was very different in 1761 from what it had been in the campaign of 1757.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1762.

I. Operations of the French and Hanoverian Armies; Battle of Wilhelmsthal (June 24); Capitulation of Cassel (Nov. 1); Peace (Nov. 24).—II. Operations in Silesia; Action of Peile (Aug. 16); Taking of Schweidnitz (Oct. 8).—III. Operations in Saxony; Battle of Freyburg (Oct. 20).—IV. Observations.

I.

In this campaign France operated with two armies: one of 80,000 men, commanded by Marshals Soubise and d'Estrées, called the Army of Hesse: the other of 30,000 men, commanded by the Prince of Condé, which was quartered, during the winter, on the left bank of the Lower Rhine. Duke Ferdinand drew in his cantonments in the beginning of May: his right was at the camp of Bielfield, composed of 20,000 English; his head-quarters were at Pyrmont. Luckner was on the right of the Weser at Eimbeck,

covering Hanover. The army of the two marshals was at Corbach. Prince Xavier of Saxony was detached into Thuringia; Chevert, with eighteen battalions and twenty-eight squadrons, covered Gœttingen. The Prince of Condé was still on the left bank of the Rhine.

On the 23d of June Duke Ferdinand arrived on the Dimel. The French army assembled at Cassel on the 20th, and took up a position at Immenhausen on the 22d. Count de Castries commanded a corps in advance of the right; Count de Stainville, with the grenadiers of France, encamped in advance of the left, at Westuffel. On the 24th Duke Ferdinand attacked the French army. Sporken and Luckner placed themselves in the rear of Count de Castries, who, after a brisk engagement, fell back on the army: at the same time Duke Ferdinand passed the Dimel in seven columns, and arrived in presence of the French army, which was disposed to defend its positions vigorously; but the English corps arrived about ten o'clock in the morning, in the rear of Stainville's left, who executed a change of front to the rear, and sustained the attack with intrepidity, but was not succoured by the marshals, who were quite confounded on hearing of this manœuvre, and beat a retreat. Stainville's division was broken, but he effected his retreat with coolness. The French

army lost 4000 men, and retreated on Cassel. Such was the result of the battle of Wilhelmsthal, in which the French ought to have gained the victory.

The marshals recalled Chevert and Prince Xavier, and, in order to maintain themselves in Cassel, adopted the plan of occupying the bank of the Fulde to a great extent. Prince Xavier occupied the extreme right; he was attacked there on the 24th of July by superior forces; he lost his positions, 1200 men, five standards, and thirteen pieces of cannon.

In the mean time the Prince of Condé had passed the Rhine, at Wesel, and marched on Coesfeld. The hereditary Prince, who was opposed to him, not having a sufficient force, retreated on Munster. A junction being wholly impracticable across the enemy's country, the Prince of Condé received counter orders, retrograded, marched up the right bank of the Rhine, and arrived at Giessen on the Lahn. The marshals evacuated Cassel, left sixteen battalions in garrison there, retrograded on the Lahn, and on the 30th effected their junction with the Prince of Condé, near Friedberg, on the heights of the valley of the Mein, in spite of Duke Ferdinand, who manœuvred to oppose this operation. The hereditary Prince had an engagement at the bridge of Assenheim, in which he lost 1500

men. After this junction the marshals found themselves in command of 90,000 men; they again marched forward to deblockade Cassel, but were unsuccessful. Their want of resolution, and the ascendancy which Duke Ferdinand had over them, enabled this general to bar the road against 90,000 French with less than 70,000 men. Cassel capitulated on the 1st of November, and its numerous garrison was made prisoners of war in sight of the grand army. This shameful event sufficiently indicates what would have been the result of the campaign; but on the 7th of November the army received news that peace had been signed at Fontainebleau, between France and England, which terminated the sixth campaign of Hanover. The Marshal and Count Broglie had been disgraced, and did not command in this campaign.

II.

Frederic's situation was now worse than ever. The presence of the Russians in Pomerania, supported on Colberg, that of Laudon at Schweidnitz, and the occupation of Dresden by the Austrians, rendered recruiting difficult. Besides, his states were exhausted, whilst the Court of Vienna, on the contrary, had never possessed more numerous, more experienced, or better organized armies. Its finances, however, being

inadequate to the support of so considerable a military establishment, it disbanded some light troops, to the number of 20,000 men, and 500 officers, whom Frederic enlisted, and by this resource recruited his army.

The Empress of Russia, Elizabeth, died on the 24th of January. Peter III. who succeeded her, was an admirer of Frederic; he recalled his troops without delay, and in May concluded a peace with Prussia, which was followed, in a few days, by a treaty of alliance, by which he engaged to furnish the King with an auxiliary army. General Czernischef, with 24,000 men, began his march to join the Prussian army of Silesia. From that moment, it was easy to foresee the *denouement* of the war; the state of the King's affairs was suddenly changed from imminent danger to prosperity. He operated with two armies in this campaign: one in Saxony under the command of Prince Henry, consisting of 48 battalions and 93 squadrons; and one in Silesia of 81 battalions and 156 squadrons, which he commanded in person. The Duke of Bevern was, in the former part of this campaign, detached with 21 battalions and 36 squadrons into Upper Silesia. The total strength of the Prussian army, during this campaign, was therefore 129 battalions and 249 squadrons. The Court of Vienna brought two armies into the

field; one under Marshal Daun, in Silesia, composed of 106 battalions and 149 squadrons, and from which General Beck was detached with 9000 men to cover Moravia and oppose the Duke of Bevern; the other, called the Army of Saxony, composed of 57 battalions and 108 squadrons, under the command of Marshal Serbelloni.

Daun marched out of the mountains, in the beginning of May, to approach Schweidnitz, which place had an Austrian garrison; he encamped near the plain of Kratzkau, at the foot of Zoptenberg. The King was cantoned on the two banks of the Loh, covering Breslaw and observing Schweidnitz. On the 1st of July, Czernichef joined him with twenty battalions and sixteen squadrons, which determined him to manœuvre to dislodge Daun. As he could not attack him in front, he detached General Neuwied with twenty-five battalions and twenty-six squadrons, to take possession of Freyberg, which induced Daun to return into the defiles, and to fix his camp behind Freyberg. To drive him from this second position, the King manœuvred by his left, occupied the camp of Hohenfriedberg, menacing Braunau, where were the grand magazines of the Austrian army; but Daun, upon this, removed his camp to another position, from which the King was in hopes to dislodge him,

by a diversion in Bohemia. His light horse penetrated as far as Konigsgratz, but Daun remained steady. In the mean time Czernichef received advices, on the 18th of July, of the catastrophe of Peter III. and the accession of Catherine, with orders to quit the Prussian army immediately. The King, however, prevailed on this general to keep this unwelcome news secret for three days, during which he manœuvred, and succeeded in cutting off Daun from Schweidnitz, and in surrounding that town with sixty battalions and one hundred and ten squadrons. Czernichef immediately afterwards set out for Poland.

The Duke of Bevern made several incursions into Moravia, but without any important result. On the 4th of August Schweidnitz was invested by General Tauenzien with twenty-one battalions and twenty squadrons. The garrison, 11,000 strong, was commanded by General Guasco. Gribeauval, a French officer, commanded the artillery; Daun, with an army much more numerous than that of the King, remained stationary at his camp at Giesdorf, and witnessed the taking of this important place, which withstood a siege of sixty days from the opening of the trenches. He wished, however, to attempt something, and therefore on the 10th of August he ordered General Beck to join him; but the Duke of Bevern followed this general's movement in a

parallel direction. On the 14th of August Beck encamped at Schonwald, and the Duke of Bevern at Ellgott. Daun secretly despatched Lascy's and Brentano's corps to join Beck, and to attack and crush the Duke of Bevern on the same day. By the success of this plan he hoped to effect the raising of the siege of Schweidnitz. The King perceived this detachment too late; however, he ordered fifteen squadrons, and Mollendorf, with a division of infantry, to march immediately to succour the Duke of Bevern; but they could not reach him until after sun-set, at the conclusion of the engagement called the action of Piele, in which the Duke of Bevern displayed great talents, and baffled all the efforts of the Austrians.

On the 8th of October Schweidnitz capitulated; 8600 men laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war; the garrison had lost 2800 men during the siege, the Prussians 3600; their engineers evinced but little skill. After the taking of this town, the King detached General Neuwied with twenty battalions, fifty-five squadrons and sixty pieces of cannon, to reinforce his army of Saxony. On the 24th of November, he concluded a convention to secure the winter-quarters of both armies.

III.

Serbelloni was encamped near Dresden, in the vale of Plauen. General Macquire occupied a camp near Freyberg, and the army of the Circles was on the Saale. Prince Henry occupied the bridge of Meissen and the camp of Wilsdruff; on the 12th of May he put his troops in motion, attacked the advanced posts of the Austrian army, took 1800 prisoners, and marched, on the 14th, on Freyberg, which town Macquire evacuated. The Prince occupied it, and left General Hulsen at Wilsdruff; on the 16th he marched on the heights of Pretschendorff; Macquire had retreated from Freyberg on Dippodiswalda. In the mean time the army of the Circles left the banks of the Saale, and advanced to Chemnitz; Prince Henry detached Seidlitz against them with 8000 men, 4000 of whom were cavalry; upon whose approach they retired to Bareith, and on the mountains of Munchberg. In July and August, this army made several fruitless attempts to join the army under Dresden, but was so ill commanded and composed of such wretched troops, that upon the news of the appearance of the smallest Prussian detachment on its flanks or in its rear, it instantly retreated with precipitation. At length, on the 6th of September, this army reached the camp at Dresden, but only by marching through Bohemia. On the 7th of September, General Had-

dick took the command of the Austrian army of Saxony; Marshal Serbelloni had been recalled. This army then consisted of ninety-six battalions and one hundred and sixty-seven squadrons, including the army of the Circles, which was twenty-three battalions and forty-two squadrons strong. With such superior forces, he put himself in motion to dislodge Prince Henry, but without running the risks of a battle.

On the 29th of September, the Prince of Lowenstein passed the Mulde, possessed himself of Tharaud, and took up a position between Dresden and Freyberg, opposite Wilsdruff. On the 30th, Prince Henry repassed the Mulde in four columns, and encamped with his right at Brand, and his left at Freyberg. On the 15th of October, Syburg's Prussian brigade was beaten, and lost 1600 men and ten pieces of cannon. The army of the Circles manœuvred to occupy Freyberg: the Prince having been obliged to evacuate that place and retreat on Reichenbach. Thus the Austrian general had attained his object by manœuvres, but after much delay and hesitation. On the 15th of October, Prince Henry again marched on Freyberg in four columns; on the 30th he attacked and defeated the army of the Circles, which lost 4500 prisoners, twenty-eight pieces of cannon, and nine colours; and had 3000 men killed and

wounded. The Prussian army had only twenty-nine battalions and sixty squadrons on the field at Freyberg. The army of the Circles, reinforced by an Austrian garrison, had forty-eight battalions and sixty-eight squadrons; but the troops of the Empire were ill organized and destitute of officers. On the very day of the battle, General Neuwied passed the Elbe with the detachment with which he had marched from Silesia, whilst Duke Albert of Saxony arrived at Dresden with a detachment from Daun's army. On the 2d of November, Prince Henry sent Klein into Bohemia to destroy several magazines; on the 6th Frederic reached the army of Saxony. On the 24th of November hostilities with the Austrians ceased, but the Princes of the Empire not being included in the armistice, Kleist laid them under contribution. On the 20th of February 1763, peace was concluded between the Queen of Hungary and the King of Prussia, at the castle of Hubersburg near Dresden, and terminated the seven years' war. After seven years' fighting this peace restored things exactly to the situation in which they stood previously to the war; not a single village having changed its masters.

IV.

Observation XXVIII.—1. The officers who directed the operations of the war at Versailles had

no military knowledge whatever; and the petty intrigues for and against the different generals had an influence over the distribution of the army, and thereby affected the campaign.

2. The Prince of Condé's march on the right bank of the Rhine exposed his small corps to a check, and could not be of any service to the grand army. Had he, at the beginning of the campaign, made that movement by the left bank, which he afterwards made on the right bank, to effect a junction on the Mein, the French army would have been constantly united, and would not have sustained a check at Cassel.

3. In this campaign the Broglies had been disgraced; but the Prince of Soubise incurred as much censure as in the preceding campaigns, which affords a demonstration that the defeats of the French armies under his command arose from his want of military knowledge and resolution. Marshal d'Estreés, who was associated with him, could not but lose through that circumstance part of the glory he had acquired at Hastenbeck.

4. The loss of the battle of Wilhemsthal, almost without fighting, is the more dishonourable to the two marshals, because M. de Castries and Count de Stainville, who commanded the two wings, evinced talent and bravery. Even the army was no longer that of Creveldt; it wanted nothing but a great general to perform grand exploits.

5. The disgraceful fact of suffering sixteen battalions to lay down their arms in Cassel when besieged by an army of 60,000 men at most, before a French army of 90,000 men, which loses its time in empty manœuvres and false movements, without fighting at all, can only be accounted for by the imbecility of the Prince of Soubise. It is probable that if peace had not been concluded, this weak general would soon have evacuated Hesse, and retreated precipitately on the Mein, making good the saying of the Athenian general: *That an army of deer commanded by a lion is better than an army of lions commanded by a deer.*

6. Duke Ferdinand's manœuvres were often contrary to the rules of war: he would have suffered severely in consequence, if he had had to deal with less pusillanimous generals; his plan at the battle of Wilhelmsthal, in which he had both the right and left turned by movements made on the eve of the battle, and with an army inferior to that of his enemy, was calculated to produce his overthrow.

Observation XXIX.—The siege of Schweidnitz, which the King of Prussia ventured to undertake before an army stronger than his own and united, is one of the finest military operations ever executed by that prince, although the siege itself was conducted without art, for want of engineers.

Observation XXX.—Prince Henry's campaign in Saxony has been too highly extolled. The

battle of Freyberg was nothing, because the victory he gained was over very bad troops: he did not display true military talent. With an inferior army, in a country much intersected, and with the lead in moving, this general could never contrive to be in force at any point, but dispersed his army over a line of several leagues. Had it been possible for the Prussians to be beaten by the troops of the Empire, Prince Henry would have suffered a defeat.

His dispositions throughout this campaign are unfit for imitation; his army was constantly divided into numerous small bodies; he would have suffered great reverses if he had had any man but Serbelloni to contend with. Any general who imitates the conduct of Prince Henry will have cause to repent it, and will find the scenes of Maxen and Landshut renewed. In this campaign the Prince constantly violated the principle, *that the several camps of an army ought to be placed in such a manner that they may be able to support each other.* The Austrians, who occupied the central position of Dresden and the debouchés of the mountains of Bohemia, might have made him repent it deeply. The battle of Freyberg is considered as Prince Henry's principal claim to glory; it was the only battle in which he was the commander-in-chief. But it was in the campaign of 1761 that this prince really displayed superior talents.

CHAPTER IX.

A FEW CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

Had Prussia in reality to contend against the combined powers of France, Austria, and Russia, in the seven campaigns of this war?—Did Frederic create a new order of battle?—What is the oblique order?

I.

If the King of Prussia really made head against France, Austria, and Russia, in the seven years' war, it would surely be a miraculous circumstance. A prince who had but four millions of subjects to struggle for seven years against the three greatest powers in Europe, who possessed eighty millions! But if we examine the events of this war attentively, we shall lose sight of the marvellous, without abating any part of the admiration inspired by the talents of this great captain.

1st, France ought not to be counted amongst the powers which Frederic had to fight against,

because the French armies were, throughout this war, kept in check on the Rhine by the army of the ten Princes in the pay of England, composed of English, Hanoverians, Hessians, and Brunswickers. 2dly, Russia did not wish to overwhelm Prussia; she only did as much as was necessary to satisfy that ambitious instinct which induced her to try her armies against armies practised in manœuvres, to enable her, at a subsequent period, to accomplish the destinies of which she already had a presentiment. 3dly, Austria had but a very weak military establishment, whilst Prussia, having long been organized like a camp, had numerous armies experienced in tactics.

During the campaign of 1756, neither France nor Russia brought any army into the field. In that of 1757, the Russian army made an incursion on the Pregel, in the month of August, gained a battle, and returned more quickly than if it had been defeated. During the first four months of that year, as in 1756, the King had only Austria to contend with.

In 1758 the Russian army made a second incursion, similar to that of the preceding year. On the 21st of August it lost a battle on the Oder, and returned into Poland. The King had no enemy in the field but Austria, for the first four months of the campaign, and towards the end of

the year, but he lost all his advantages by the ill-judged operations of Moravia and Hokenkirch.

The campaign of 1759 was a repetition of that of the preceding year. The Russian army made its third incursion in the month of August, defeated the King at Kunersdorf, and, faithful to its system, returned to its frozen regions. During the first four months, or in the autumn, the King might have crushed the Austrians; but either he knew not how to avail himself of so precious an opportunity, or he lost a corps of 18,000 men, officers and privates, through his imprudent manœuvres, which were followed by the capitulation of Maxen.

In 1760 we find a similar repetition. In the first four months the King might have done any thing against the Austrians; and yet Laudon, in sight of Prince Henry, who was cantoned in Silesia, surrounds and takes a corps of 12,000 men, officers and privates. The Russians reach the Oder too late, and do not fight a battle, although they remain longer than usual. At last, however, they return to winter amongst their snows.

In 1761 and 1762, the population of Prussia began to be exhausted. The Austrians took Schweidnitz, and the Russians Colberg. Dresden had been taken in the preceding campaign. The King's position became critical; but Elizabeth

died; the Russians abandoned the coalition, and formed an alliance with Prussia.

The large subsidies which Frederic received from England, afforded him the means of raising soldiers and officers throughout Germany: this alone did more for the cause of Prussia than the five incursions of the Russian army did for that of Austria.

1st, This great captain has been censured for not having profited as he should have done, by having the lead in 1756; 2dly, for not having struck some grand blow in the spring of any of the five following years, whilst the Russians were remote from the field of action; 3dly, for the errors which produced the disasters of Hokenkirch, Maxen and Landshut; and 4thly, for the injudicious conduct of his invasions of Bohemia and Moravia. But these errors are eclipsed by the great actions, the fine manœuvres, and the daring resolutions by which he was enabled to terminate so disproportionate a contest triumphantly. He was eminently great at the most critical moments; which is the noblest eulogium that can be bestowed upon him. But every thing tends to prove that he could not have resisted France, Austria, and Russia, for one campaign, if these powers had acted in earnest; and that he could not have sustained two campaigns against Austria and Russia, if the Cabinet of St.

Petersburg had allowed its army to winter on the theatre of operations. Thus the marvellous part of the history of the seven years' war disappears. But the truth which remains is sufficient to justify the high reputation which the Prussian army enjoyed during the last fifty years of the past century; and rather establishes than shakes the great military reputation of Frederic.

II.

The success obtained by the King in this war has been attributed to a new order of tactics, in battle, said to have been invented by him, and called the oblique order. In the course of the seven years' war Frederic fought ten battles in person and six by his lieutenant, including the affairs of Maxen and Landshut. Of the former he won seven and lost three; and of the latter he gained one and lost five. Thus out of sixteen battles Prussia won eight and lost eight. In none of these battles did the King ever make use of any new tactics; he did nothing but what has been practised by other generals, ancient and modern, in all ages.

But what is this oblique order? Its advocates vary in their accounts of it. Some of them say that all the manœuvres made by an army, either on the eve or on the day of a battle, to reinforce its line on its right, its centre, or its left, or even

to get into the rear of the enemy, belong to the oblique order. In that case Cyrus manœuvred in the oblique order at Thymbria, the Belgian Gauls at the battle of the Sambre against Cæsar, and Marshal Luxembourg at Fleurus, who took advantage of a height to turn the enemy's right; Marlborough manœuvred in this order at Hochstett, Prince Eugene at Ramillies and Turin, and Charles XII. at Pultowa. There was hardly ever a battle, ancient or modern, in which the general who attacked did not reinforce his columns of attack, either by a greater number of troops, or by placing grenadiers, or by a great number of cannon. If Frederic had invented this manœuvre, he must have been the inventor of war itself, which, unfortunately, is as old as the world.

Others say that the oblique order is that which the King had executed on the parade at Potzdam, in which two armies are at first placed in line parallel to each other. That which manœuvres advances on one of the wings of its adversary, by a succession either of close or open columns, and is suddenly posted, unperceived by the enemy's general, on one of his wings, and attacks it on all sides, before there is time to succour it.

I. It is impossible to place two parallel lines of 3000 toises each, at a distance of 900 toises

from each other, and one inclining on the other, so that one of the wings being at a distance of 300 toises, the other shall be distant enough to be entirely out of reach, and sheltered from attack. Whilst the army is marching to take oblique order, it must expose the flank; if it be attacked, it must be defeated; the wing menaced may easily be put out of danger, by reinforcing it from the second line of the army, or the reserve.

II. It would be necessary for the line of operations of the army taking oblique order, to be on the side of the wing on which it rests, otherwise it would lose it, and be exposed to the most disastrous consequences. There are two principles in war which cannot be violated with impunity: the first is, *Never perform flank marches before an army in position;* and the second, *Preserve your line of operations carefully, and never abandon it inconsiderately or unnecessarily.* Accordingly, some of the partisans of the oblique order require that this manœuvre should be concealed from the enemy in order to confound and surprise him; that it should be made by night, under the favour of fogs, or the cover of *rideaux*.

1. If this manœuvre must be concealed from the enemy, it is not an order of tactics; its power is not in itself, but depends upon surprising and

confounding: it belongs to the system of ambuscades, stolen marches, surprises, &c.

2. Ambuscades, stolen marches, and surprises, have been practised in all ages, not only by disciplined troops, but even by savages and irregular forces.

Frederic fought ten battles in the seven years' war; in none of which did he carry into execution the manœuvres of the reviews at Potzdam, or put in practice any new manœuvre whatsoever: all those which he ordered had been known and practised from time immemorial. He made two movements at the battle of Losowitz, in 1756: the first, to repulse the attack of the height; the second, when he had, by a movement of cavalry, menaced the left of the Austrian army, which induced it to repass the Eger. There was no invention in this.

In 1757, the Prussian and Austrian armies were of equal strength, but the Prussian army was composed of old well-disciplined troops, that had seen much service. The greater part of those of the Duke of Lorraine were very indifferent, and new levies. At the battle the two armies were separated by a ravine. The King marched with his troops in three lines by the left flank, until he found a debouché. The Duke of Lorraine ought to have marched in three lines by

the right flank, and followed the King's movement in a parallel direction; or to have taken the lead, made his left and centre pass the ravine, and attacked the King's right. He adopted neither of these measures, but contented himself with executing a change of front on his right, to the rear. Armies have in all ages been seen to march side by side, several times, even for several leagues, in order to reach a debouché which might afford them an opportunity of attacking the enemy with advantage.

The partisans of the oblique order admire the King's manœuvre at the battle of Kollin; and although it was attended with the most disastrous consequences, and occasioned the loss of the battle, of half his army, and of 200 pieces of cannon, which obliged him to raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia, they nevertheless persist in their infatuation; nothing can open their eyes. Some of them say that the victory was snatched from him by the fault of a lieutenant-colonel, who gave an untimely order to wheel into line on the right, and stopped the march of the army. Others, of a more reasonable character, struck with the disadvantages attached to a flank march before an army in position, but not therefore the less enthusiastic for the oblique order, say that the King's manœuvre ought to have been executed by night, whereby

he would have avoided the fire of the Austrian army, which would not have perceived him; and that at daylight he would have confounded, surprised, broken, and routed his adversary. No doubt, it is a very fine thing to surprise one's enemy; but why stop at turning a wing? why not take the army in the rear, seize their parks, their cannon on the limbers, their ammunition, and the piles of musquets in the camp? The loss of the battle of Kollin is to be ascribed to the violation of the first of the principles abovementioned. If Frederic had had to deal with any other general than Daun, who, after the battle, remained twelve days in his camp, chaunting *Te Deums*, he would have severely felt the consequences of the violation of the maxim of abandoning his line of operations. The routed troops would never have reached either his magazines or the army before Prague. He would never have recovered from this blow.

At the battle of Rosbach, the Prince of Soubise took it into his head to attempt to imitate the oblique order. He executed a flank march before the King's position. The consequences are very well known. Frederic only lost his army at Kollin; but Soubise lost both his army and his honour at Rosbach.

At the battle of Zorndorf the King repeated the manœuvre of Kollin. Instead of attacking

the left of the Russian army, which was within reach of the points by which he debouched, he executed a flank march before it, in order to attack the opposite wing. The Russians, who had baffled a similar manœuvre the year before, when they defeated Marshal Lehwald at Jaegendorf, fell on the flank of the King's columns of attack, broke them, and threw them into disorder. All would have been lost, had not the intrepid Seidlitz, with his matchless cavalry, and the *coup d'œil* for which he was so remarkable, saved the army. The Russian infantry was not sufficiently skilled in manœuvres to support its columns of attack by echelons; it was driven back into its squares. The battle continued; the Prussian army gained the victory, but only because it was driven by the force of circumstances into true principles, for it was the left of the Russian army that it broke in spite of Frederic's orders. The following year, the Prussian Marshal Wedel made another flank march at the battle of Kay. Soltikoff made him repent it, and gave him a good lesson.

But, it will be said, you do not mention the battle of Leuthen, which was the master-piece of the oblique order. No doubt, that battle immortalized the moral character of Frederic, and displayed his great military talents in a conspicuous manner; but it presents nothing similar

to the manœuvres of Potzdam. Frederic was indebted for this victory solely to the surprise of the enemy: it belongs to the chapter of accidents. If the Prince of Lorraine had had a single vedette or patrole in advance of his front, he would have been apprised that the King was marching on his right, and entering a morass which seemed impassable, in order to attack his left wing: he would have sent his reserve thither, and at the same time advanced his right and centre; and he would have taken the Prussian army in flank, defenceless, and defeated it. It is a strange delusion to confound a surprise with a systematic order of manœuvres.

At the battle of Hokenkirch, Daun, it may be said, manœuvred in the oblique order, because, when he fired the first musquet, he had already surrounded the whole right of the Prussian army: but this would be a strange abuse of words. It can only be said, simply, that Daun surprised the King's army, which the latter gave him the opportunity of doing by the injudicious choice of his camp, which he persisted in retaining several days. Such an error ought never to have been committed since the invention of powder.

The eighth battle was that of Kunersdorf. The King at the beginning of that battle was stationed perpendicularly on the left flank of the enemy's

army; he was, therefore, more than in the oblique order. That position was not the result of any manœuvre on the field of battle, but of a march which had been stolen on the enemy behind woods and morasses. The Russian general, who had at first fronted towards Frankfort, changed his position, and took up another by means of which he found himself *en potence* on the Prussian army; impassable morasses prevented the King from debouching as he had intended. He attacked as he stood, obtained some advantage over the left of the Russians, which he surprised; but the latter having formed their order of battle on their centre, parallel to the Prussian army, obtained a victory which placed Prussia within a hair's breadth of ruin.

The ninth battle in this war, that of Liegnitz, was an accidental rencontre, which saved Frederic from the danger to which he had exposed himself by the most erroneous manœuvres.

The tenth battle was that of Torgau, where all the King's dispositions were unfortunate, being as ill-conceived as executed. If Frederic were to be judged of by his conduct at that battle, it would give a very mean idea of his talents. Neither at Liegnitz nor at Torgau does any thing new, or any trace of this famous oblique order, appear.

Old Frederic laughed in his sleeve at the parades of Potsdam, when he perceived young officers, French, English, and Austrian, so infatuated with the manœuvre of the oblique order, which was fit for nothing but to gain a few adjutant-majors a reputation. A profound examination of the manœuvres of this war ought to have enlightened these officers; and what should have completely dispelled their illusion is, that Frederic never manœuvred but by lines and by the flank; never by deployments.

On the whole there is nothing of a peculiar or novel description in any of these ten battles. The King lost several of them through his rashness in executing flank marches before an army in position. His experience at Kollin and Zorndorf, Marshal Lehwald's at Jagendorf, General Wedel's at Kay, and that of the Prince of Soubise at Rosbach, have proved the danger of such operations.

Some French officers, admirers of the oblique order (Guibert for one), have carried the illusion so far as to pretend that the detachments made by Duke Ferdinand at Creveldt and Wilhemsthal, on the flanks of the French army, were brilliant corollaries of the oblique order, in contempt of this principle: *Do not leave any interval between*

the different corps of your line of battle, through which the enemy may penetrate. If, notwithstanding the violation of this principle, he was successful, it was only because the Count de Clermont commanded the French.

SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

FIRST AND SECOND VOLUMES OF

HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

SECTION III.

"THERE were three objects in the expedition to Egypt: 1st. To establish a French colony on the Nile, which would prosper without slaves, and serve the Republic instead of Saint-Domingo and of all the sugar islands. 2dly. To open a market for our manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to supply our commerce with all the productions of those vast countries. 3dly. Setting out from Egypt, as from a place of arms, to lead an army of 60,000 men to the Indus, to excite the Mahrattas and oppressed people of those extensive regions to insurrection."* (*Historical Miscellanies*, Vol. II. p. 205; and Vol. I. p. 67.)

No. I.

LETTER from the General-in-chief, BONAPARTE, to the MINISTER OF EXTERIOR RELATIONS.

Passeriano, 27th Fructidor, year V. (September 13, 1797.)

YOU will find hereto annexed a letter which I have written to citizen Canclaux, minister at Naples, in answer

* The following letter, No. I. proves that the idea of the *Expedition to Egypt* originated with General Bonaparte; he had previously mentioned it to the Directory in his despatches from Milan of the 29th of Thermidor, year VI. (August 16, 1797.) Nos. II. and III. show that the government approved of this plan.

to overtures which have been made to him by M. Acton, and of which he will certainly have given you an account.

The Court of Naples dreams of nothing but acquisitions and greatness. On one side it wants Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, &c.; and on another, half the states of the Pope, and especially Ancona. These pretensions are too amusing; I think they mean to cede us the Isle of Elba in exchange. It appears to me that the grand maxim of the Republic ought henceforth to be, never to abandon Corfu, Zante, &c. On the contrary, we ought to establish ourselves firmly there. We should there find resources for our commerce, which would be of great moment to us, and to the future events of Europe.

Why should we not possess ourselves of the Isle of Malta? Admiral Brueys might very well anchor there and take the place. The only guard of the city of Valetta consists of 400 knights and a regiment not exceeding 500 men. The inhabitants, who amount to upwards of 100,000, are all favourably disposed towards us, and much disgusted with their knights, who are destitute of means of subsistence, and actually starving. I had all their property in Italy confiscated for this very purpose.

With the Isle of San Pietro, which has been ceded to us by the King of Sardinia, Malta, and Corfu, we should be masters of all the Mediterranean.

Should it happen, on our making peace with England, that we should have to cede the Cape of Good Hope, we ought then to possess ourselves of Egypt. That country never belonged to any European nation; the Venetians alone once possessed a precarious preponderance there. We might sail hence with 25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten ships of the line, or Venetian frigates, and conquer the country.

Egypt does not belong to the Grand Signor.

I should be glad, Citizen Minister, if you would obtain some information at Paris, and let me know what re-action our expedition to Egypt would have on the Porte.

(Signed,) BONAPARTE.

No. II.

The MINISTER OF EXTERIOR RELATIONS to the General-in-chief, BONAPARTE.

Paris, 2d Vendemiaire, year VI. (Sept. 23, 1797.)

THE Directory approves of your ideas respecting Malta, &c. As to Egypt, your notions on this subject are grand, and their utility ought to be felt; I shall write to you on this point at large. For the present I can only say, that if the conquest were made, it ought to be done to frustrate the Russian and English intrigues, so often renewed in that unhappy country. So great a service done to the Turks would easily induce them to leave us all the preponderance and all the commercial advantages we want. Egypt, as a colony, would soon supersede the productions of the Antilles; and as a road, would give us the commerce of India; for every thing, in commercial affairs, depends on time; and time would give us five voyages for three by the ordinary route.

(Signed,) CH. M. TALLEYRAND.

No. III.

The EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY to the General-in-chief, BONAPARTE.

Paris, 5th Brumaire, year VI. (October 26, 1797.)

THE uncertainty in which your silence left the government, from the 20th of Vendemiaire, has just been suc-

ceeded by a very lively satisfaction on the arrival of citizens Berthier and Monge. * * * * *

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To the impetuosity of victory you have added the moderation of true courage and the wisdom of negotiation. If you had only been able to win battles, you would only have been a great general; buf you have aspired to a nobler title, and have made yourself a civic general. Let this glorious name, then, be your first recompense!

The Executive Directory has another in store for you, which it thinks also worthy of you; that of putting the last hand to the grand work you have so far advanced. You will see, in the first place, by the documents subjoined to this letter, that on quitting the command of the Army of Italy as soon as circumstances will allow, you are to take that of the Army of England. This denomination itself will sufficiently indicate to you the *perfect analogy of the ulterior views of the Executive Directory to those which you yourself have announced.*

(The following paragraph informs him of his nomination to the functions of president of the plenipotentiaries of the French Republic to the Congress of Rastadt, and invites him to repair thither as soon as possible, *as the general intrusted with the exchange of the ratifications and orders to be given for the evacuations to be made* (that of Mentz by the troops of Austria and the Empire) *according to the secret additional convention.*

" The commencement of the war of the second coalition had been heard of at the camp of Saint-Jean d'Acre." (*Historical Miscellanies*, Vol. II. p. 211.)

Note by the Editor.

The General-in-chief of the Army of the East had taken measures for carrying on his correspondence, at least with his family, over land and by way of Constantinople. The letters went to Berlin, whence they were addressed to the Dutch ambassador to the Porte, Baron Van Dedem Van Gelder, who despatched them by Tartar couriers. This correspondence was broken off after the expedition into Syria.

"NAPOLEON returned to France, 1st, because his instructions authorized him to do so; *he had carte-blanche in all respects.*" (*Historical Miscellanies*, Vol. II. p. 212.)

Note by the Editor.

Were the instructions of the General-in-chief of the Army of the East in writing, or verbal? This is not known. They are not to be found in the portfolios brought back from Saint-Helena. If they exist, the original is not in Europe. The various searches made in the registers of the Directory, and in public archives, to discover the minute, or copies of the instructions, have hitherto proved unsuccessful.

Had the General-in-chief *carte-blanche in all respects?* Every thing tends to prove that he had: 1st, The manner in which the decrees of the Directory relative to the Army of England are entered in the minute-book; contrary to the custom observed on all other subjects, they are without preamble. Appointments of agents of the Republic to Eastern princes, delivered by the Directory, with the name in blank, were countersigned by the Minister of exterior relations, and do not bear the signature of the

Secretary-general Lagarde, but that of François de Neufchateau, one of the directors.

2. The denomination of Army of England was retained by the Army of the East up to the period of its embarkation, so that the divisions embarked at Civita-Vecchia appeared to form its right wing, under the command of General Desaix.

3. The secrecy observed respecting this expedition. We have a letter from Admiral Brueys furnishing the plan of the attack of Malta, and requesting, a few weeks before the sailing of the expedition, to be informed of its real object; and a note from the Minister at war, Scherer, requesting the General-in-chief to *take him with him to the Directory, that he might at length learn the object of the grand preparations making on all sides.*

General Desaix was in the secret, and wrote from Rome declaring that this secret had not been divulged; Monge knew it, and wished to go with the expedition. General Moreau shared in the universal error. The subjoined letter, No. I., which was written by him to the Commander-in-chief Bonaparte, proves that on the 6th of Germinal, year VI. he was ignorant of the principal object of the expedition; and No. II., a letter from General Kleber to Moreau, shows that the latter had been initiated into this mystery at a subsequent period, but did not approve of the expedition.

It is, moreover, known, that from the 18th of Fructidor, after some misunderstandings between the General-in-chief Bonaparte and the Directory, and their reconciliation in Vendemiaire, in year VI., the ministers at war and of exterior relations were under the immediate command of General Bonaparte. Between this authority and *carte-blanche* on all matters, there is no great interval.

Napoleon declares it here; and we ought therefore to believe him.

Lastly. Before the expedition into Syria, he announces to the Directory, by his letter from Cairo of the 22d Pluviose, year VII., that he shall return to France, if the news of war between France and the Kings should be confirmed.* He must, therefore, have considered himself empowered to do so, by his written instructions, or rather by the extensive powers with which he was invested.

No. I.

LETTER from GENERAL MOREAU to GENERAL BONAPARTE, Commander-in-chief of the Army of England.

Paris, 5th Germinal, year VI. (March 27, 1798.)

CITIZEN GENERAL,

THERE are few Frenchmen who have not long been desirous of an invasion of England; and there are few who do not feel confident of the success of this expedition, since you have undertaken the command of it.

It is the duty of all who love their country, and who have acquired any experience in war, to impart to you every suggestion which they may think calculated to contribute to the success of this enterprise. I have accordingly thought it incumbent on me to communicate to you some reflections on this perilous scheme.

We cannot but be sensible that the superiority of our enemy's navy leaves us no chance of reaching his coasts except by a surprise. We ought, therefore, to contemplate the possibility of an interruption of the communica-

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* See Memoirs, Vol. II. p. 371.

tions of the army, after effecting its landing, with the fleet which is to transport it.

The greatest disadvantage which could arise from this circumstance would be a want of ammunition and military stores. It is needless to endeavour to convince you of the danger of such a deficiency, particularly with respect to the courage of the troops, which it might shake.

I think that if we were now to have the field-pieces with their appendages necessary for your army cast in our arsenals, of a calibre equal to that of the English, we might always hope, supposing the communication with the fleet to be intercepted, to procure ammunition by the captures that would be made, either in the arsenals or in battle.

I do not remember what are the English calibres; I think they are for three, six, and nine pounder balls, and their howitzers of five and seven inches; but they may easily be found at Douay, whither all the artillery taken from them by the Army of the North has been sent.

Without attempting to penetrate into your schemes, I presume you will avail yourself of the immense extent of coast which we possess in order to effect several debarkations, or at least to threaten them as well on the Irish as English coasts; they are menaced from the entrance of the Atlantic, at Brest, as far as the Texel in the North sea.

On the supposition that the expedition will sail from different ports, either to tend towards the same point and operate a single debarkation, or to attempt different attacks, it is indispensably necessary to establish so prompt a communication, that the distances of the several places of departure from each other may not interfere with the concert necessary for such an operation, either by ex-

posing a partial debarkation, which might not be supported by the rest, or by failing to produce the numerous diversions which are always requisite for a real attack.

The invention of telegraphs was never more appropriate than on this occasion; for posts carefully established along the coast from Brest to the Texel, would communicate orders with unparalleled celerity, secure the simultaneous sailing of all the fleets, and prevent the partial departures which the wind or other obstacles might allow in one port and render impossible in another.

I wish, Citizen General, that these reflections may be of use to you. I have my country's success too much at heart not to make it a duty to communicate to you whatever I may think conducive to the success of an expedition which, by securing a lasting peace to the Republic, will raise your personal glory to the highest pitch.

(Signed,) MOREAU.

No. II.

LETTER from GENERAL KLEBER to GENERAL MOREAU, at Paris.

Toulon, 29th Floreal, year VI. (May 19, 1798.)

I SHALL not be able, my dear Moreau, to write to you at length, until we are out at sea, and I am freed from the trouble and confusion of the embarkation. I have not a moment's leisure. The wind, which was favourable a few days ago, suddenly changed, and this disappointment gave an opportunity of making some alterations in the distribution of the troops; all which creates trouble and anxiety. At last the wind seems to be coming round, and if it continues thus we shall be at sea in three days. You must surely be acquainted with the secret of our expe-

dition. I have heard that you disapprove of it, which I was sorry to find; I could have wished that you had been less hasty in this respect. When one does the only thing there is to do, the operation is good, for the very reason that it was impossible to do better. But when, besides that, great results may be expected, it seems to me that we ought not to withhold our approbation. I shall explain myself better in my next letter, and, as I am somewhat remiss in writing, Baudot will be the person who will transmit to you my ideas and all I have to communicate.

I send Gaillard back to Paris. (*Here follow some domestic details.*)

Adieu, my dear Moreau, I hope the government will shortly be more just, and have sense enough to draw you from a retirement for which you were not made, by making use of your talents. Rely eternally on my attachment and sincere friendship.

(Signed,) KLEBER.

"The Duke d'Enghien, a young prince of distinguished bravery, resided within four leagues of the frontier of France." (*Historical Miscellanies*, Vol. II. p. 223.)

No. I.

LETTER from the FIRST CONSUL to the MINISTER AT WAR.

Paris, 19th Ventose, year XII. (March 10, 1804.)

YOU will please, Citizen General, to give orders to General Ordener, whom I place at your disposal for this purpose, to proceed post to Strasburg by night, travelling under an assumed name, and to see the General of the division.

The object of his mission is to advance on Ettenheim, surround that town, and bring off from thence the Duke d'Enghien, Dumouriez, an English colonel, and all other persons in their suite. The general of the division and the quarter-master of gendarmerie who has been to Ettenheim to reconnoitre the place, will give him all necessary information.

You will direct General Ordener to send from Schelestadt 300 men of the 26th dragoons, who will repair to Rheinau, where they will arrive at eight o'clock in the evening.

The commandant of the division will send fifteen pontooneers to Rheinau, who will likewise reach that place by eight o'clock in the evening, and who will, for that purpose, set out post, or on the horses of the light artillery. Besides the ferry-boat, he must previously have taken care that there be four or five large boats in readiness, so that three hundred horse may be carried over at a single trip.

The troops will take sufficient bread for four days, and provide themselves with cartridges. The General-of-division will add to them a captain or officer, and a lieutenant, with three or four brigades (thirty) of gendarmes.

As soon as General Ordener has passed the Rhine, he will proceed straight on Ettenheim, and march directly up to the houses of the Duke and Dumouriez; after completing this expedition, he will return to Strasburg.

In passing Luneville, General Ordener will order the officer of carabineers, who commanded the depôt at Ettenheim, to repair to Strasburg, there to wait for orders.

General Ordener, on reaching Strasburg, will very secretly despatch two agents either civil or military, and will make arrangements with them to come to meet him.

You will give orders, that on the same day, and at the same hour, 200 men of the 26th dragoons, under the command of General Caulaincourt (to whom you are consequently to give the necessary orders) shall proceed to Offenburg to surround that town and arrest the Baroness de Reich, if she has not been taken at Strasburg, and other agents of the English government, respecting whom the prefect, and citizen Mehée, now at Strasburg, will give him information.

From Offenburg, General Caulaincourt will direct patroles on Ettenheim, until he learns that General Ordener has succeeded. They will afford each other mutual assistance.

At the same time the General of the division will send 300 cavalry to Kelh, with four pieces of light artillery, and send a post of light cavalry to Willstadt, the intermediate point between the two routes.

The two generals will take care that the greatest discipline prevail, and that the troops require nothing from the inhabitants; for this purpose you will cause 12,000 francs to be paid them.

If it should happen that they cannot accomplish their mission, but should expect to fulfil it by remaining three or four days and sending out patroles, they are authorized to do so.

They will inform the baillies of the two towns, that if they continue to afford an asylum to the enemies of France, they will draw heavy calamities upon themselves.

You will order the commandant of Neuf Brisac to send 100 men and two pieces of cannon to the right bank.

The post of Kelh, as well as those of the right bank, will be evacuated the moment the two detachments have effected their return.

General Caulaincourt will have thirty gendarmes with him, and will, with General Ordener and the General of division, hold a council, and make such alterations in the present arrangements as may be deemed advisable.

Should it happen that neither Dumouriez nor the Duke d'Enghien remains at Ettenheim, an extraordinary courier is to be despatched with an account of the state of affairs.

You will give orders to arrest the post-master of Kelh and other individuals capable of giving information on the subject.

(Signed,) BONAPARTE.

No. II.

LETTER from the MINISTER AT WAR to GENERAL ORDENER.

Paris, 20th Ventose, year XII. (March 11, 1804.)

IN consequence of the arrangements made by government, placing General Ordener under the command of the Minister of War, he is ordered to set out post from Paris, immediately on the receipt of this order, and to proceed with all possible speed, and without stopping an instant, to Strasburg. He will travel under an assumed name. On reaching Strasburg he will see the General of the division. *The object of the mission is to go to Ettenheim, to surround the town, and to bring away the Duke d'Enghien, Dumouriez,* an English colonel, and all other individuals in their suite. The general commanding the fifth division, the quarter-master who has reconnoitred Ettenheim, and the commissioner of police, will give him all necessary information.

General Ordener will give orders to despatch 300 men of the 26th dragoons from Schelestadt who will proceed

to Rheinau, which place they will reach at eight o'clock in the evening. The commandant of the fifth division will send fifteen pontooneers to Rheinau, who are also to be there by eight o'clock in the evening, and for that purpose will set out post on horses belonging to the light artillery. Independently of the ferry-boat, he will have taken care to have four or five large boats there, in order to carry over 300 horse at one trip. The troops will take bread for several days, and will provide themselves with a sufficient quantity of cartridges. The General of the division will add a captain, a lieutenant of gendarmerie, and thirty gendarmes. As soon as General Ordener shall have passed the Rhine, *he will proceed straight to Ettenheim, and march directly to the house of the Duke d'Enghien and to that of Dumouriez.* After this expedition he will return by Strasburg. In passing Luneville, General Ordener will give orders to the officer of carbineers who commanded the depôt at Ettenheim, to go post to Strasburg, there to wait for orders. On reaching Strasburg, General Ordener will, with great secrecy, despatch two agents, either civil or military, and will appoint them to come to meet him. General Ordener is informed that General Caulaincourt is to set out with him on a separate duty. General Ordener will preserve the strictest discipline, and take care that the troops require nothing of the inhabitants. Should it happen that General Ordener could not fulfil his mission, but should expect to succeed by remaining three or four days and sending out patroles, he is authorized to do so. He will inform the baillie of the town that if he continues to afford an asylum to the enemies of France, he will draw great misfortunes upon himself. He will give orders to the commandant of New Brisac to send 100 men and two pieces of cannon over to

the right bank of the Rhine. The post of Kelh, as well as those of the right bank, are to be evacuated as soon as the two detachments shall have effected their return.

General Ordener, General Caulaincourt, and the general commanding the fifth division, will hold a council, and make such alterations in the present arrangements as they may deem expedient. Should it happen that neither Dumouriez nor the Duke d'Enghien is now at Ettenheim, General Ordener will send me an account of the state of affairs, by a courier extraordinary, and wait for fresh orders. General Ordener will require the commandant of the fifth division to have the postmaster of Kelh arrested, as well as all other persons capable of affording information.

I remit to General Ordener a sum of 12,000 francs for him and General Caulaincourt. General Ordener will require the general commanding the fifth division to send 300 cavalry with four pieces of light artillery to Kelh, whilst he and General Caulaincourt are engaged in their expedition. He will also send a post of light cavalry to Willstadt, the intermediate point between the two routes.

(Signed,) ALEXANDRE BERTHIER.

No. III.

COPY of the REPORT made by CITIZEN CHARLOT, Chief of the thirty-eighth squadron of National Gendarmerie, to GENERAL MONCEY, first Inspector-general of the Gendarmerie.

24th Ventose, year XII. (15th March, 1804.)

GENERAL,

IT is now two hours since I returned into this town from the expedition to Ettenheim in the Electorate of

Baden, whence, with a detachment of gendarmerie and a party of the 22d dragoons, I have, by the orders of Generals Ordener and Fririon, brought off the persons whose names are as follow :

Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duke d'Enghien;

General the Marquis de Thumery ;

Colonel the Baron Grunstein ;

Lieutenant Schmidt ;

The Abbé Wemborn, formerly proctor of the bishopric of Strasburg.

The Abbé Michel, Secretary to the bishopric of Strasburg, (beyond the Rhine) and Secretary to the Abbé Wemborn ; this latter is French, as Wemborn is.

The Duke d'Enghien's secretary, named Jacques.

Feraud (Simon) valet de chambre to the Duke.

Poulain (Pierre) servant to the duke.

Joseph Cannon, do.

The General Dumouriez, who was said to reside with Colonel Grunstein, is no other than the Marquis de Thumery abovementioned, who occupied an apartment on the ground-floor, in the house inhabited by Colonel Grunstein, whom I arrested at the Duke's house, where he had slept. I am indebted to the colonel for the honour of writing to you at this moment. The Duke being informed that his lodgings were surrounded, seized a double-barrelled gun, and levelled it at me as I was desiring several persons who were at the Duke's windows to open the door to me, and threatening that, if they did not, I would carry off the Duke by force. Colonel Grunstein prevented him from firing, by saying, " My Lord, have you involved yourself?" The latter having answered in the negative, " Well," said Grunstein, " all resistance is useless, for we are surrounded, and I perceive a great number of bayonets ; it appears that this is the commanding officer.

Recollect that by killing him you would ensure your own destruction and ours." I well remember hearing the words *This is the commanding officer;* but I was far from supposing my life in such imminent danger, as the Duke has since repeatedly declared to me it was. At the moment of the duke's apprehension, I heard a cry of fire! (a German signal.) I immediately went to the house in which I expected to arrest Dumouriez; and on my way I heard the cry of fire! repeated in several directions. I stopped a person who was going towards the church, probably to sound the tocsin; and at the same time I satisfied the inhabitants of the place, who were running out of their houses in consternation, by saying, " It is all by your sovereign's consent:" an assurance which I had already given to his Master of the Hunt, who had hastened to the Duke's lodgings on the first cries that were heard. On reaching the house in which I expected to seize Dumouriez, I arrested the Marquis de Thumery. I found this house in a state of tranquillity, which removed my anxiety, and invested as I had left it before I proceeded to the Duke's.

The other arrests were effected without noise. I made enquiries to ascertain whether Dumouriez had appeared at Ettenheim, and was assured that he had not. I presume the idea of his having been there must have arisen from confounding his name with that of General Thumery.

To-morrow I shall look into the papers which I have hastily brought off from the prisoners' houses, and shall then have the honour to make my report thereon to you. I cannot too highly applaud the firm and distinguished conduct of Quarter-master Pfersdorff in this affair. He is the person whom I sent the day before to Ettenheim, and who pointed out to me the lodgings of our prisoners:

he stationed all the vedettes, in my presence, at the outlets of the houses they occupied, and which he had reconnoitred the preceding day. At the moment when I was summoning the Duke to yield himself prisoner to me, Pfersdorff, at the head of several gendarmes and dragoons of the 22d regiment, penetrated into the house by the back part, by getting over the walls of the court-yard: these were the men perceived by Colonel Grunstein, at sight of whom he prevented the Duke from firing at me. I solicit, General, the brevet of a lieutenant for Quarter-master Pfersdorff, for which place he was proposed at the last review of the Inspector-general Wyrion. He is in all respects fit to be promoted to that rank. Generals Ordener and Caulaincourt will mention this sub-officer to you, and what they will say to you respecting him, leads me to hope that you will take into serious consideration the favour I ask of you for him. I have to add that this sub-officer has informed me that he was particularly seconded by the gendarme Henne, of the brigade of Barr. As Pfersdorff speaks several languages, I should hope his promotion would not remove him from the squadron.

The Duke d'Enghien has assured me that Dumouriez has not been at Ettenheim; that he might possibly, nevertheless, have been charged to bring him instructions from England; but that he should not have received him, because his rank did not allow of his holding communication with such people; that he esteemed Bonaparte as a great man, but that, being a prince of the house of Bourbon, he had vowed an implacable hatred against him, as well as against the French, with whom he would wage war on all occasions.

He is extremely fearful of being taken to Paris; and I

believe that, in order to carry him thither, he must be very vigilantly guarded. He expects that the First Consul will confine him, and says he repents his not having fired on me, as that would have decided his fate by arms.

The Chief of the 38th squadron of
National Gendarmerie,

(Signed,) CHARLOT.

No. IV.

COPY of a LETTER from GENERAL ORDENER, to the FIRST CONSUL.

Strasburg, 24th Ventose, year XII. (15 March, 1804.)

I HAVE the honour, General, to forward to you the procès verbal and the papers which were seized at the residence of the Duke d'Enghien. As fast as those of the other individuals are verified, General Caulaincourt will despatch them to you. Although my mission is fulfilled, I shall await your orders to return to Paris.

I salute you very respectfully.

(Signed,) ORDENER.

No. V.

LETTER from the MINISTER AT WAR.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

Paris, 21st Ventose, year XII. of the French Republic, one and indivisible (12th March, 1804.)

The MINISTER at WAR to Citizen CAULAINCOURT.

THE First Consul orders Citizen Caulaincourt, his aide-de-camp, to go post to Strasburg. He will there expe-

dite the building and launching of the light vessels constructing there for the navy. He will collect such information from the prefect and citizen Mehée, as will enable him to get the agents of the English government at Friburg and Offenburg arrested, particularly the Baroness de Reich, if she is not already in custody.

Captain Rosey, who is on a mission to the English ministers, and who possesses their full confidence, will give him all necessary information respecting the plots formed against the tranquillity of the state, and the safety of the First Consul.

Citizen Caulaincourt will inform the baillies of the towns of the right bank, that they may involve themselves in great calamities by harbouring persons who are endeavouring to disturb the tranquillity of France; and he will take measures, in concert with the general commanding the fifth military division, for employing, in case of need, a force sufficient for the execution of the present order.

He will render a particular account of Captain Rosey's commission to the First Consul.

The Minister at War.

(Signed,) ALEX. BERTHIER.

No. VI.

LETTER from the MINISTER OF EXTERIOR RELATIONS to GENERAL CAULAINCOURT.

Paris, 21st Ventose, year XII. (12th March, 1804.)

GENERAL,

I HAVE the honour to address to you a letter for Baron Edelsheim, Principal Minister to the Elector of

Baden; you will have the goodness to forward it to him as soon as your mission to Offenburg is accomplished. The First Consul instructs me to say, that if you lead no troops into the states of the Elector, and should learn that General Ordener has not caused any troops to enter his territories, this letter is to remain in your own hands, and not to be delivered to the Elector's minister. I am ordered to recommend you particularly to have Madame de Reich's papers seized, and to bring them with you.

I have the honour to salute you.

(Signed,) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. VII.

The MINISTER AT WAR to the GENERAL commanding the Fifth Division.

Paris, 20th Ventose, year XII. of the French Republic, (11th March, 1804.)

I HAVE to inform you, Citizen General, that General Ordener and General Caulaincourt are proceeding to Strasburg on missions of great importance; I order you, on your own responsibility, to perform all that may be required of you by General Ordener and General Caulaincourt, for the purpose of executing the mission with which they are charged; they will acquaint you with their instructions so far as you are concerned therein. You will likewise direct the *Ordonnateur* to comply, likewise, with all their demands for provisions.

You will likewise give orders for the movements of the troops, the artillery, and the boats.

(Signed,) ALEX. BERTHIER.

No. VIII.

(With three papers inclosed.)

A.

EXTRACT from the Supplement to the MONITEUR UNIVERSEL of Friday, 23d Germinal, year XII. of the Republic (April 13, 1804.)

REPORT of the Mission with which I was charged by the Counsellor of State, the Prefect of the Department of Bas-Rhin, to Mr. DRAKE, the English Minister at Munich.

On the 10th of Ventose, after having received from the Prefect of Bas-Rhin, M. Muller's instructions, I set out from Strasburg to wait on Mr. Drake, the English minister at Munich.

On the 13th I reached Augsburg, and sent him the letter, of which the following is a copy:

"SIR,

"I have been intrusted by M. Muller with a letter, which I am desirous to deliver into your own hands; will you have the goodness to inform me of the day and hour when it will be least inconvenient to you to receive me?

"I have the honour to be, &c."

On the morning of the 17th, having received no answer, I set out for Munich. On my arrival, I addressed the following letter to Mr. Drake:

"SIR,

"During my stay of four days at Augsburg, I had the honour to address two letters to you; I presume that

you have not received them, as I am without an answer. Do me the favour, Sir, to inform me at what hour I may hope to deliver to you personally, the letter with which Mr. Muller has intrusted me.

"I have the honour to be, &c."

Immediately on the receipt of this letter, he sent to request me to come to his house immediately, saying he was waiting for me.

I presented myself to Mr. Drake as a chief of battalion, aide-de-camp to a republican general, and presented my credentials to him, of which the following is the tenour:

"SIR,

"The bearer of this note is the person whom the company had the honour to address to you, through me, a few days since.

"He possesses the entire confidence of those by whom he is sent, and I beg you to consider what he will say, as the sincere expression of their sentiments.

"The commission, which will be most agreeable to him, is unquestionably that which he has expressly received, to communicate to you the devotedness of the company: permit me, Sir, to add the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be,

"Sir,

"Your very humble and obedient servant,

(Signed,) "MULLER."

After reading this letter, he asked me what was the news from France, and how things were going on there? I answered, that the hour of triumph for the jacobins was now arrived; that it was the general opinion, that, unless

they renounced all thoughts of any attempt against the government, they would never find a more favourable opportunity than that which now presented itself.—"What can I do for you? speak. What are your views? What do you hope to accomplish? Have your general and committee any particular project?"

Perceiving this to be a favourable moment, I presented him my plan (the same which is contained in the minute of my instructions); after having read it attentively thrice, he said, "This plan is a very good one; but I do not see many fortified places amongst those which you mention: yet that is what should particularly engage your attention."

I named the *place d'armes* of Besançon and its citadel; representing that this place was very strong, and that we were certain of finding a great quantity of artillery and stores of every kind there. "Have you horses for your artillery?"—"We have already secured them."—"Very well; but take care not to be too hasty; do not strike until you are sure of your blow; in case of failure, however, you might retire into the mountains of the Jura; there you would find a secure retreat, and might defend yourselves a long time, during which, the other departments, in which you have already formed connexions, would make diversions in your favour." After a moment's meditation, he went for his map to examine what German town is nearest to one of those we are to occupy, where he might be most conveniently situated for speedy communication with us, and for assisting us by all means in his power. "This plan," said he, "merits my utmost attention; I approve highly of it; to-morrow and the following day I shall employ myself in writing to your general, and I doubt not but you will carry him a satisfactory answer."

Mr. Drake then mentioned Pichegru to me; I asked whether he thought he was still in France. "Certainly not," said he; "I know him well; he is a man of merit, but too cool and too steady to have engaged so rashly in such an enterprise. Rest assured that he is at this moment in London, and say so wherever you go. As to Georges, I know most positively that he cannot be at Paris, for I have received letters from persons at London who had seen him there just before they wrote."

I informed him of the rumours of Continental war which were in circulation; I represented such an event as the most dreadful and fatal to the Jacobins, as it would firmly establish the government for ever. To this he replied: "There are strong grounds for hoping that Russia will be prevailed on to declare against France."

He conversed at great length on the scheme of an invasion of England, and, whilst he lavished opprobrious expressions on the First Consul, he could not entirely conceal the fear with which the idea of the invasion, and the enterprising genius of the French army, inspired him.

He spoke much of M. Muller. I answered, according to my instructions, that I had never seen him, &c. and that I was perfectly certain that he had set out for the army of the Coasts on a very important mission. He smiled, with an air of satisfaction, and said:

"When I heard of Moreau's arrest, I instantly wrote to M. Muller, to desire him to come to me, desiring that my letter might be forwarded to him wherever he might be, because I judged that this circumstance would be favourable: I do not understand this delay; but I am certain that he is in Germany, for a friend of mine writes that he saw and spoke to him there; in short, I expect him every day; I hope to see him very shortly."

" —— I am glad to have an opportunity of telling you that citizen Muller does not enjoy the greatest confidence; he seldom goes to the committees. They complain bitterly that he does not explain himself sufficiently."—"With respect to that, I beg you will tell your general that he is not to blame. When I sent him into France, it was absolutely only to arrange a correspondence, and not to remain there, as he has done; for he ought to have returned above two months ago: he himself has written to me mentioning all you state, and even more, for he says the committee accused him of having received funds for another revolutionary committee. I assure you, I know no other committee. The reason I have sent no more money is, I tell you candidly, because I did not see very clearly into the plans ofyour committee: some time ago I received letters, stating that four departments might be induced to rise, and that I must send them a plan, although I did not know their resources, or what they were able to effect. The case is now different; I see clearly into it; and I shall be very ready and willing to assist you with all the pecuniary resources at my disposal; you may rely upon me; so come and dine with me on Friday at four o'clock, and you will find your despatches ready."

On Friday, I again presented myself at Mr. Drake's, who received me in the most gracious manner. " Your papers are ready; I have written to your general; I dare say he will be satisfied with me. The writing is not apparent; but I presume your general has the recipe; if he has not, M. Muller will give it: you will again advise him not to be too hasty, for my first idea was to wait until B..... had set out for Boulogne, and was upon the point of embarking. You will represent to your general the necessity of possessing himself of Alsace, particu-

larly of Huninguen and the citadel of Strasburg. Ah! if you could obtain Huninguen and the citadel of Strasburg, what a stroke it would be! I could draw nearer to you, and give you pecuniary assistance from time to time; there would be no delay in our operations; we should act in concert together, and things would go on infinitely better; it will also be important to have a very strong party at Paris, for, without that, all the rest is nothing. You must get rid of B..... (I confess that at this moment I was fearful of being betrayed by the violent indignation which agitated me.) He continued; "That is the surest way to obtain your liberty, and to make peace with England. One thing which I again recommend to your general, is to put all parties in motion: all ought to be equally eligible to you, royalists, jacobins, &c. &c., except the friends of B..... whom you must not trust, for fear of being betrayed. Your general must also distrust the proclamations which the First Consul will not fail to put in circulation. When you have commenced your revolt, he will say that trifling insurrections have taken place in such and such provinces; but that they are already quelled; and that to intimidate the other departments and prevent them from acting. It was thus that he extinguished the war of la Vendée: a report was spread that Georges was arrested; order was universally restored: and the same use will now be made of Pichegru's name, as was made of that of Georges, for, although the gazette of this day mentions his apprehension, I do not believe a word of it. It is easy to arrest some unfortunate man and say, it is Pichegru."

"It will be important that you should tell your general to point out to me, as soon as possible, one or two towns into which I may send confidential persons; they will

have money at your general's disposal, when he wants it. He will send some one with one of the cards I now send him (they are numbered up to four). 2 or 3000 louis may be remitted at a time; I suppose gold will suit him best: for I cannot send bills on Paris without exciting suspicion. You will, however, deliver him these four bills of exchange, amounting to 9,990 francs or 10,114 livres, 17 sous, 6 deniers: that is all the paper I could procure on Paris. I have just written to Mr. Smith at Stuttgard, desiring him to collect as much cash as possible. You will yourself put the letter into the post at Kanstad, that operations may not languish for want of money: but if you can wait till Wednesday, you may take a more considerable sum with you." I told him that my general had expressly commanded me to return immediately, and that it was impossible for me to wait. "If your general sends you again, or any other persons, you will tell him to address them to me directly. There will always be apartments ready for them. I reside out of town, purposely, for I am surrounded by spies here; every step I take is watched."

"Apropos," replied I; "I forgot to tell you that it is reported here that you are about to quit this town and return to England; it is said you are recalled by your government." "There is such a report; but this is what gave rise to it: some time ago, I had my house furnished; I desired my upholsterer to send me an inventory of the goods he had supplied me with, and hence it was supposed that I was going away: but rest satisfied, my friend, this news is false."

He let me out by a little private door, and accompanied me as far as the gate of the town, telling me he hoped he should soon hear from my general.

Such were the expressions used by Mr. Drake, in the conversation we had together relative to my mission.

The plan or letter of Mr. Drake, written in sympathetic ink; the letter which was addressed to me under the name of Lefebvre; the receipt of the postmaster of Kanstadt for the letter addressed to Mr. Smith at Stuttgard, the four bills of exchange, and the present report, have been transmitted to the prefect.

Strasburg, 25th Ventose, year XII.

(Signed,) ROSEY,
Adjutant-major, Captain in the 9th Regiment of Infantry of the Line.

EXTRACT from the Supplement to the MONITEUR UNIVERSEL of Friday, 23d Germinal, year XII. of the Republic. (April 13, 1814.)

REPORT of the Mission with which I was charged by the Counsellor of State, the Prefect of the Department of Bas-Rhin, to MR. FRANCIS DRAKE, Minister from England at Munich.

ON the 4th of Germinal I reached Munich, at six o'clock in the evening, and alighted at Mr. Drake's, the minister from England; he lodged me in his house in a chamber on the ground-floor, under his own apartment, as we had agreed at the time of our first interview. Jacobin as he supposed me to be, he received me with studied politeness; I delivered the letter from my pretended general, requesting him to answer it immediately, which he did the following day. As this answer may be said to contain all the principal particulars of our conversation, I shall confine myself to a succinct statement of our interview.

Mr. Drake asked me the news from France, and how things were going on; I replied, that events had never

been more favourable to us; that the arrests of different royalists, which had taken place, threw an impenetrable screen over our secret plans, and that we had rejoiced to see that no Jacobin had been arrested, &c. &c.

"I think as you do," answered Mr. Drake, "that you are safe from all suspicion, and I have no doubt but that your aim will be the more certain; but remember to repeat to your general that it is essential to combine all parties in the first operations he undertakes; it is necessary for him to have an imposing mass to oppose to the First Consul; he may make an advantageous use of the royalist party." I observed to Mr. Drake, that my general was perfectly of his opinion, but that the committee could not make up their minds to associate a party so contrary to their principles in so noble a cause. "Nevertheless make use of them;" said he, as we walked in his garden; "and when you have overthrown B....., it will be very easy for you to purify yourselves from all that do not belong to your party, as you did several times in the Revolution."

I was obliged to recollect all the importance of the task imposed on me, and the utility of which my mission might be to my country, to repress the sentiment of indignation to which I was near giving way; I felt the strongest inclination to make myself known, under my true name, to this wretch, and to demand instant satisfaction at the point of the sword, for all the evil he had dared to speak and to imagine. However I restrained my feelings. The conversation flagged; Drake soon resumed it.

"Remember, said he, to enforce the idea I suggested to your general in a letter: an increase of pay must be promised to the regiments on which you can rely; I will furnish the means of supporting this expense for several

months, after which you will be able to provide for it yourselves, by means of the property you will confiscate, belonging to persons not of your party.

" I could have wished that your general had waited a little longer before he commenced operations; but as he thinks it a favourable moment, he must by all means possess himself of the fortress of Huninguen, which is not far distant from the centre of your operations. I intend to take up my residence at Friburg, to be at hand to afford you prompt and certain succours; as for the citadel of Strasburg, it must no longer be thought of; it is too far off.

" I presume your general has taken care to form a powerful party in the army, to operate a diversion; for without that B..... might contend against you with advantage. It is necessary to calculate beforehand all the resources he possesses to oppose you with, in order to render all his efforts fruitless.

" But take advantage, at the proper moment, of the consternation into which the rest of his partisans will be thrown. Crush them without pity; pity is misplaced in politics."

Mr. Drake urgently required that my general should immediately send back M. Muller to him. " He is indispensably necessary to me. I want him to inform me of what is passing, and to make me acquainted with those who are of your party; for otherwise, I should not be in a situation to justify myself to my government, which will require me to communicate the names of the principal parties, when such considerable sums as it will be necessary to supply you with are in question. I therefore insist on your general's sending M. Muller back to me."

Mr. Drake then delivered to me a sum of 74,976 livres

in gold: "This is all I can do for you at the present moment," said he, "but I send you to Mr. Spencer Smith at Stuttgard, who will give you a larger sum. Here is a letter for him, and a passport as an English courier charged with our despatches for Cassel; as such, you will not be obliged to present yourself before the French envoy, who has spies upon all our steps: you will say nothing to Mr. Smith respecting what passes between us; you may, however, satisfy his curiosity respecting the news from France."

I then took leave of Mr. Drake, on Monday the 5th inst., got into a post-chaise which was brought to the door of my hotel at half past ten at night, and set out for Stuttgard. I reached that city on Wednesday the 7th, at half-past one in the afternoon, in the character of a courier from England. I took up my lodgings at the Golden Hunting Horn, and desired a boy belonging to the house to shew me the way to Mr. Spencer Smith's, where I was announced under the name of Lefebvre. He received me, at first, with distrust, and in the coldest manner possible; I handed him Mr. Drake's letter. He no sooner found who I was, than he overwhelmed me with civilities, entreating me to excuse the ill reception he had given me at first: "The fact is," said he, "I am by no means in safety here, I assure you. For several days I have received nobody but with a pistol in my hand. I am not on a bed of roses; far from it. I consider myself as an advanced post, and I declare to you that were B..... to require my apprehension, the Elector of Wurtemberg (although his wife is an English princess) would give me up to him without any warning to me; for he already suspects what I am about here, and is fearful lest it should compromise him with the Consul."

He made very particular inquiries about the affairs of France, and told me that the apprehension of the Duke d'Enghien had greatly disconcerted him; that he was deeply interested for Pichegru, on whose mission England had justly founded great hopes, as a man equally popular and able. "I knew him well," he repeated with great emotion; "I was privy to the affair, for it was my brother's lieutenant who landed him on the coast of France. I was in hopes that he would contrive to escape; but we must no longer think of that, for it appears certain that he is arrested."

He earnestly requested that in passing through Strasburg I would write a letter to Madam Franck, Banker, requesting her to forward to him without delay all letters she might have received addressed to Baron Herbert, a German officer. "She may send them to me," said he, "under the feigned address of M. the son of George Henry Keller, banker, Stuttgard. I would give any thing to have them; they ought to contain information respecting Pichegru." He also requested me to make inquiries about Madam Henriette de Tromelin, whose husband he had known at Constantinople. This emigrant was to have been in the neighbourhood of Brest at this time.

He was so excessively obliging as to inform me that his *nom de guerre* was Leblond; and he appeared to pride himself on the reputation for intrigue which he assured me he had attached to that name.

This Mr. Smith's secretary is an emigrant named Pericaud, secretary to the ex-bishop of Seez. M. Pericaud entertained me a long time with his doleful harangues, and the most atrocious abuse of the chief of the French nation; he appeared much alarmed and agitated. "Mr. Spencer Smith," said he, "is a minister; but I, as

an emigrant, should have nothing to say for myself. The police of France might apprehend me, as it has apprehended the emigrants carried off from Ettenheim, or the Bishop of Chalons, whose arrest has been effected at Munich."

Mr. Drake, Mr. Spencer Smith, and Mr. Pericaud, all took care to inform me that they should find Munich and Stuttgard very dull, were it not for the occupation they derive from the affairs of France. They boast of being able to draw considerable sums on the English government. "Tell your friends to put confidence in us," said Mr. Spencer Smith; "there are bills of exchange for 113,150 livres. I will send them whatever they may want, but, in God's name, let them strike home." In pronouncing these last words he presented me a pair of pistols from the manufactory of arms at Versailles, saying: "You may make a good use of them; such little friends as these never fail one." I hesitated a moment, whether to accept them; but I presently felt the necessity of not giving up the part I was acting, and of completing my mission. I considered myself as an officer of engineers or artillery, who gets into an enemy's town in disguise to reconnoitre. He assumes any mask; he suppresses his sensibility, and regards nothing but his general's orders, and the object of his mission.

He was also to deliver me a sum of money in gold, and every thing was arranged for that purpose; but just as he was about to deliver it, he received the Manheim newspaper, in which was an extract from the Moniteur, and from Mr. Drake's correspondence. Mr. Smith now hesitated, and I took care not to urge this point.

Before I left Mr. Smith, a person of the name of Lienhard, an emigrant in the pay of England, came in the

name of his disconsolate comrades to request assistance and protection. "They will no longer tolerate us," said he, "in the electorate of Baden; we are every where driven out, and we know not whither to fly for refuge."

The English minister at first suspected that this was a French agent sent by the police, with papers found on some person who had been arrested, and who was come to sound him, and draw admissions and information from him.

I could not help telling him, laughing, that he ought to be on his guard against such emissaries; and that it was very probable that the police of Strasburg would send him some that he would not suspect. "Oh!" said he, "it will not be the first time I have had such tricks attempted; I shall be ready for them."

These are precisely the expressions used by the English ministers in my conversations with them.

I took leave of Mr. Spencer Smith on the 9th inst.: he sent for post horses for me, which were brought by one of his servants, and put to my chaise at four o'clock in the afternoon. I reached Strasburg on the following day, the 10th, and travelled on towards Paris, where I arrived on the 14th.

I should in vain attempt to describe the hatred and furious animosity of these monsters towards our country. It is the object of their existence to arm us against each other. There is no employment so vile or atrocious that they will not undertake; but at the same time it would be difficult to find more cowardly wretches. The shadow of a brave man would make them sink into the earth. They pass their lives in hatching plots; and, by a natural retribution justly attached to guilt, they constantly fancy themselves surrounded with snares and dangers. Whether they are not looked upon with a favourable eye

in these courts which are friendly to France, and under such important obligations to the First Consul; or whether they have been found out by the inhabitants of the towns in which they reside, and perceive that public opinion is against them; or whether, in short, an internal voice incessantly repeats to them that the man who respects nothing is entitled to no respect,—they seem bent under the weight of public contempt, and already blasted by the indelible infamy which must ever attach to their names. (Signed,) Rosey, Adjutant-major in the 9th Regiment of Infantry of the Line.

B.

Extract from the Moniteur Universel of Wednesday the 21st of Germinal, year XII. of the Republic (11th April, 1814).

Munich, April 3 (13th Germinal).

Mr. Drake behaved with insolence and audacity, and put himself in a violent passion on account of the last order of his Excellent Highness, by which the emigrants were expelled from Bavaria. He demanded, in his note, whether the emigrants under the immediate protection of England, would also be obliged to remove? and whether the guarantee of his Britannic Majesty's agents, for their conduct, would not be accepted? But his tone was speedily changed. His Excellent Highness, having received communications from Paris relative to the base and shameful plot of this minister, caused the annexed note to be sent to him.

It might have been expected that Mr. Drake would

dispute the authenticity of the documents produced against him. But he took the matter differently; he persuaded himself that sixteen gendarmes had set out post from Strasburg to apprehend him. He therefore informed M. Montgelas, the Bavarian minister, that, inhabiting a detached house at the extremity of the suburbs of Munich, he did not consider himself in safety, and was apprehensive of the attempts of the French police. He therefore desired such protection as might remove his anxiety.

But as several hours elapsed, and no answer arrived from court, the disorder of his conscience communicated to his brain; he took it into his head, that the sixteen gendarmes had reached the next post; and he set out on foot, without taking leave, or even waiting for his carriage; he walked three leagues by the cross road, and it was three hours before his carriage overtook him. He has disappeared by leaving his residence like a captain of banditti; but the indignation of Europe, and the contempt of all honest, religious, and sensible men in England, will follow him wherever he goes. Wretch that he must be, to dishonour and debase the character which civilized nations venerate, and which is respected even by the most savage hordes!

"The undersigned, Minister of State, and of his Serene and Excellent Bavaro-Palatine Highness's Conferences, has received express orders from His Serene and Excellent Highness to transmit to his Excellency, Mr. Drake, &c. the printed copy of the letters annexed, and to inform him that the originals of these letters, in Mr. Drake's own hand-writing, are now before him.

" H. S. E. H. is deeply concerned that the very place of his residence should have been made the theatre of a correspondence so foreign to the mission which his Excellency Mr. Drake was sent to his court to fulfil; and owes it to his dignity, his honour, and the interest of his subjects, to declare to his Excellency, that from this moment, it will be impossible for him to have any communication with Mr. Drake, or to receive him at his court.

" Two subjects of H. S. E. H., deeply implicated by Mr. Drake, have already been arrested at Munich, for having, at his instigation, engaged in transactions decidedly disapproved by the laws of nations.

" The undersigned is farther instructed to declare, that H. S. E. H. is too well acquainted with the noble and generous sentiments of His Britannic Majesty and of the English nation, to suppose, for an instant, that his conduct on this occasion can expose him to the slightest reproach. He will, without delay, explain himself on the subject directly to His Majesty, and deposit in his bosom the profound regret he feels in withdrawing his confidence from the minister charged to represent him at this court. The Elector is fully convinced that His Britannic Majesty will only see in this measure a fresh proof of the high opinion he has of His Majesty's character, and of his sense of the good will he has so often manifested towards the Electoral House.

(Signed,) " Baron Montgelas."

C.

EXTRACT from the MONITEUR UNIVERSEL of Wednesday the 21st of Germinal, year XII. of the Republic (11th April, 1814).

Stuttgard, April 3 (13th Germinal).

Mr. Spencer Smith, the English ambassador to the Elector of Wurtemberg, departed suddenly yesterday (Tuesday), after spending several hours in burning his papers. The Abbé Pericaud, who was placed with him at London by the Abbé Ratel, to organize the plots he was hatching in France, has fled with him.

It is publicly known here, that Mr. Spencer Smith had a mission relative to the internal disturbances in France; but we should never have imagined he would have disgraced his character so far as to engage in so infamous a plot as this last.

A few days ago, Spencer Smith forwarded a great number of bills of exchange on Paris; he likewise sent some on Zurich, which affords room to suspect that he was no stranger to the present commotions in Switzerland. What a system of public morals! what a government! good God! must that be, which avails itself of the privileges of diplomatic inviolability, to kindle disorder and crimes on every side! and employs the ministers representing its sovereign directly in the management of the most infamous plots.

No. IX.

SPECIAL Military Commission appointed in the First Military Division, by virtue of the Decree of Government dated 29th Ventose, year XII. of the Republic, one and indivisible.

JUDGMENT

IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

This day, the 30th of Ventose, in the 12th year of the Republic, the special military commission appointed in the first military division, by virtue of the decree of government, dated the 29th of Ventose, in the year XII, composed according to the law of the 19th of Fructidor in the year V. of seven members, that is to say: citizens Hulin, brigadier-general commanding the foot grenadiers of the guard, president;—Guiton, colonel, commanding the 1st regiment of cuirassiers;—Bazancourt, colonel, commanding the 4th regiment of light infantry;—Ravier, colonel, commanding the 18th regiment of infantry of the line;—Barrois, colonel, commanding the 96th regiment of infantry of the line;—Rabbe, colonel, commanding the 2d regiment of the municipal guard of Paris;—Dautancourt, captain-major of the gendarmerie *d'elite*, acting as captain-reporter;—and Mollin, captain, in the 18th regiment of infantry of the line, clerk; all nominated by the General-in-chief, Murat, governor of Paris, and commanding the first military division. Which president, members, captain-reporter, and clerk, are neither of kin or alliance to each other, or to the accused, within the degrees prescribed by law.

The commission convoked by order of the General-in-chief, governor of Paris, met in the castle of Vincennes,

in the apartments of the governor of the place, for the purpose of trying the person named Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, born at Chantilly, on the 2d of August, 1772; height 1 metre 705 millimetres; hair and eyebrows auburn; face oval, long, well made; eyes grey, approaching to brown; mouth middle-sized; nose aquiline; chin somewhat pointed, well made. Accused, 1st, of having borne arms against the French Republic; 2dly, of having offered his services to the English government, an enemy to the French people; 3dly, of having received and countenanced agents of the said English government, of having procured them means of establishing correspondences in France, and of having conspired with them against the internal and external safety of the state; 4thly, of having placed himself at the head of an assemblage of French emigrants and others, in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France, in the countries of Friburg and Baden; 5thly, of having established an intelligence in the fortress of Strasburg, tending to excite the surrounding departments to revolt, in order to operate a diversion in favour of England; 6thly, of being one of the abettors and accomplices of the conspiracy formed by the English against the life of the First Consul, and of having intended, in case that conspiracy had succeeded, to enter France.

The sitting being opened, the president ordered the reporter to cause all the documents to be read, as well those for the charge as those for the defence. The reading being concluded, the president ordered the guard to bring in the accused, who was introduced free and without irons before the commission. Being interrogated respecting his names, pre-names, age, place of birth and domicile, answered that his name was Louis Antoine

Henri de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, aged 32 years, born at Chantilly, near Paris, having left France on the 16th of July, 1789. After having interrogated the accused, by means of the president, on all the contents of the accusation against him; heard the reporter's report and conclusions, and the accused in his means of defence; after the latter had declared that he had nothing to add to his justification, the president asked the members whether they had any observations to make, and on their answering in the negative, and previously to taking their opinions, he ordered the accused to retire. The accused was reconducted to prison by his escort; and the reporter and the clerk, as well as the citizens present in the auditory, withdrew at the request of the president. The commission deliberating with closed doors, the president put the questions as follows:—Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, accused, 1st, of having borne arms against the French Republic, is he guilty? 2dly, of having offered his services to the English government, an enemy to the French people, is he guilty? 3dly, of having received and countenanced agents of the said English government, of having procured them means of establishing correspondences in France, and of having conspired with them against the internal and external safety of the state, is he guilty? 4thly, of having placed himself at the head of an assemblage of French emigrants and others, in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France in the countries of Friburg and Baden, is he guilty? 5thly, of having established an intelligence in the fortress of Strasburg, tending to excite the surrounding departments to revolt, in order to operate a diversion in favour of England, is he guilty? 6thly, of being one of the abettors and accomplices of the conspi-

racy formed by the English against the life of the First Consul, and of having intended, in case that conspiracy had succeeded, to enter France, is he guilty? The votes being separately collected on each of the above questions, beginning with the senior in rank, the president having delivered his opinion last:—the commission declares the person named Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, 1st, unanimously, guilty of having borne arms against the French Republic; 2dly, unanimously, guilty of having offered his services to the English government, an enemy to the French nation; 3dly, unanimously, guilty of having received and countenanced agents of the said English government, of having procured them means of establishing correspondences in France, and of having conspired against the internal and external safety of the state; 4thly, unanimously, guilty of having placed himself at the head of an assemblage of French and other emigrants in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France, in the countries of Friburg and Baden; 5thly, unanimously, guilty of having established an intelligence in the fortress of Strasburg tending to excite the surrounding departments to revolt, in order to operate a diversion in favour of England; 6thly, unanimously, guilty of being one of the abettors and accomplices of the conspiracy formed by the English against the life of the First Consul, and of having intended, in case that conspiracy had succeeded, to enter France. Upon which, the president put the question relative to the application of the punishment; the votes being again collected in the form above indicated:—The special military commission unanimously condemns to the punishment of death the person named Louis Antoine Henri de Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, in atonement of the crimes

of acting as a spy, of holding correspondence with the enemies of the Republic, and of attacking the internal and external safety of the Republic. The said penalty pronounced in conformity to Articles 2, Title iv. of the Military Code of offences and punishments of the 21st Brumaire, year V.; and 1st and 2d of Section II. of the 1st Title of the Ordinary Penal Code, of the 6th of October, 1791, conceived as follows, that is to say: Article 2, (of the 21st Brumaire, year V.) "Every individual, whatever may be his rank, quality, or profession, convicted of acting as a spy for the enemy, shall suffer the punishment of death." Article 1st. "Every plot and enterprise against the Republic shall be punished with death." Article 2d. (of the 6th of Oct. 1791.) "Every conspiracy and plot, tending to disturb the state by a civil war, by arming the citizens against each other, or against the exercise of lawful authority, shall be punished with death." Ordered that the captain-reporter do forthwith read this judgment to the condemned in presence of the guard assembled under arms. Ordered that the president and reporter be required to send copies thereof within the term prescribed by law, to the minister at war, the grand judge minister of justice, and the General-in-chief, Governor of Paris.

Adjudged and registered without separation, the day, month, and year before mentioned, in public sitting; and the members of the special military commission have signed, together with the reporter and clerk, the minute of the judgment.

(Signed,) GUITON, BAZANCOURT, RAVIER, BARROIS, RABBE. DAUTANCOURT, Captain-Reporter. MOLIN, Captain-clerk, and HULIN, President.

"The invasion of England was always regarded as practicable; and, if once the descent had been effected, London must infallibly have been taken. The French being in possession of that capital, a very powerful party would have arisen against the oligarchy * The flotillas were only the means of landing these 160,000 men in a few hours, and of occupying all the shallows. The passage would have been effected under the protection of a squadron assembled at Martinique, and coming thence full sail to Boulogne. If the plan of this rendezvous should fail one year, it might succeed another time. Fifty ships sailing from Toulon, Brest, Rochefort, l'Orient, and Cadiz, assembled at Martinique, would have arrived before Boulogne and secured the landing in England, whilst the English squadrons would have been traversing the seas to cover the Indies.

(*Historical Miscellanies*, Vol. II. p. 223.)

No. I.

BOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS AND ORDERS.

NAVY.

Instructions for Admiral Villeneuve.*

Pavia, May 8, 1805.

A. (First.)

Your fleet, composed of fourteen French and six Spanish ships, will be reinforced at Ferrol, by five other of

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* The object of the naval armaments of France, in 1804 and 1805, is here clearly explained. Napoleon ordered the Toulon squadron of twenty ships of the line, the Rochefort squadron of six ships, and the

our ships, and by nine ships belonging to the King of Spain, which will increase your force to nineteen of our ships and fifteen of those of the King of Spain.

We have five ships and three frigates in the roads of the Isle of Aix, and one ship and one frigate in l'Orient roads, all ready to set sail. We leave you at liberty to deviate from your course for the purpose of rallying these six ships to your squadron, if you should think fit, taking into consideration the state of the wind and other circumstances.

Should our Ferrol squadron be unable to put to sea for several days, you would consider that circumstance as a

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l'Orient squadron of two ships, to unite in the roads of Fort Royal, Martinique: they were to proceed to deblockade the Brest fleet, of twenty-one ships of the line, commanded by Admiral Gantheaume, and to enter the Channel, with or without an engagement with the English fleet, which could not assemble more than sixty-two ships of the line, and these were dispersed on twelve different stations. Admiral de la Touche Treville was at the head of the Toulon squadron, and was to take the command of the fleet off Brest. He died at Toulon on the 10th of August, 1804, and was succeeded by Admiral Villeneuve.

Spain declared war against England, and entered into a maritime convention with France, signed at Paris on the 5th of January 1805, by Admiral Gravina. The co-operation of the naval forces of Spain naturally produced a change in the first arrangements. The Rochefort squadron, under command of Admiral Miciessy, sailed from the roads of the Isle of Aix, on the 11th of January. It carried troops and had several missions, which it executed successfully in the course of the month which was allowed it for waiting for the Toulon fleet, and returned into the roads of the Isle of Aix, on the 20th of May. The Toulon squadron sailed on the 15th of January, met with several gales of wind, suffered some damage, and returned into port. On the 30th of March it sailed again, to the number of eleven ships, carrying from 5 to 6000 land troops, under the command of General Lauriston.

reason for presenting yourself before the Isle of Aix without loss of time, giving the Ferrol squadron orders to join you there, which it might easily do, as you would disperse the enemy's cruisers. If, on the contrary, the Ferrol squadron should have favourable weather for standing out and joining your flag, without suffering any delay, and the winds should be such as to afford you hopes of a rapid passage to your destination, it would, perhaps, be preferable to leave the Rochefort squadron, to avoid deviating from your course, as delay would certainly increase the strength of the enemy's cruisers before Brest.

You will therefore manœuvre to effect your junction with Admiral Gantheaume's squadron, anchored before

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It was to rally the Spanish squadron of Carthagena, of six ships, and that of Cadiz, of twelve or fifteen. On the 9th of April it had only been joined at Cadiz by one French ship of the line, and six Spanish ships, commanded by Admiral Gravina. It reached Martinique on the 14th of May. To increase the forces of Admiral Villeneuve, and in expectation of the return of the Rochefort squadron into port, Rear-admiral Magon sailed from the roads of the Isle of Aix, on the 1st of May, with four new ships, carrying fresh instructions to Admiral Villeneuve. He rallied him in time, in the roads of Fort Royal at Martinique.

The Brest fleet, under Admiral Gantheaume, attempted to get out from the anchorage of Bertheaume on the 27th of March. The English fleet had been reinforced, and never left its station during the whole of the month of April.

It was under these circumstances, in consequence of the letters of Admiral Villeneuve and General Lauriston, received at Stupiniz, on the 22d of April, and according to the modifications of the original plan, that the two papers of instructions, dated from Pavia on the 8th of May, were drawn up.

It is superfluous to add that the greatest secrecy was observed, and that the book of orders and the correspondence are, for the most part, of Napoleon's hand-writing or dictation.

the entrance of the harbour, under the protection of the strong batteries we have had constructed between Bertheaume and Camaret. For the last month the signals have announced the enemy's numbers, sometimes at fifteen, sometimes at eighteen, and never at more than twenty sail. It is our intention that you should effect your junction without fighting, if possible; but that if you are constrained to engage, you should fight as near Brest as possible, in order that Admiral Gantheaume may take part in the action. We expect that, in your passage from Ferrol to Brest, you will have to change your course, in order to avoid falling in with the cruisers off Brest, if they should think proper to advance fifteen or twenty leagues to meet you. In your last deviation from your course, you ought to steer for Lizard Point, so as to avoid meeting the enemy, or at least to meet him as near Brest as possible.

Your junction with Admiral Gantheaume's squadron being effected, and reinforcing you with twenty-one good ships, your forces will be much more considerable than those which the enemy can bring to oppose you, and you will steer for Boulogne, where we shall be in person.

Of all the operations proposed, this appears to us the preferable one, as the most certain. But if, on your arrival off Lizard Point, favourable winds or other circumstances should lead you to consider it possible for you to enter the Channel, to gain several days upon the enemy's squadron off Brest, and to arrive off Boulogne three or four days before it, we leave you at liberty not to approach Brest, but to make for Boulogne. If your presence gives us the command of the sea, off Boulogne, for three or four days, we shall have it in our power to effect our expedition, with 160,000 men embarked in 2000 vessels.

Cherburg is in a state of defence, and able to contain your squadron and protect it against any description of force. We have provisions for your squadron at Brest, Cherburg, and Boulogne.

We place the most perfect reliance on your zeal, experience, and perfect knowledge of the sea and of the localities of the places in which you are intended to act, trusting that you will do whatever appears to you conducive to the accomplishment of the object we have in view.

From our knowledge of the distribution of the enemy's forces, we have reason to think that with a squadron of more than sixteen ships of war, we should have the absolute command of the sea off Boulogne, supposing the Brest squadron to have been passed by, and left behind.

Our Minister of marine is instructed to write to you at length, to recommend to you all possible precautions for securing Admiral Gantheaume's being informed of all your motions, both on your departure from Ferrol and on your reaching the latitude of Brest.

B. (Second.)

The direction you will have to take immediately after your departure from Ferrol, depends on so many different circumstances, that all I can do is to rely upon your naval experience and your zeal for my service. In fact, so many events have taken place since your departure from Martinique, that the strength of the enemy's squadrons which you drew into America, the strength of the Ferrol squadron, of the enemy's cruisers off that port, and the situation of your armament, are all necessary to be known before any positive instructions can be given for your farther destination.

The principal object of the whole operation is to pro-

cure us the command of the sea off Boulogne for a few days. Were we masters of the Straits for four days, the expedition would be fully effected by 160,000 men on board of 2000 vessels. To accomplish this grand object, you would, on your arrival at Ferrol, have the choice of four modes of proceeding.

The first would be, to steer for Rochefort, and off that port to join the five ships I have in those roads; I have sent instructions to the ship Regulus, which is at l'Orient, to join you: thus with twenty-five French and fifteen Spanish ships, you would have to effect your junction with the Brest squadron, and then to enter the Channel with upwards of sixty sail of the line.

The second plan would be, to leave the Rochefort squadron, which engages an equal number of the enemy's ships, and to make for Brest with all possible despatch, to effect your junction with Admiral Gantheaume.

The third course is, after your junction with the Ferrol squadron, to double Ireland, to join the Texel squadron, consisting of seven sail and the convoy, and to make for Boulogne.

The fourth seems to be, to shape your course for Lizard Point, and, when thirty leagues out at sea, to avail yourself of a West wind to sail along the English coast, avoid falling in with the fleet that is blockading Brest, and arrive off Boulogne four or five days before it. For each of these operations you will be sufficiently supplied with provisions, taking into the account those you will find on board of the French and Spanish ships, and at Rochefort; and having long since foreseen your expedition, I have collected a great quantity beforehand at Brest, Cherburg, and Boulogne.

If you determine on the plan of effecting your junction

with the Brest squadron, you should endeavour to do it without an engagement; and if that should be too difficult, make your arrangements so as to fight as near Brest as possible; and for this purpose you must deceive the enemy by changing your course, if on hearing of your appearance at Ferrol, he resolves to sail twenty leagues to meet you. But if you adopt the plan of doubling Ireland, you should pass out of sight of the coasts, and keep your voyage as much as possible unknown to the enemy, who will for a time believe you have returned into the Mediterranean, which report, care will be taken to spread by all possible means. Admiral Gantheaume, with twenty-one ships, victualled for six months, is anchored without the entrance of the harbour between Bertheaume and Camaret, under the protection of batteries of upwards of one hundred and fifty guns. The moment he finds you have reached Ferrol, he will get under sail; he is in a better position for standing out to sea than he could have been any where within the channel of the harbour.

In case you should prefer your junction with Brest, you would take care to give notice of your intention, by brigs which you would despatch to the nearest coast to Brest, with an officer who must be ordered not to lose a moment in proceeding to Admiral Gantheaume.

If you double Ireland, you will go to the Texel; positive instructions have been sent thither, as well as information of the state of the enemy's forces in those latitudes.

Should you, in consequence of events which may have taken place in America, or in the course of your voyage, find yourself not in a situation to fulfil these instructions, or to attempt any new operation, you will despatch Admiral Gourdon's squadron, with three or four of the Spanish

ships that sail best, from Ferrol*, to cruize, according to the annexed instructions: our intention is that you should raise the blockade of Rochefort, give the annexed instructions to the German captain, whom you must enable to sail; and, that being done, return with my squadron and the Ferrol ships to Cadiz; protect the entrance of the Carthagena squadron into that port, occupy the Straits, ravage the roads, of Gibraltar, and supply yourself there with provisions.

I should deeply regret the procrastination of our important expedition on account of the circumstances last alluded to, or even of any actions you may have had with inferior forces, or any accidents of separation, or other occurrences. I have endeavoured, however, to provide for the measures you would have to adopt, in case of events which I cannot calculate upon, or have any knowledge of.

Note by the Editor.

These instructions had been modified, and the modifications were forwarded to Admiral Villeneuve by the Topaz frigate. They directed him to repair to Brest, after having rallied the Ferrol fleet and the squadron under Rear-admiral Lallemand, composed of five French ships, and the Regulus, a seventy-four, which he would find at Vigo, where he was to terminate his cruize to the West of Ireland. Admiral Villeneuve, with his fleet of twenty sail, would have been joined by eleven French and five Spanish ships from Ferrol, and the six from Vigo, making

* Admiral Gourdon's squadron, of five French sail of the line, had already been blockaded in the port of Ferrol, for some time, by the English fleet under Admiral Calder.

a total of forty-two. He would have entered the Channel, after raising the blockade of Brest roads, and receiving Admiral Gantheaume's fleet of twenty-one sail. Thus sixty-three ships of the line, French and Spanish, would have appeared off Boulogne, had not their number been diminished by engagements and unforeseen events. (*Register of Orders, &c.* Milan, May 9.)

Up to that period these arrangements had been attended with success.

Miciessy's squadron, which sailed from Rochefort on the 6th of January, was not pursued or sought for, until Admiral Cochrane sailed in quest of it, in pursuance of orders from the English Admiralty, dated the 10th of February. This admiral was off Lisbon on the 4th of March, at the Cape Verd islands on the 15th, and at the Antilles on the 30th of April. Admiral Miciessy had sailed from Saint Domingo a month before, on the 30th of March. Cochrane joined Lord Nelson on the 10th of June, with only three ships.

Nelson was intrusted with the blockade of Toulon roads. At the time of Admiral Villeneuve's first sailing, he was persuaded that the destination of this squadron was Egypt; he went to the Western coast of Sicily, to wait for it; he persisted obstinately in this opinion; and it was at Naples that he first heard of Villeneuve's sailing for the second time. He went to look for him in the seas of Syria and Egypt, returned and resumed his station West of Sicily, and was not in sight of Gibraltar until the end of April. On the 11th of May he sailed from the bay of Lagos for the Antilles, and arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th of June, with ten ships, after great fatigue.

Admiral Ord, who was watching the ports of Carthagena and Cadiz, abandoned his cruising station and the

Straits, without taking in provisions, and proceeded to join the Channel fleet.

The ports of Ferrol and Rochefort were successively deblockaded, and the English ships on those stations rejoined the Channel fleet before Brest, which then became superior to Admiral Gantheaume's fleet, who could not quit the roads of Bertheaume and Brest.

Thus the project of the invasion of England was seconded by fortune and by the consequences of the feeble composition of Mr. Pitt's last administration, and of the necessity he lay under to make himself popular, which had induced him to provoke a maritime war with Spain. The English system of blockades was now decried and seen to be useless and dangerous. The advantages of the lead which Napoleon had taken in the naval campaign continued on his side, and displayed themselves in the most striking manner. Napoleon and his Minister of marine, Vice-admiral Decrés, to whose energy, talents, and industry, justice has been rendered too late, shewed very superior views and resources to those of Mr. Pitt and the English admiralty.

Unfortunately for France, the execution of these plans, which could only be confided to naval men, was exactly the reverse of the calculations and arrangements. Lord Nelson, an admiral of the most daring resolution, corrected the errors arising from the unskilfulness of the ministry which employed him. Admiral Villeneuve, whom Napoleon had already accused of a want of resolution, at the time of the battle of Aboukir, (*Memoirs of Napoleon*, vol. II. p. 190.) and who, in General Lauriston's report from Corunna, dated the 3d of August, was contrasted with Admiral Gravina, "who is all genius and de-

cision in battle," (*Book of Instructions and Orders of Napoleon—Navy,*) spoiled the operations intrusted to his management, executing his instructions and orders weakly or injudiciously.

On returning into the European seas, Admiral Villeneuve had an engagement with Admiral Calder, on the 22d and 23d of July, fifty leagues from Cape Finisterre. He could not avoid this action, but did not avail himself of the advantages he possessed. He was blamed by Napoleon, who gave orders that Admiral Gantheaume should take the command at Brest. (*Book of Instructions, &c.* Boulogne, 13th and 20th of August.) Villeneuve put into Corunna, and afterwards into Ferrol, whence he sailed on the 13th of August, with thirty-four ships, gave no orders to the Vigo squadron, and instead of repairing to Brest, according to his last orders and his letters to Rear-admiral Lallemand, he went to Cadiz to get himself blockaded there. Napoleon ordered the Minister of marine to make him a report on the conduct of Admiral Villeneuve, and to bring him before a council of inquiry. (*Book of Instructions, &c.* Boulogne, August 28.) Admiral Rosilly was appointed to succeed him. A victory was now become necessary to Admiral Villeneuve; and he went and fought the disastrous battle of Trafalgar.

We shall not now bring forward any more of the proofs afforded by the various documents in our possession of the wisdom of Napoleon's dispositions for employing the French fleets of men-of-war, in aiding the invasion of England by the army of the coast of Boulogne.

The junction of the French and Spanish squadrons had occasioned too great a loss of time; the descent ought to have been effected, at latest, before the end of August.

The hostile preparations of Austria now assumed so serious a character, that it became necessary to attend to them without delay.

Towards the end of 1804 a memorial by Count Sta *** ***, an Austrian minister, had awakened in Mr. Pitt the genius of coalitions. Shaking off his lethargy, he gave orders, on the 10th of January, to the English legation in Russia, to feel the pulse of the Cabinet of Saint Petersburg, and to fan the sparks of discord which had existed between that court and the Cabinet of the Tuileries ever since the affair of the secularizations of Ratisbon. On the 11th of April the *Treaty of Concert* was signed at Saint Petersburg. In June the Archduke Charles gave up the direction of the affairs of the Austrian monarchy. Austria entered into formal engagements; the conventions and plans of co-operation and military movements were drawn up. It was now necessary to raise the camps of Boulogne. The coalition sustained the surrender of Ulm and the battle of Austerlitz; but Mr. Pitt was delivered, at least for a time, from the fear of an invasion of England.

The ensuing document will shew that the plans of 1805 were only adjourned, and will also give a more correct idea of what Admiral Villeneuve's operation ought to have been.

No. II.

Instructions for the Minister of Marine, relative to the Flotilla.

Paris, Sept. 8, 1815.

I.

I wished to have assembled forty or fifty ships of war in the port of Martinique by combined operations from Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest, to bring them all

at once back to Boulogne, to become, by these means, master of the sea for a fortnight; to have 150,000 men and 10,000 horses encamped on that coast; 3 or 4000 vessels of the flotilla in readiness, and the moment signals should be made of the arrival of my fleet, to land in England and possess myself of London and the Thames. This plan failed of success. But if Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering Ferrol, had contented himself with rallying the Spanish squadron, and had sailed for Brest to join Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have landed; it would have been all over with England.

II.

To succeed in this enterprise, it was necessary to assemble 150,000 men at Boulogne, to have a flotilla of 4000 boats and immense equipments and stores, and to embark them all; and at the same time to prevent the enemy from suspecting my plan. If I accomplished this, it was by doing the reverse of what it appeared that I ought to do. Although fifty ships of the line were to protect the passage of the army to England, it was unnecessary to have any shipping, except transports, at Boulogne: and all that parade of praams, gun-boats, flat-bottomed boats, pinnaces, &c., was perfectly useless. If I had thus collected 4000 transports, the enemy would, no doubt, have perceived that I waited for the arrival of my squadron to attempt the passage, but by constructing praams and gun-boats, and arming all these vessels, I seemed to oppose cannon to cannon, vessels of war to vessels of war, and the enemy were duped. They believed that I intended to force a passage by the mere military strength of the flotilla. The idea of my real plan never occurred to them; and when, on the failure of the movements of

my squadrons, they perceived the danger to which they had been exposed, the councils of London were thrown into consternation, and all people of sense confessed that England had never been so near her ruin.

III.

The scheme was unmasked; the enemy saw that the plan was to effect a landing under the protection of my fleets. The works constructed at Boulogne and at the ports of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, with which they were perfectly acquainted, also convinced them that the flotilla could not sail in a single tide, and could not weather a gale in Boulogne roads. From that time England no longer feared the passage of the flotilla by its own strength, since Admiral Villeneuve's arrangements had proved that I waited for his arrival in order to cross, and since their knowledge of the coast satisfied them that it was impossible for the flotilla to put to sea in a single tide. Thus, from that time, the same men who had declared that it would be impossible to prevent the flotilla from landing, now said that nothing could prevent the arrival of 100 or 150 ships, which would form an expedition of 15 or 16,000 men; but that it was not probable that a more considerable expedition would have a chance of success.

IV.

In this state of affairs, Boulogne roads not being adapted for training my sailors, and the flotilla being no longer able to alarm England with the apprehension of its forcing a passage, it became necessary to resume the plan which had miscarried, to have an army of from 20 to 80,000 men on the heights of Boulogne; to have 500 ships capable of carrying from 40 to 50,000 men and several thou-

sand horses; to have only part of the seamen necessary for manning these ships, and at the moment when my squadrons should commence their movements, to make a levy of fishermen and sailors on the coasts; to re-establish the line of naval defence; embark the artillery and stores; and, in short, make all the demonstrations necessary to show that nothing was waited for, in order to effect the passage, but the presence of a fleet.

V.

The advantages of this plan are immense. In the first place I shall always have a pretext for keeping from 80 to 100,000 men encamped in a healthy situation, easily supplied with provisions, and whence they could speedily advance into Germany; and so great a number of troops being seen from the English coast, with a number of vessels which will allow of my effecting the descent, if ever I am master of the sea for a few days, will have a double effect in England: 1st. It will oblige the English to maintain troops to guard and keep watch against the invasion which has become practicable; and, 2dly, it will compel them to keep a portion of their squadrons in reserve in the Downs or the Thames for this extraordinary emergency.

VI.

If my Scheldt, Toulon, or Brest fleet, were to land 30,000 men in Ireland, England would have reason to fear that after having landed them it would continue its movement, join my other squadrons at a given point, and return to Boulogne to land an expedition on the coast of England. And if my squadrons were to carry the war into the East or West Indies, the English would likewise be fearful that if they sent their fleets to a distance, mine might return

to Boulogne, and finding themselves on their arrival possessed of the dominion of the sea, as we were after the action off Ushant, they might cover the passage of an expedition, the preparations for which had been perceived from England.

VII.

The principal expense of this grand diversion consists in the maintenance of the troops in camp; but the advantages attached to the presence of these troops at that point, in a continental point of view, have already been mentioned; and being obliged to keep up a great number of troops to support our national character, it is indifferent whether they are maintained at Boulogne or elsewhere. As to the 500 ships, we have them; it will be sufficient to have crews for a fourth part of them; and the support of these crews will therefore be all that it will cost France for this means of annoying and attacking her enemy.

VIII.

Let us suppose a fleet of forty sail of the line arrived off Boulogne, and finding there an army of 100,000 men with 10,000 horses; what could it do? What a time would it require for transporting the men, horses, and *materiel* over to England! It would require more than ten voyages. Let us now suppose forty sail of the line arriving off Boulogne, and finding 500 vessels, praams, pinnaces, gunboats, &c., armed or without cannon, all the artillery, stores, men, and horses ready embarked, taking on board part of the men whom the flotilla cannot carry; thus in a few days the whole expedition might be landed in England. This will therefore oblige England to have a land army, and to keep a naval force in reserve. Of all means

that could be proposed for annoying the enemy in this contest, none could be invented that would be less expensive to France and more disastrous to England.

IX.

Having thus acquainted the minister of marine with the purposes for which I intend the flotilla at Boulogne, I wish him to suggest to me the modifications necessary for the accomplishment of my object with the least possible expense.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME

OF MISCELLANIES.

LIST OF PLATES, &c.

TO THE THIRD VOLUME OF MEMOIRS.

Fac Simile of a page of the MSS. written at Saint Helena by General Montholon, dictated by Napoleon, and corrected with his own hand. . . . . — to face the Title.

TO THE THIRD VOLUME OF HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

Fac Simile of a page written in pencil by Napoleon, at Saint Helena, and forming part of his Memoirs. . . . — at the end of the Volume.

Fac Simile of a page of the MSS. written at Saint Helena, by General Montholon, copied fairly from the scarcely legible hand-writing of Napoleon. — to follow the preceding Plate.

3156

LONDON:

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1°. Cette campagne a duré deux mois. tout l'avantage a été pour Turenne. Montécuculli voulait porter la guerre en Alsace par le pont de Strasbourg, dont les habitans lui étaient dévoués. Turenne voulait garantir l'Alsace qu'il avait conquise la campagne précédente, et obliger Montécuculli à repasser la Forêt Noire. Quand il fut tué, Montécuculli repassait les montagnes. Turenne avait donc triomphé.

2°. Montécuculli prit l'initiative, passa sur la rive gauche du Rhin pour y porter la guerre. Turenne resta insensible à cette initiative, il la prit lui même, passa le Rhin et obligea Montécuculli à repasser lui même sur la rive droite. Cette première victoire de la campagne était réelle.

3°. Le Maréchal se campa à Wilstett, couvrant Strasbourg qui était à deux lieues derrière son camp et son pont d'Ottenheim qui était à quatre lieues sur la droite. Montécuculli se plaça derrière le Kintzig à une lieue et demie de l'armée française, appuyé à la place d'Offenbourg, où il avait garnison. La position de Turenne était mauvaise; il devait plutôt livrer bataille que de s'exposer à perdre le pont d'Ottenheim et sa retraite, ou le pont de Strasbourg.

Fac Simile of a page of the M.S.S. written at Saint Helena by General Montholon, as fairly copied from the scarcely

Turenne

1º Cette campagne a duré deux mois, tout l'avantage a été pour Turenne. Montécuculli voulait porter la guerre en Alsace par le pont de Strasbourg dont les habitans lui étaient vendus. Turenne voulait garantir l'Alsace qu'il avait conquise la campagne précédente et obliger Montécuculli à repasser la Forêt Noire. Quand il fut tué, Montécuculli repassait les montagnes. Turenne avait donc triomphé.

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Gravé d'après la page originale par Pierre Tardieu.

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